

Avicenna on Emotions:  
their nature and significance for knowledge and morality

by

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## Abstract:

This dissertation examines the view of emotions found in the writings of the philosopher and medical doctor Avicenna (Ibn Sīna, d. 1098 CE). Avicenna is known to have influenced the course of cognitive psychology in the Muslim East and the Latin West, yet little has been written on his *affective* psychology. Over the course of five chapters, I examine his accounts of animal and human emotions, their physiology, and their relation to voluntary action and moral dispositions. Avicenna is notable for the degree to which he highlights uniquely human emotions, while simultaneously giving attention to the complexity of emotions able to be felt by animals. He also stands out for the way that he integrates his knowledge of physiology into his analysis of philosophical questions.

Emotions, according to Avicenna, are acts of the animal motive faculty, caused by cognitions of varying complexity. For example, uniquely human emotions are caused by cognitions of which only humans are capable, but they are fundamentally actualizations of the same motive faculty shared by animals and humans alike. Emotions are also to be understood as inclinations (Ar: *inbi' āthāt/nizā'āt*), meaning that they *incline* us towards various objects and courses of action, but do not on their own initiate any type of movement.

This dissertation includes a full translation of Avicenna's section on emotion in his *Healing: Rhetoric*.

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## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction: Avicenna on Emotion</b> .....	1
1 How to approach studying emotions in Avicenna.....	1
2 A basic sketch of Avicenna's views on emotions.....	2
3 Avicenna's sources for views on emotions.....	7
4 The variety of discussions of emotions in Avicenna's corpus.....	9
5 Prior work on emotions in Avicenna.....	12
6 Roadmap of following chapters.....	13
<b>Chapter 1: Varieties of Emotions in the Animal Motive Soul</b> .....	17
1.1 Aristotelian Background for the Concept of "Moved-Mover".....	18
1.2 Basic Emotions in Avicenna: Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite.....	21
1.2.1 Innate Attractions and Aversions in All Psychological Faculties.....	24
1.2.2 The Final Objects of Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite.....	25
1.2.3 Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite as Varieties of <i>Shawq</i> .....	30
1.3 Emotions Oriented Towards Internal Pleasures of the Imagination.....	31
1.3.1 Clarifying the Nature of External, Internal and Rational Pleasure.....	35
1.3.2 Varieties of Pleasures and Varieties of Emotions.....	40
1.3.3 Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation.....	41
1.4 Deepening the Category of Emotion: More on the Irascible Faculty.....	42
1.5 Widening the Category of Emotion: Uniquely Human Emotions and Pleasurable Completion-States as Types of Emotions.....	45
1.5.1 Human Emotions.....	46
1.5.2 Pleasurable Completion States.....	47
1.6 The Variety of Emotions Involving the Animal Motive Soul According to Avicenna.....	49
<b>Chapter 2: Avicenna on Uniquely Human Emotions</b> .....	52
2.1 Overview of the Evidence that Human Emotions Involve the Animal Motive Soul.....	53
2.2 The Practical Intellect as a Motive Principle.....	55
2.3 Avicenna's Discussions of Specific Uniquely Human Emotions.....	60
2.3.1 Wonder and Grief.....	61

2.3.2 Shame as a Response to Social Order.....	65
2.3.3 Fear and Hope: Emotions Related to a Uniquely Human Awareness of Time.....	67
2.4 Pleasures of the Rational Soul.....	71
2.5 Ennobling of the Lower Faculties by Higher Faculties.....	73
2.6 Conclusion.....	79
<b>Chapter 3: Emotions and Resolution to Act.....</b>	<b>80</b>
3.1 Introduction: emotion is not sufficient for action.....	80
3.2 Inclination is distinct from resolution.....	81
3.3 Different cognitions for different motive faculties.....	86
3.4 Emotions for means, resolution for ends.....	94
3.5 Evaluations lead to inclination.....	96
3.5.1 Evaluations are about particulars.....	97
3.5.2 Evaluations can be imaginative or reason-based.....	103
3.6 Practical judgments lead to resolution.....	109
3.7 Conclusion: reviewing the distinctions.....	116
<b>Chapter 4: Physiology in Avicenna's Affective Psychology.....</b>	<b>119</b>
4.1 Avicenna's writings on the physiology of emotions.....	120
4.2 The nature of the vital spirit.....	123
4.3 The physiology underlying occurrent emotions.....	129
4.4 Physiology of emotional dispositions.....	131
4.4.1 Observations in need of an explanation.....	131
4.4.2 Physiological dispositions in the context of Avicenna's predecessors.....	134
4.4.3 Dispositions for emotions in Avicenna's medical texts.....	136
4.4.4 Physiological emotional dispositions in relation to moral formation.....	139
4.5 Physiology of emotional effects.....	141
4.5.1 Temperamental effects considered to be primarily of the body.....	141
4.5.2 The distinction between emotions and their temperamental effects.....	145
4.5.3 Further examples of emotional effects.....	147
4.5.4 Emotions and the necessity of some sort of physical effect.....	149
4.5.5 Further effects: action-readiness and cognitive influence.....	153

4.6 Conclusion.....	155
<b>Chapter 5: Emotions in Avicenna's <i>Rhetoric</i>: Analysis.....</b>	<b>157</b>
5.1 Avicenna's <i>Rhetoric</i> in its broader context.....	157
5.2 The structure of Avicenna' discussion of emotions in the <i>Healing: Rhetoric</i> .....	158
5.3 Insights about the nature of emotion from the <i>Healing: Rhetoric</i> .....	161
5.4 Character traits in the <i>Healing: Rhetoric</i> .....	165
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>169</b>
<b>Appendix 1: Translation of the sections on emotions in Avicenna's <i>Healing: Rhetoric</i>.....</b>	<b>171</b>
3.1 On persuasive rhetorical speeches.....	171
3.2 On the types of friendship, and hope and fear, and courage and cowardice.....	178
3.3 On the types of shame, and its opposite, and kindness.....	184
3.4 On having concern and pity for others, and on envy, revenge, jealousy, zeal and scorn.....	189
3.5 On the roots of the differences of people with respect to character traits.....	198
<b>Appendix 2: Emotions in Avicenna's <i>Categories</i>.....</b>	<b>208</b>
<b>Appendix 3: List of emotions mentioned in Avicenna's writings.....</b>	<b>213</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>214</b>

## Introduction Avicenna on Emotion<sup>1</sup>

The growing interest in affective psychology among historians and philosophers alike is understandable: few things affect our quality of life, or lack thereof, more than emotions. Yet little has been written about how such topics were dealt with in Classical Arabic philosophy. One of the barriers to this is that many of the relevant texts remain untranslated. This dissertation, which includes a full translation of Avicenna's section on emotion in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, addresses that lacuna by offering the first detailed explication of Avicenna's theory of emotions. Avicenna (Ibn Sīna, d. 1098 CE) is known to have influenced the course of psychology in the Muslim East and the Latin West.<sup>2</sup> Over the course of five chapters, I examine his accounts of animal and human emotions, their physiology, and their relation to voluntary action and moral dispositions. I show that Avicenna, despite not having a single treatise explicitly dedicated to emotions, has a nuanced affective psychology that can be seen by considering his corpus collectively.

### 1 How to approach studying emotions in Avicenna

A problem facing any study of emotion in the history of philosophy is that it is difficult to locate a historical category that precisely overlaps with our modern category of emotion. But the reason for this lack of overlap is not that pre-modern philosophy did not deal with the same topic. Rather, it is that even today it is notoriously hard to agree upon what counts as an “emotion,” leading to a wide range of theories about what emotions actually are. So it is no use looking for something in the history of philosophy that fills exactly the same role as our modern category for emotions, since we are far from agreement on what that role is.

Yet it is clear that Avicenna and his contemporaries are attempting to explain similar phenomena as modern day emotion theorists if we take our cues from particular emotions. That is, there are certain states (e.g., fear, joy, envy) that many of us seem to agree *are* emotions, though for different reasons, and if we look at how Avicenna engages with terms such as these, a clear starting point can emerge.

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<sup>1</sup> All translations of the Arabic in this dissertation are my own, unless noted.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Black (2000) and Hasse (2000).

Once the texts where emotions are dealt with have been identified, the best way of understanding them is to follow the inner logic of Avicenna's own system. That is, every reader will surely have particular questions they would like answered about what emotions are, or issues one thinks should be discussed. But this dissertation will primarily be an exposition of Avicenna's approach to emotions, taking its cues from what is central to his mode of explanation. For example, by far the largest portion of his work dedicated to emotions is a section in his *Healing: Rhetoric* that delves into definitions of specific emotions, and one might be tempted to start there. However, given that emotions are psychological phenomena, Avicenna holds that they are most fundamentally explained by the major divisions of psychological faculties found in *Healing: Psychology*, so this dissertation will start with the issues he raises in that text. *Healing: Rhetoric* and other texts do add to the picture, but they are secondary from Avicenna's point of view, and should be fit into the schema laid out by the texts on psychology, not the other way around.

Relatedly, but more particular to this dissertation, I should specify that my primary goal here is to present Avicenna's texts and views on emotions, not necessarily to defend them or supply copious analysis not already found in the texts. As will be made clear later in this introduction, very little work has been done on emotions in Avicenna (or on emotions in Classical Arabic philosophy more generally), so my goal is simply to present a comprehensive and coherent account of what is available in Avicenna's corpus on this topic. I will attempt to describe what might have motivated Avicenna's concerns based on issues raised in his own writings or relevant background, as appropriate. But sometimes there are no philosophical puzzles motivating the discussions being presented—there is just Avicenna's attempt to articulate the nature of emotions in as nuanced a way as possible, and my attempt to clearly present what he has said.

## 2 A basic sketch of Avicenna's views on emotions

Before anything else, it will help to have a plain account of what emotions are according to Avicenna, along with explanations for how he uses some key terms. Support for this interpretation will come in the chapters that follow.

The first distinction necessary for understanding what emotions are for Avicenna is his distinction between motive and cognitive psychological faculties. To call something a



*psychological faculty* is just to say that it is an ability that living things have, which inanimate objects do not. In other words, a psychological faculty is an ability to perform some act characteristic of life. For example, all living things (plants, animals and humans) have the faculty of growth, in virtue of which they grow. *Cognitive* psychological faculties are faculties that animals and humans have which help them take in and process information about themselves or the world. *Motive* psychological faculties are faculties that do not deal with information directly, but which are instead responsive to information, in the sense that they help cause voluntary motion.<sup>3</sup> For example, we might have a cognition that a pot of honey is delicious, and a motive faculty would respond to that cognition by instigating us to have a taste.

Emotions fall on the motive side of the cognitive-motive divide. That is, emotions are responses to behaviorally relevant value judgments, and they do not themselves convey any new information. What sort of responses are emotions? They do not instigate any actual movement, but are rather *inclinations* (Ar: *inbi 'āthāt/nizā 'āt'*) towards particular objects and activities. For example, when we judge that some bit of food would be pleasant to eat, we might then have an emotion that inclines us to acquire and eat it. Or if we judge some person to be rude we might then have an emotion that inclines us to shout at them. Emotions do not get us all the way to those particular movements or activity, but they orient us in that direction. Another way of putting the idea that emotions are on the motive side of the cognitive-motive divide would be to say that inclinations are felt, rather than thought. To be angry at someone is not to have the thought, “that person is odious,” but rather to feel the visceral drive to do something about it.<sup>5</sup> To put this in the language of faculties, we would say that animals and humans have an appetitive/inclining faculty, in virtue of which they feel emotions.

<sup>3</sup> “Voluntary” is specified here because involuntary motion is just motion that is not in response to cognition. There is motion involved in activities like blood circulating and the stomach digesting, and these activities only happen in living beings, but since these things happen automatically/naturally, they are not meant to be explained by the motive faculty.

<sup>4</sup> One might have expected the Arabic term *infi'āl* to capture the idea of emotion. While Avicenna does sometimes use *infi'āl* loosely to refer to emotions, in Classical Arabic philosophy *infi'āl* more frequently just captures the idea of “passion/affection,” i.e., an accidental form brought about when one is acted on, or *passive*, in some way. See discussion in “Appendix 2: Emotions in Avicenna's *Categories*” to see how emotions and passions are distinct species of the category quality.

<sup>5</sup> One could object to Avicenna's view on the grounds that not all emotions seem to incline us towards a particular object or activity. For example, sadness might sometimes just be deeply felt, characterized in fact by a *lack* of activity. But, of course, Avicenna could just supply his own interpretation of the phenomena, and characterize the activity in question as, e.g., withdrawal from society. It follows from Avicenna's view that we could always give some such account of what an emotion inclines us towards, though it might not be obvious at first glance.

That emotions have an inclining role is clarified by the fact that Avicenna accounts for actual motion with other sub-faculties of the motive faculty, called the resolving/decisive faculty and the locomotive faculty. As this suggests, Avicenna uses the term motive faculty (*al-quwwa al-muḥarrika*) as a generic term, making the inclining faculty, the resolving faculty, and the locomotive faculty three branches (i.e., sub-faculties) of the motive faculty (or three motive faculties, as he will sometimes say).

The resolving faculty, too, is a non-cognitive faculty, which responds to certain types of cognitions. We can contrast the inclining and resolving motive faculties as follows: an act of the inclining faculty is called an emotion/inclination; an act of the resolving faculty is called a resolution (*ijmāʿ*). Emotions are motive responses to value judgments; resolutions are responses to practical judgments. Practical judgments go one step further than value judgments: an example of a value judgment is the cognition that some bit of food *would be* pleasant, while a practical judgment would be the judgment that *I should seek it out*. Again, we can have the cognition that some person *is offensive* (a value judgment), and also the judgment that *I should shout at them* (a practical judgment). The locomotive faculty (*al-fāʿil*) is the power in the muscles and ligaments to actually carry out said actions.

One final bit of terminology that should be clarified upfront is the notion of being a motive principle (*mabdaʿ muḥarrik*). Sometimes Avicenna will refer to some cognitive faculties, and the motive faculties, all together in a group as motive principles. Motive principle is thus a broader term than motive faculty. It is not extremely well defined, but Avicenna seems to use it to capture both the motive faculties themselves, and some cognitive faculties, insofar as they are capable of triggering motive faculties. It is thus a useful way of picking out all the aspects of our psychology most closely related to facilitating voluntary movement. Cognitive faculties also have plenty of functions *not* associated with motion, such as making mathematical calculations. The thought “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” is not behaviorally relevant in any immediate way, whereas the practical intellect is responsible for making behaviorally relevant practical judgments. So, again, the term “motive principle” captures motive faculties, simply speaking, and cognitive faculties, *insofar as* they are relevant to voluntary motion.

Two charts will help visualize the distinctions made so far. First, we can distinguish the various categories of motive principles as follows, together with some examples that will be discussed in the ensuing chapters:

- Motive principles
  - **Cognitive** faculties (responsible for evaluative and practical judgments)
    - imagination
    - estimation
    - practical intellect
  - **Non-cognitive, motive** faculties
    - The inclining motive faculty (acts of this faculty and its sub-faculties constitute **emotions**)
      - Concupiscible and irascible appetites (the most basic sort of emotions)
      - Capacity for more complex animal emotions
      - Capacity for uniquely human emotions
    - The resolving/decisive motive faculty
    - The locomotive faculty

An aspect of this chart in need of explanation is the reference to various sub-faculties of the inclining motive faculty (concupiscible appetites, humans emotions, etc.). As will be discussed at length in chapter two, Avicenna distinguishes capacities for types of emotions according to their final objects. Concupiscible emotions aim at external pleasure, while irascible emotions aim at dominance. More complex animal emotions aim at pleasures of the imagination, rather than just pleasures of the external senses. For example, the urge to eat a pot of honey is basic concupiscible emotion, involving seeking the satisfaction of the sense of taste, while tenderness towards one's offspring is an emotion whose fulfillment is not achieved merely by the act of some external sense. Similarly, some emotions are focused on objects of which only humans are capable of grasping, like the joy of learning a new abstract idea. Another way of putting this is that different types of emotions are oriented at the perfections of different types of cognitive faculties. Concupiscible appetite seeks the pleasure of the external senses, while some emotions seek pleasures unique to the imagination, and some seek pleasures of the mind.

A second chart will be helpful to visualize how the various motive principles outlined above work together to cause voluntary motion:

	Stage 1 <sup>6</sup>		Stage 2	
Process leading to action	Cognition 1 <b>(evaluation)</b> →	Motive Act 1 →	Cognition 2 <b>(practical judgment)</b> →	Motive Act 2
<b>Animal</b>	Imaginative act	Inclining will (emotion)	Estimative belief	Resolved will
<b>Rational</b>	Conceptual act	Inclining will (emotion)	Intellectual belief	Resolved will

The concepts in this chart will be unpacked more fully in chapter three, but it is helpful to see ahead of time where emotions are supposed to fall in the sequence of cognitions and motive acts leading to voluntary motion. The first stage of psychological activity involved in causing voluntary motion consists of inclining towards some object or activity, which is a non-cognitive act (i.e., an emotion), caused by an evaluative judgment (e.g., that honey would be delicious to eat). The second stage involved in causing voluntary motion is to have a non-cognitive resolution, caused by a practical judgment (e.g., I should go eat that honey). All other things being equal, and provided there are no impediments,<sup>7</sup> a subject with that sequence of cognitive and non-cognitive states will activate their locomotive faculty to in fact go eat some honey. One thing that this chart helps emphasize is that emotions are caused by their respective cognitions, and that the cognitions *precede* those emotions. Again, emotions themselves are non-cognitive.

The chart is divided into the categories “animal” and “rational” because it is possible for the cognitions involved in this sequence to be the product of rational, discursive reasoning (as in humans), or not. In other words, an emotion can be caused by a discursive thought, or by a thought much more like an animal instinct. Animals, lacking the ability to reason, always act or feel emotions based on cognitions that amount to a type of instinct (whether that instinct is passed down through birth into a particular species, or developed through experience). Humans do not always act or feel emotions based on discursive thought, but they can. Humans can also

<sup>6</sup> The items in bold in this chart are terms supplied by me, based on the analysis that will follow in chapter 3. The logic of this chart will be unpacked in more detail in that same chapter.

<sup>7</sup> It is of course possible that one could try to act, but be prevented by external impediments (like being chained in prison) or internal impediments (like the force of habit pulling in the other direction). These factors will be discussed in chapters four and five.

act or feel emotions based on instinct, they are just not making use of their full range of cognitive resources when they do so.

### 3 Avicenna's sources for views on emotions

Avicenna was unique in a number of ways: from the complexity he attributes to animal emotion, to the attention he pays to uniquely human emotions, to the way he integrates his medical and physiological knowledge with his philosophical psychology. But his basic view of emotions is not surprising, given the Aristotelian tradition in which he is working.

Avicenna's chief source for affective psychology would have been the Arabic versions of Aristotle's *De Anima* and the *Parva Naturalia*. These would have been available in Arabic by the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, well before Avicenna. The *De Anima* was available in multiple versions whose quality varied,<sup>8</sup> while the *Parva Naturalia* was passed down to the Classical Arabic philosophers in more of an adaptation that departed from the Aristotelian text in significant ways.<sup>9</sup> These texts will be discussed in more detail as they become relevant in the chapters that follow. The *De Motu Animalium* would of course also have been relevant to Avicenna's discussion, but it does not appear to have been available to him.<sup>10</sup>

Like the late antique commentary culture before him, Avicenna's work is often organized as a development of the Aristotelian corpus. Avicenna eschewed commentary, and instead sought to present new syntheses on scientific topics.<sup>11</sup> He nonetheless used the late antique commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, to understand Aristotle, and took his cues about what topics to discuss from what was discussed by previous Aristotelians. Thus, Aristotelian background, and the commentary tradition on Aristotle, is frequently used as background in this dissertation for the sake of understanding Avicenna. Knowing what Aristotle

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<sup>8</sup> The extant Arabic text of Aristotle's *De Anima* is available in editions by Badawi (1954) and al-Ahwani (1962). However, these editions preserve an earlier, inferior version, not the main edition (translated into Arabic by Ishāq ibn Hunayn) used predominantly by Avicenna. See discussion of the *De Anima*'s translation history in Taylor's introduction to Averroes's *Long Commentary* (2009, lxxvi-ix) and D'Ancona (2013), footnote 68.

<sup>9</sup> The complicated relationship between the original *Parva Naturalia* and the Arabic version is discussed in chapter 4, 4.5.1.

<sup>10</sup> Discussed below in 3.2.

<sup>11</sup> Avicenna's lack of interest in commentary is recorded by his disciple al-Jūzjānī in Jūzjānī's introduction to Avicenna's *Healing*. See Gutas (2014), 32.

or one of the commentators said on some issue is useful for orienting us towards what Avicenna is likely to say.

Avicenna's dependence on the Aristotelian tradition of psychology can be seen in the way that he adopts a basically Aristotelian conception of the soul, in contrast to a Platonic/Galenic conception. The Platonic/Galenic schema was available to Avicenna in Arabic translations of Galen's own works, which included paraphrases of Platonic texts like the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, both of which include an overview of Plato's parts of the soul.<sup>12</sup> What Avicenna objected to in what he understood to be Plato and Galen's view was the way that they seemed to divide the soul into appetitive, spirited, and rational “parts.” This was unhelpful in terms of organization, and too often ended up sounding like there were three “substances” in a single human (localized in the liver, heart and brain, respectively).<sup>13</sup> Contra such a view, Avicenna followed Aristotle in holding that each living being has one soul, with various “faculties” (vegetative, animal or rational). Humans have rational faculties as their species defining trait, plus all the rest. Humans and animals both have animal faculties, similar in a generic sense, but particularized according to each species. For example, animals and humans both have concupiscible and irascible appetite, with the precise character of these faculties differing from species to species.

Avicenna also had access to Stoic psychology, again via Galen, which is of course a tradition rich with debate over the nature of emotions.<sup>14</sup> We discuss some of this as background to particular issues in chapter four. That is, the Stoics wrestled with some features of emotions that needed explanation, like why the same value judgment is able to cause an emotion in one person, and not another, or at one time, and not another. But Avicenna does not appear to have been influenced in any fundamental way by Stoic views on the nature of the soul or emotions.

Amongst Avicenna's predecessors in the Classical Arabic tradition, emotions mostly arise in the context of works that address how we should correct our thoughts in order to dispel unwanted emotions. The main texts of this sort include:

<sup>12</sup> Relevant works by Galen translated into Arabic include his *On Character Traits* [*De Moribus*], *On Affections and Errors of the Soul* [*Aff. Dig./Pecc. Dig.*], *Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body*, *On Plato and Hippocrates*, and compendiums/paraphrases of Plato's *Timaeus* and *Republic*. See Gutas (2010), 8-7-808.

<sup>13</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.7, p. 252.

<sup>14</sup> Galen outlines the debates between Stoics over the nature of emotions in *On Plato and Hippocrates*. See discussion in chapter four, section 4.4.2.

- *Art of Dispelling Sorrows*, Al-Kindī (d. 873)
- *Sustenance of the Soul*, Al-Balkhī (d. 934)
- *Directing Attention to the Way of Happiness*, Al-Fārābī (d. 950)
- Two distinct texts, both titled *Reformation of Morals*, by Yaḥyā ibn ‘adī (d. 974) and Miskawayh (d. 1030)<sup>15</sup>

These works generally express the idea that the rational faculties can be used to *order* the appetitive faculties, either through discipline, or through cognitive therapy. For example, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī focuses on how developing good habits through attending church or mosque, listening to good music, keeping good company, and so on, can improve one's overall happiness.<sup>16</sup> Al-Kindī meets negative emotions more head on with countervailing beliefs: don't be sad about misfortunes, because since misfortunes are a necessary part of life, wishing you would never experience misfortunes is tantamount to wishing that you didn't exist.<sup>17</sup> It is possible that this whole genre is to some degree a product of the influence of the Stoic tradition, but there is no direct evidence of Stoic texts on cognitive therapy having been translated into Arabic.<sup>18</sup>

In any case, Avicenna himself produced no work focused on cognitive therapy, so although it is a rich line of thought in the Classical Arabic tradition, it does not constitute a major source for the present discussion. The texts in the tradition of cognitive therapy typically begin with a basic overview of the nature of the soul (along Platonic or Aristotelian lines, depending on the author), and then focus on issues more specific or practical than those Avicenna takes up. Avicenna was focused primarily on the nature of the emotions as an aspect of philosophical psychology and physiology, as we will see.

## 4 The variety of discussions of emotions in Avicenna's corpus

Avicenna's works in which we find discussions of emotions fall into roughly four categories:

- Philosophical psychology
- Medical/biological texts
- *Healing: Categories*
- Works related to rhetoric and poetics

<sup>15</sup> After these thinkers, and after Avicenna, major strides in the field of emotion come by way of al-Ghazālī, whose work integrates emotions into an ethic more explicitly influenced by Islam. On this, see Fakhry (1994), chapter 9, and, more recently, Kukkonen (2016).

<sup>16</sup> Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (2002) 4.11-12.

<sup>17</sup> Al-Kindī (2012) 6.8.

<sup>18</sup> Gutas (1994), 4959-4962.

Avicenna's texts on philosophical psychology contain the most relevant material, particularly in Avicenna's various summative works on the nature of the soul. These texts are primarily relevant for their discussions of the motive faculty, of which emotions are acts, and the cognitive faculties, which lead to emotions. Avicenna's first philosophical treatise, *Compendium on the Soul* (c. 999 CE)<sup>19</sup>, contains discussions of all these faculties, but in far less detail than his later works. He divides the motive faculty into two branches, the concupiscible and the irascible, which exist because animals—unlike plants—need a way to seek out things that are useful, and drive away things that are harmful.<sup>20</sup> He says in the *Compendium* that in non-rational animals, the motive faculty is the “end [*al-ghāya*]” with respect to the cognitive faculties, since the cognitive faculties exist in order to provide information that leads to motion, whereas in rational animals the motive faculty exists to carry out the judgments of the rational faculties.<sup>21</sup>

Far more detail is provided in Avicenna's magnum opus on psychology, *Healing: Psychology* (c. 1020-1027). As a whole, the multi-volume *Healing* (in which *Psychology* is contained) is organized into four parts, beginning with logic, then physics, mathematics, and finally metaphysics. *Psychology* is the sixth work in the physics division. It is preceded in the physics division of the *Healing* by various works on the elements, matter, change, and it is followed by books focused on plants and animals.<sup>22</sup> *Psychology* itself is organized into five books:

- Book 1: The nature of the soul in general
- Book 2: The vegetative faculties and the external senses, excluding vision
- Book 3: Vision
- Book 4: The internal senses (imagination, estimation, etc.) and the motive faculty
- Book 5: The rational faculties

The motive faculty is discussed in 4.4, the final section of the fourth book. Avicenna's concerns in 4.4, as with the rest of *Psychology*, are broadly modeled on those in Aristotle's *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*, with some additions, as will be noted throughout the chapters in this dissertation. For example, 4.4 in turn can be broken down into roughly the following sections (this is an approximation, as Avicenna's text does not contain further divisions):

- 4.4a: discussion of the various branches of the motive faculty found in animals, including, but not limited to, concupiscible and irascible appetite.

<sup>19</sup> For dating, see Gutas (2014), 165.

<sup>20</sup> Avicenna, *Compendium* (1875), 352.

<sup>21</sup> Avicenna, *Compendium* (1875), 353.

<sup>22</sup> Gutas (2014), 105.



4.4b: discussion of other psychological states, such as sleeping and waking, health and sickness, modeled on some concerns from *Parva Naturalia*.<sup>23</sup>

4.4c: discussion of the unique abilities found in the “prophetic” state of the motive faculties, such as the ability to affect motion at a distance.

It is thus the first part of chapter 4 (labelled 4.4a), in which the most important, guiding texts for this dissertation are found.

Three other philosophical psychology texts will be important for this topic. These are distinct from the preceding in that they are not as tightly tied to the organization of the Aristotelian sciences. First, we have the appendix to the physics section of Avicenna's late *Remarks and Admonitions* (c. 1030-1034). *Remarks* as a whole is organized according to the Aristotelian sciences, but the appendix to the physics section contains discussions of a variety of topics related to the motive faculty that are not discussed elsewhere. Second, we have the *Marginal Glosses* (c. 1029), a record of Avicenna's attempt to grapple with and paraphrase the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *De Anima*. It is thought to have been originally written by Avicenna in the margins of his copy of Aristotle, hence the title. Finally, there is his early *Treatise on Love* (from a similar period as the *Compendium*). In the *Treatise*, Avicenna broadly discusses various beings' inborn love (i.e., their teleology, or “what they tend towards”); from the inborn “love” that rocks have for downward motion, on up to God's “love” for God's own sheer, perfect essence.<sup>24</sup> Of particular interest for our purposes in the *Treatise* is his characterization of the aims of the motive faculties, and how they relate to the goals of other faculties. These three texts will all be used throughout the dissertation to provide insight into emotions as part of Avicenna's philosophical psychology, but it is the *Healing: Psychology* 4.4 which makes most clear Avicenna's priorities and mature way of thinking about emotions.

As for Avicenna's writings that relate to the physiology of the emotions, these include primarily *Healing: Psychology* 5.8, the *Canon of Medicine*, and *Cardiac Drugs*. That Avicenna thought there was an overlap in the concerns of philosophical psychology and medicine/biology can be seen in the fact that the final chapter of *Healing: Psychology*, 5.8, provides an overview of

<sup>23</sup> This is discussed more in section 4.5.1.

<sup>24</sup> On the Necessary Existent's love for its own essence, see also Avicenna (2005) 8.7.

physiology that Avicenna deems relevant to the study of the soul.<sup>25</sup> Yet most of what is in fact relevant for our purposes is found in the latter two texts just mentioned.

The *Canon* is Avicenna's magnum opus on the medical practice, and contains specific etiology for certain emotional disorders (like melancholy), along with advice for how to treat them.

*Cardiac Drugs* is a work focused on the medical conditions related to the heart. As will be seen, Avicenna believes that the seat of emotions is the vital spirit that is in the heart, and much of the *Cardiac Drugs* is taken up with discussing what accounts for certain emotional dispositions, and how emotions affect the body.

These texts on physiology will be introduced further at the beginning of chapter four, but one thing to note for now is that they will be consulted primarily for how they relate to philosophical psychology. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate the specifics of Avicenna's medical recommendations. Rather, chapter four will be taken up with explaining what philosophical issues Avicenna thinks are best illuminated by attending to physiology. For example, we might wonder what it is that causes one person to feel shock, and another not to, when they both evaluate some situation as horrific. In some cases, the answer might simply boil down to their physical temperaments.

The final texts that need to be mentioned in the context of emotions are three texts from the first, logical part of the *Healing*, namely, the *Categories*, *Poetics*, and *Rhetoric*. All of these texts have something to say about the nature of emotions, or specific emotions, and I will analyze a translation of the section on emotions from *Healing: Rhetoric* in chapter five. Like Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Avicenna's section on emotions in this text primarily consists of a discussion of specific emotions, with an eye towards how a rhetorician can stir them up, and what sort of effect that would have on their audience.

## 5 Prior work on emotions in Avicenna

The need for a study such as this dissertation is clear from the influence Avicenna had on the field of psychology, plus the fact that little work has been done unpacking his affective

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<sup>25</sup> *Psychology* 5.8 is obviously found in a work overtly concerned with philosophical psychology, but in and of itself it is primarily concerned with physiology.

psychology. Much has been done to examine Avicenna's cognitive psychology, especially his accounts of the imaginative/cogitative, estimative and intellectual faculties.<sup>26</sup> The influence of those cognitive faculties on the Latin West has also been traced in detail.<sup>27</sup> But Avicenna's affective psychology, which includes his appetitive/motive faculties, under which falls the concept of emotion, has not been given the same sort of attention.

As for what has been written thus far, there is an overview of Avicenna's views on emotions in Simo Knuuttila's *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*.<sup>28</sup> This dissertation does not disagree with anything there, but Knuuttila's overview only focused on a small subset of Avicenna's writings on emotions, confined to the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De Anima*. There is also some analysis of the concepts of inclination and resolution in Gätje (1975) and Van Riet (1967).<sup>29</sup> But, again, these concepts need to be unpacked in more detail, and fitted in the context of Avicenna's broader work on affective psychology.<sup>30</sup>

There is no doubt that Avicenna spent more of his time analyzing the nature of cognition, and this aspect of his work seems to have had more of an impact, than what he wrote on affective psychology. So the focus thus far has been warranted. But what he says about emotions is nonetheless unique, detailed, and worth studying on its own. Probing the *influence* of his affective psychology will of course have to wait until his affective psychology is understood on its own terms.

## 6 Roadmap of following chapters

What follows is a summary of the parts of this dissertation, which reiterates some of the overview material from section 2, above:

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<sup>26</sup> See Black (1993), (2013) and (2014).

<sup>27</sup> See Black (2000) and Hasse (2000).

<sup>28</sup> Knuuttila (2004) *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 218-225.

<sup>29</sup> Their work discussed at the beginning of chapter 3.

<sup>30</sup> Insofar as I argue that Avicenna defines an emotion as an inclination, prior work on Avicenna's physics might seem relevant (for example, chapter 4 of Lammer (2016)). However, the term “inclination” in the context of physics is typically *mayl*, used to describe something's tendency on account of its nature (like a rock's downward tendency). This is distinct from the terms used for inclination in the context of emotions (*nizā'āt/inbi'āthāt*), where such inclinations are for and in response to cognized objects. These latter terms are discussed at length in chapter 1, especially at the end.

In chapter one of this dissertation I argue that Avicenna's main account of animal emotions (in his *Healing: Psychology* 4.4) shows that they are construed as inclinations (*nizā'āt/inbi'āthāt*) in response to positive or negative value judgments. The notion of "inclination" is intentionally broader than terms used by Avicenna's predecessors (Gr. *orexis*, Ar. *shawq*), because Avicenna wants to articulate a range of affective states of which animals are capable beyond Aristotelian concupiscible and irascible appetite. Concupiscible and irascible appetite relate to pleasures and pains appreciable by the external senses, but animals also incline towards things like freedom, companionship, and aesthetic experience. Further, animals experience varieties of pleasure, which Avicenna regards as a type of inclination, insofar as it inclines us to keep going in some activity.

In chapter two I argue that Avicenna's account of uniquely human emotions (in *Psychology* 5.1 and his *Treatise on Love*) is highly integrated with his account of animal emotion. Animal emotions are acts of the motive faculty, and are localized in the heart and vital spirits, the organs most responsible for action-readiness. Uniquely human emotions involve actualizations of this same hardware, but their cognitive causes differ in that they are significantly more complex. For example, shame is fundamentally an act of the shared animal motive faculty, but is caused by a cognition related to social norms of which non-human animals are not capable. Avicenna articulates a standard account of how reason can be said to govern animal emotions (i.e., using self-control to be less angry), but he also attends in detail to emotions that seem to have no parallel in animals, such as wonder, anxiety, shame, and future-oriented fear and desire.

Of course, to incline on account of some value judgment is not the same thing as to act, so the question naturally arises of how emotions relate to voluntary action. In chapter three, I argue that Avicenna makes a distinction between the inclination to act (which is what an emotion is) and the resolution to act (which leads directly to voluntary motion). Both inclination and resolution are acts of the animal motive faculty, but they have differing cognitive causes. Inclinations (i.e., emotions) are caused by simple evaluations of objects, while resolutions are caused by reaching the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Humans arrive at the conclusion of a practical syllogism through deliberation, whereas Avicenna says that animals arrive at something analogous through a more instinctual process.

In chapter four I flesh out the aspects of physiology that are relevant to Avicenna's philosophy of emotion. That is, in Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology*, two issues arise which Avicenna thinks are actually best illuminated by considering physiology. On the one hand, we might wonder why the same evaluative judgment sometimes causes an emotion, sometimes not, and, when it does, why the emotion varies in strength. For example, two people evaluate a situation as dangerous, yet one person cowers, and the other is brave. If we stipulate that the judgment in these cases is the same, the best explanation for their different responses has to do with their temperamental dispositions. A second issue related to physiology concerns the nature of emotion more generally, i.e., what sort of physical changes we think are *constitutive* of an emotion, and which are merely the emotion's *effects*. For Avicenna, the changes underlying an occurrent emotion are actually quite narrow in scope (basically limited to changes in the heart, and the vital spirit in the heart), whereas other changes we often associate with emotions (like going pale from fear) would be considered effects. In chapter four I touch on the issue of how a medical doctor might diagnose and treat emotional disorders, but I do not delve deeply into that issue, as I am primarily concerned with emotions from the point of view of philosophical psychology.

Such are the key philosophical issues Avicenna deals with in relation to emotions. Chapter five and appendix one focus on the section on emotions from Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*. Chapter five is the analysis, while appendix one is the translation. As mentioned earlier, this is not the sort of text in which would expect to find Avicenna's primary account of the nature of emotions. Nonetheless, it allows for some interesting supplemental discussions, touching on the way that emotions affect cognition, their positive or negative hedonic quality, the objects of specific emotions, and the relation between emotions and psychological character traits.

Similarly, Avicenna's *Healing: Categories* is not as fundamental to this discussion as his psychological texts, but it does provide some insight into, unsurprisingly, how we should categorize emotions. Thus, appendix two looks at emotions from the point of view of the *Categories*, i.e., as types of “qualities.” Specifically, they are transitory, passing “conditions”, in contrast to more stable qualities like “habits.”

Appendix three consists of a chart listing the various specific emotions discussed by Avicenna, keyed to their locations in his works. This dissertation does not spend much time analyzing

specific emotions, nor does Avicenna (outside of the *Healing: Rhetoric*). But appendix three serves as a useful guide for seeing at a glance where emotions are in fact discussed in his corpus.

## Chapter 1 Varieties of Emotions in the Animal Motive Soul

A desire for food and fear of a predator. Wonder at art and a longing for freedom. Some would insist on calling the latter two states “emotions,” and the former “animal appetites.” Naturally, how we parse this depends on what we say emotions are. If emotions are something more elevated, constituted by evaluative judgments, while animal appetites are just hardwired impulses towards specific objects, then such a distinction makes sense.<sup>31</sup> Avicenna—notable within classical Arabic philosophy for his optimism about what animal nature is capable of—approaches the matter differently. But this is not because he thinks there is no difference between animal and human emotional life. Rather, it’s because he thinks that states seemingly as different as the above-mentioned pairs are fundamentally actualizations of the same faculty, shared by all animals, human and non-human. That is, all these states are *inclinations* (translating *inbi’āth* or *nizā’*), with cognitive causes of varying complexity. They are emotions insofar as they incline their subject to various acts and objects, and insofar as they are inclinations, they are basically alike.

In what follows I will argue that Avicenna’s understanding of emotion captures a wider range of affective states than had previously been recognized in his tradition, by showing how Avicenna deemphasizes traditional Aristotelian terminology (Gr. *orexis*, Ar. *shawq*), and instead makes use of this idea of “inclination (again, *inbi’āth* or *nizā’*)” as that which is fundamental to being an emotion. My argument will largely be borne out through a detailed contextualization and analysis of some difficult texts that have not thus far been treated in detail: Avicenna’s most comprehensive account of the motive faculty, in his *Healing: Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> See Martha Nussbaum, developing a theory she takes to be in the Stoic tradition, in Nussbaum (2001) 131.

<sup>32</sup> The first scholar to draw attention to Avicenna’s usage of *inbi’āth* and *nizā’* was Helmut Gätje, in “Zur Psychologie der Willenshandlungen in der islamischen Philosophie,” pp. 357-359. What I present here will not disagree with Gätje, but it will show that Avicenna’s picture is complex in ways Gätje’s brief treatment does not address.

We will see Avicenna begin by discussing basic concupiscible and irascible emotions<sup>33</sup>, and then slowly broaden the category of emotion to include emotions that are *like* concupiscible emotions, but which have what he calls “internal” goods as their object, as opposed to “external” goods. From there, I will show how he expands the category of emotion to include affective states unique to humans, and then, finally, varieties of pleasure. These are all presented as states of the animal motive faculty, which makes the last of these especially unexpected, since pleasure is a completion-state, not a state wherein any new object is desired. But since inclination is a broader concept than desire or appetite, all these states end up able to be grouped together in a meaningful way.

## 1.1 Aristotelian Background for the Concept of "Moved-Mover"

In its most basic terms, an inclination is just some sort of non-cognitive state that inclines its subject towards or away from some object (e.g., a bear's desire for the honey in the honeypot is a type of inclination). “Inclination” is roughly synonymous with terms like desire and appetite, but for Avicenna these latter terms apply to more specific types of inclination, and inclination is the generic term. Inclinations, being non-cognitive states, are caused by cognitions that evaluate an object in some way (e.g., the bear judges that the honey would be delicious). And these non-cognitive inclinations are part of the causal chain leading to actual motion (e.g., the bear sticking

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<sup>33</sup> The structure of this chapter is shaped by the order in which Avicenna presents concepts in *Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4, supplemented by additional texts along the way that are necessary for understanding them. Thus, some of the rationale for distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible faculty are not discussed until well after the initial distinctions are made. But we can briefly summarize that rationale here: the concupiscible faculty is the faculty responsible for our attraction to sensible pleasures, and our aversion to sensible pains (these are the most basic types of animal emotions/inclinations). The irascible faculty is posited to explain our urge to dominate potential harms, and avoid defeat/humiliation.

One might wonder whether the irascible faculty's emotions/inclinations could just be explained by the concupiscible faculty, calling into question the need for the irascible faculty in the first place. For example, when an animal sees a predator, its choice to either attack and defend itself, or run away, could perhaps just be explained in terms of a desire to avoid pain. Yet while the second of these (running away) could be so explained, attacking and defending behavior only *indirectly* involves avoiding pain. Directly, attacking and defending oneself might actually temporarily *increase* pain. Or again, if you upset a dog by taking its food away, and then give it back, the dog might still be upset with you, even though you are no longer posing a threat or withholding pleasure. This is why we need to say that there exists an irascible faculty, with an attraction to *dominance*, and an aversion to its opposite.

And once we have said that, another reason for distinguishing these two faculties is clear: dominance (and its opposite) is a more abstract goal than sensible pleasure and pain, requiring more advanced cognitive abilities. Thus, as we will see, some animals (like sea sponges, to use Aristotle and Avicenna's example) only have the concupiscible faculty, and are indeed guided by mere attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. But higher cognitive abilities allow for more complex behavior, like male deer locking antlers to prove their dominance during mating season.



its paw in the honeypot). Inclinations on their own do not cause movement, but they orient us towards objects in ways that we might eventually choose to act on. To summarize: the bear judges the honey would be delicious, then inclines towards it (i.e., has an emotion), then acts on that inclination.

This basic picture is shared by Avicenna and Aristotle. But we can be a bit more specific, showing how this maps onto the terminology Aristotle uses in the *De Anima*. That is, Avicenna's notion of "inclination" fills roughly the same role in his psychology as that of "moved-mover" for Aristotle, being an elaboration of the terrain covered by Aristotle in *De Anima* 3.9-11.<sup>34</sup> After this section, we will not make extensive use of this "moved-mover" terminology, instead relying on the basic picture sketched above. But it is worth briefly discussing the technical terms found in the original source for the basic picture.

At the start of *De Anima* 3.9 Aristotle divides animal and human psychological faculties into two kinds: those enabling cognition, and those enabling voluntary motion.<sup>35</sup> Aristotle says that voluntary motion involves four things: two causes of movement, the means of movement, and the moving subject. This is seen in the following text, where Aristotle initially says there are "three factors," but he then specifies that the first factor is in fact of of "two kinds":

But movement involves three factors: first the moving cause, secondly the means by which it produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds: one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved. The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved is the animal.<sup>36</sup>

The last two factors involved in voluntary motion are the most straightforward: in the case of animal motion, the *subject* of movement is the whole animal, and the *means* of movement are the various organs and muscles that operate by pushing and pulling. Shortly after this text, Aristotle argues that there must be a central axis for all this pushing and pulling, which later commentators understood to be the heart.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium* is of course another key text for the motive faculty, but—despite Averroes' later awareness of *De Motu* in broad strokes—the text itself does not seem to have ever been translated into Arabic. See Gutas (2014) 361, n. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

<sup>36</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

<sup>37</sup> Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 223.

Prior to the means and the subject of motion is the cause of motion, which Aristotle breaks down into the practical good and appetite. Aristotle does not explain what he means by “practical good” in this context, but Themistius interprets him to simply mean a good that is relevant to and within reach of some agent, as opposed to goodness in some unqualified and universal sense.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias understands the starting point of movement to mean some external object understood as something to be pursued or avoided.<sup>39</sup> This would make a “practical good” any specific object, understood in such a way as to be relevant to appetite. For example, not *the* good, but *a* good, like food; and not just food, but food *grasped as* pleasant or nutritious. The reason the practical good is an “unmoved-mover” is because it is the end of action. In a commentary attributed to John Philoponus, the notion of something being an unmoved-mover is explained by pointing out the sense in which God is called an unmoved-mover: God is not changed, but is rather the goal towards which changeable things direct their actions.<sup>40</sup> So the practical good is an unmoved-mover because an object, when evaluated in a certain light, can be the goal for motion.<sup>41</sup>

The proximate cause of motion, on the other hand, is a *moved*-mover, and it is this component of Aristotle’s psychological schema that has traditionally been associated with emotion. Aristotle himself explains what he means by “moved-mover” as follows: “for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement.”<sup>42</sup> The first half of this simply tells us that appetite is one of the causes of motion, the second half tells us that appetite causes motion by itself being a kind of motion, or change. Just like how the sense in which practical good remains *unchanged* helps us understand the sort of mover it is, so here the sense in which appetite *is* a change helps us understand why it is a mover. Again, (Pseudo) John Philoponus attempts to explain the core of what it is to be a moved-mover when he says that

<sup>38</sup> Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 220.

<sup>39</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* (1980) 98, section 2.89.

<sup>40</sup> See (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 39, section 587.5ff.

<sup>41</sup> Towards the end of the section on voluntary movement, there is a text where it might seem that Aristotle is identifying the unmoved-mover with the cognition, not the object, saying “the cognitive faculty is not moved but remains still (3.11, 434a).” But, of course, cognition is a kind of change, which means it is not the best candidate for being the unmoved-mover, precisely speaking. So what must be meant here is that the object, *as presented by some cognitive, evaluative act*, is the end which to which appetite responds, and that cognition does not have to undergo any further change in order to serve its purpose. The process of cognition is not the object of appetite, but is rather a necessary condition for the object to be relevant to appetite. In other words, one reaches out not for the thought of their object as pleasant, but rather just for the pleasant object. The thought of the object as pleasant merely occasions that reaching out.

<sup>42</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

appetite is a change “insofar as it reaches out.”<sup>43</sup> This is an appeal to the origins of the word appetite (or *orexis*). As Martha Nussbaum relates, prior to Aristotle, the verb *oregô* was fairly common outside of philosophical literature, and was used to refer to a literal reaching out (with one’s hand, for example) towards some physical object (like a cup).<sup>44</sup> Aristotle is obviously not using *orexis* in this context to refer to the literal, external reaching, since he is focused on the internal causes of motion, rather than motion itself. Nussbaum considers it a major contribution of Aristotle’s to use *orexis* to refer to an inner reaching out, which is the cause for action in the more literal, prior sense of the verb. If we are talking about an appetite to avoid, rather than to pursue, then the distance of Aristotle’s usage from the literal sense of *orego* is even more clear.

So the four factors involved in movement can be summarized as follows:

- 1) unmoved-mover: a practical good, i.e., an object cognized/represented in the subject
- 2) moved-mover: an act of the motive faculty/appetite, in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole<sup>45</sup>

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle further subdivides appetite into concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), irascible appetite (*thumos*), which are moved-movers in response to objects of sensation, and will or choice (*boulêsis*), which is in response to an object of thought<sup>46</sup>. But he is less concerned in this text to define and distinguish these appetites from one another than to clarify the role of appetite in general as a cause of movement.

## 1.2 Basic Emotions in Avicenna: Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

The portions of Avicenna’s *Healing: Psychology (Al-Shifā’ : Kitāb al-Nafs)* where he treats emotions, and questions similar to those of *De Anima* 3.9-11, are his discussions of the animal motive faculty (*al-quwwa al-muḥarrrika*), and the practical intellect considered as a motive principle (*mabda’ muḥarrrik*). These terms will be discussed at length in chapter three, but for

<sup>43</sup> (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 41, section 591.10ff.

<sup>44</sup> Nussbaum (2001) pp. 130–31.

<sup>45</sup> Avicenna most explicitly replicates this fourfold schema in *Healing: Metaphysics*, section 6.5.3. Some of the precise terminology differs between Aristotle and Avicenna. For example, Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences in labeling ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

now we can say that a motive *principle* is a broader term than motive *faculty*. Motive principles are any faculties directly relevant to causing voluntary motion. This can include cognitive faculties (such as the practical intellect), and non-cognitive, motive faculties (such as the concupiscible appetite). To call a cognitive faculty a motive principle is just to refer to that cognitive faculty insofar as it is able to trigger non-cognitive, motive faculties. So something can be a motive principle without also being a motive faculty (e.g., practical intellect), but every motive faculty (e.g., concupiscible appetite) is a motive principle.

Avicenna introduces the motive faculty in *Healing: Psychology* 1.5, in his initial enumeration of all psychological faculties, where motive faculties are distinguished at first from the apprehending (*mudrika*) faculties.<sup>47</sup> The motive faculty, next, is divided into two types: the motive faculty as inclining (*bā'itha*)<sup>48</sup> with respect to movement, and the motive faculty in the sense of actually moving (*fā'ila*).<sup>49</sup> The inclining (*bā'itha*) side is roughly synonymous with Aristotle's idea of moved-mover, while the actually moving side is constituted by the muscles and ligaments, which Aristotle called the means of motion. So the inclining side instigates movement, and the "actually moving" side carries it out.<sup>50</sup> As we will see, actualizations of the inclining (*bā'itha*) side of the motive faculty constitute emotions, and so emotions on Avicenna's schema can be thought of as fundamentally inclining with respect to movement. This does not mean that emotions are always *successful* in triggering movement, just that they incline towards it. The terms inclination and emotion can thus be used interchangeably when discussing Avicenna's views.

Avicenna's first foray into explaining varieties of emotions in *Psychology* begins by distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Given that he is working in the

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<sup>47</sup> Lest this sound overly obscure, we should recall that talk of "psychological faculties" is just a way of describing the sort of abilities that living organisms have. One of the things some living organisms can do is engage in voluntary motion, and the "motive faculty" is an umbrella term for any faculty involved in voluntary motion.

<sup>48</sup> Avicenna elsewhere further subdivides the inclining side into inclination to act *and* resolution to act (*ijmā'*). For example, Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 25, page 435.

<sup>49</sup> A more literal translation of *fā'ila* would be "acting" or "doing," but "moving" is appropriate because the act in question is specifically physical motion (from place to place, or in place).

<sup>50</sup> In his *Psychology*, Avicenna is most interested in discussing motive faculty in the sense of being a motivating moved-mover, i.e., in terms of emotions. Like Aristotle, who spent more time talking about the means of movement elsewhere, for example in his *De Motu*, Avicenna discusses means of motion in his medical and biological works.

Aristotelian and Neoplatonic tradition, this is not surprising.<sup>51</sup> But we need to understand *how* Avicenna goes about introducing the motive faculty here in 1.5, as it will help us see how he identifies and contrasts other varieties of inclinations beyond concupiscible and irascible appetites later in 4.4:

The motive faculty has two divisions: the motive faculty insofar as it instigates movement, and the motive faculty insofar as it carries out [movement]. The motive faculty insofar as it instigates is the appetitive [*al-nuzū 'iyya al-shawqiyya*<sup>52</sup>] faculty, and this is the faculty that, when a form to be sought or to be avoided [*šūra maṭlūba aw mahrūba 'anhā*] is inscribed in the imagination—a faculty we'll discuss soon—it [the appetitive power] impels the other [loco]motive power—that we're about to discuss—towards movement.

And the appetitive faculty [*al-quwwa al-nuzū 'iyya al-shawqiyya*<sup>53</sup>] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [*al-shahwāniyya*] faculty, which is a faculty that instigates motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍarūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan*], seeking pleasure [*al-ladhdha*]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [*al-ghaḍabiyya*] faculty, is the faculty which instigates motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [*al-ghalaba*].<sup>54</sup>

Two points need to be observed in this text to understand Avicenna's general approach to emotions: 1) the inclining motive faculty (in a generic sense, as described in the first paragraph), is the faculty responsible for instigating us towards objects of attraction, and away from things to be avoided, but 2) the concupiscible and irascible appetites each have their own particular objections of objects of attraction, constituting their final object (pleasure and dominance, respectively). In other words, it is *not* the case that the concupiscible faculty is, say, the faculty for attraction, and the irascible faculty is the faculty for, say, aversion. Rather, both of these faculties are responsible for *attraction* to a defined type of object. By understanding the sense in which the concupiscible and irascible faculties have final objects, and what those objects are, we'll be able to better see the *further* distinctions Avicenna makes between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, since he appeals to distinct final objects for distinct types of emotions. (1) and (2) will be explained in more detail in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 that follow presently.

<sup>51</sup> The concupiscible and irascible faculties have their roots in Plato's appetitive and spirited parts of the soul, which were two parts of the tripartite division of the soul (see Knuuttila (2004) 7). Aristotle also speaks of appetitive and spirited parts of the soul, but more often just an appetitive faculty that has acts such as desire and anger (ibid., 26-27).

<sup>52</sup> This is the same faculty as what I called the inclining (*bā'itha*) motive faculty above. There is some variation in how Avicenna refers to the inclining motive faculty, but it is normally very clear when he is referring to the inclining faculty in generic terms, and when he is talking about specific branches/sub-faculties, such as the concupiscible and irascible appetites.

<sup>53</sup> See prior note.

<sup>54</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, p. 41.

### 1.2.1 Innate Attractions and Aversions in All Psychological Faculties

A crucial point needed to understand Avicenna's description of concupiscible and irascible emotions in *Psychology* 1.5, and how he categorizes further types of emotions (that we will see later on) is as follows: voluntary motion (motion in response to cognition) and involuntary, natural motion (motion that does not involve cognition) both involve faculties that have attractions and aversions. In talking about motive faculties, he is talking about faculties most directly responsible for voluntary motion, and these faculties themselves have natural, *involuntary* attractions and aversions. In one of Avicenna's early works, *Treatise on Love*, he makes the following point about how all psychological faculties incline towards their final objects, and away from the opposites of those objects:

There is no doubt that each of the animal faculties is characterized by a type of behavior, impelled by an innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*]. If animal faculties did not possess a natural aversion [*nufūr tabī'ī*] whose principle is an innate hatred [*baghda gharīziyya*], and a natural desire [*tawaqān tabī'ī*] whose source is innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*], then their existence in the animal body would be superfluous. And it is apparent that that is the case for each of the divisions [of psychological faculties].<sup>55</sup>

As Avicenna's examples in *Treatise on Love* go on to show, this is essentially a statement that every psychological faculty is meant for some particular final object, or end, and is in a state of completion when it attains that object. The external and internal senses are made for perceiving certain types of sensibles, and are averse to perceiving others. This is *natural* attraction and aversion and, like the stone's natural attraction towards the earth, it results in natural, *involuntary* movements, as when the eye flinches at something that is too bright. The only objects that can naturally attract or cause aversion to some faculty are those specifically in the domain that faculty is designed for.

But animals are capable of voluntary motion, and this is due to faculties that have attraction and aversion in response to *cognized* objects. This is what Avicenna is trying to capture in *Psychology* 1.5 when he says that the motive faculty is the faculty that responds to things inscribed in the imagination as “to be sought or to be avoided.” If all he were saying here is that the motive faculty is attracted to its object, and averse to the opposite of its object, this would be nothing new—it would be natural attraction and aversion. What makes the motive faculties unique is that they respond to the specific objects of *any* faculty, provided they are cognized as

<sup>55</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.

“to be sought or to be avoided.” Rather than just being in response to objects that are naturally attractive or repugnant to some faculty, there is an added layer of processing: one person might cognize a bit of food as attractive, another might see it as repugnant. There follows from that evaluative cognition an attraction or repulsion in the motive faculty. It's the motive faculty's aversion or attraction to things *cognized* in a particular way that makes it a capacity for voluntary motion.

So when Avicenna says in the text from *Psychology* 1.5 that there are at least two branches of the motive faculty, he is not saying that there is one faculty for “seeking,” and one faculty for “avoiding.” Based on the fact that the concupiscible faculty is the faculty associated explicitly with pleasurable things, and the irascible with harmful things, it would be tempting to associate the former with attraction, the latter with aversion, and to assimilate all motivation related to negative objects with the irascible faculty. But we know from the more general facts just mentioned about how *all* faculties are structured that both branches have a certain function, and will lead to some emotions that constitute attractions to their final object, and some emotions that are aversions to its opposite. Clarifying that every faculty has attractions and aversions allows us to more precisely specify the objects of concupiscible and irascible emotions, as follows.

### 1.2.2 The Final Objects of Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

Knowing that both concupiscible and irascible faculties have objects to which they are attracted as *final* objects, we need to read the text from *Psychology* 1.5 with a view to characterizing what those objects are. But this requires some careful parsing, since Avicenna mentions several things about each faculty. Here is the relevant text again:

And the appetitive faculty [*al-quwwa al-nazū'iyya al-shawqiyya*] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [*al-shahwāniyya*] faculty, and it is a faculty that incites motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍarūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan*], seeking pleasure [*al-ladhdha*]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [*al-ghaḍabiyya*] faculty, is the faculty which incites motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [*al-ghalaba*].<sup>56</sup>

The concupiscible appetite *seeks* pleasure, in response to something “*imagined* to be necessary or beneficial,” and it aims to *acquire* that imagined thing. Likewise, the irascible appetite *seeks*

<sup>56</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

dominance in response to something “*imagined to be harmful or corruptive,*” and it aims to *defend* against that imagined thing. There seems to be some goal, some cognition, and some associated action.

We can orient ourselves to determine which of these three items constitutes the faculties’ proper, final objects with a clue from, again, the *Treatise on Love*. After mentioning the attractions and aversions of the perceptive faculties, Avicenna says that the irascible faculty is attracted to revenge and dominance (*al-intiqām wa-al-taghallub*), and is averse to lowliness and submission (*al-dhull wa-al-istikāna*).<sup>57</sup> In the *Psychology* 1.5 text, dominance is that which the irascible appetite “seeks,” so the parallel for the concupiscible appetite would be its “seeking pleasure.” Avicenna does not say so in the *Treatise on Love*, but we can assume that the opposite of pleasure would be pain, so the concupiscible appetite is attracted to pleasure, and averse to pain.

The associated cognitions and actions, then, flesh out what it means to be attracted to pleasure and dominance, respectively. Attraction to the possibility of pleasure can occur when something is “imagined to be necessary or beneficial,” and the movement prompted by such attraction would be an attempt to acquire pleasure. Attraction to the possibility of dominance can occur when something is “imagined to be harmful or corruptive,” and the logical way of achieving dominance in light of such an imagination would be defensive, or retaliatory behavior. So the other aspects of the *Psychology* 1.5 text simply capture the cognition which occasions attraction from the concupiscible or irascible faculty, which we could call the faculty’s *intentional* (as opposed to final) object, and the associated *generic behavior* that would constitute acting on that emotion. For example, a puppy might see some food left on the table as delicious (an intentional object), and so try to eat it, on account of its final object, pleasure.

To be clear, these terms (final object, intentional object, and associated behavior) are my terms for clarifying what Avicenna is getting at, and are not in the text itself. By “final” object, I mean that towards which the faculty is attracted, or, in other words, towards which the act is directed (e.g., pleasure or dominance). By “intentional” object I mean how some other object is cognized so as to make it relevant to that final object (e.g., some object conceived of as pleasant or

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<sup>57</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.



harmful).<sup>58</sup> Motive acts are not cognitive, of course, so to say they have intentional objects means they are preceded by intentional cognitions.

To summarize, concupiscible and irascible faculties give rise to emotions that are attractions to their final objects, and to aversions to the opposites of those final objects. Since these are faculties for voluntary motion, they are actualized by cognized, intentional objects that make the final object (or its opposite) clear, which leads to characteristic behaviors. Avicenna has a similar discussion of the concupiscible and irascible appetite at the start of *Psychology* 4.4, and apart from some minor variations in terminology, he gives the same general picture.<sup>59</sup> A comparison of the two texts is as follows:

	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 1.5	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 4.4
Generic Name for Appetites	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>
Concupiscible Name	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>
Concupiscible Final Object	Pleasure <i>al-ladhḥa</i>	That which is pleasant <i>al-ladhīdh</i>
Concupiscible Intentional Object	Imagined to be necessary or beneficial [ <i>al-mutakhayyila ḍarūriyyatan aw nāfi‘atan</i> ]	Imagined to be beneficial [ <i>al-mutakhayyil nafi‘an</i> ]
Concupiscible Associated Behavior	Getting closer/approaching [ <i>yaqrub</i> ]	Acquiring [ <i>tajlab</i> ]
Irascible Name	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>
Irascible Final Object	Dominance [ <i>al-ghalaba</i> ]	Dominance [ <i>al-ghalaba</i> ]
Irascible Intentional Object	Imagined to be harmful or corruptive [ <i>al-mutakhayyil ḍarran aw mufsidan</i> ]	Imagined as an obstacle [ <i>al-mutakhayyil munāfiyan</i> ]
Irascible Associated Behavior	Defense [ <i>yadfa‘</i> ]	Defense [ <i>tadfa‘</i> ]

<sup>58</sup> The fact that there is something like an intentional object (i.e., an object cognized in such a way as to be relevant to the motive faculty), is supported by the following text, occurring later in *Psychology*:

“For the irascible faculty is not affected by pleasures, and the concupiscible power is not affected by harmful things [*al-mu‘dhiyāt*], and the apprehensive power is not influenced by that which influences these two, and nothing is conceptualized by these two [irascible and concupiscible faculties] insofar as these two are receptive of the apprehended form (5.7, 252).”

This text makes it clear that one and the same object can have various properties: sensible properties and evaluative properties. Insofar as some object is grasped as pleasant or harmful, it is relevant to the concupiscible and irascible faculty, respectively.

<sup>59</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195, 4.4.

The above table captures details of the concupiscible and irascible faculties related to their natural *attractions*: the concupiscible faculty is attracted to pleasure, and is triggered when something is perceived as pleasurable or beneficial; the irascible faculty is attracted to dominance, and is triggered when something is perceived as harmful. Avicenna is not explicit about the details concerning these faculties' *aversions*—but we can work to fill in the blanks. We know from the *Treatise on Love* that the irascible appetite is averse to lowliness (the opposite of dominance),<sup>60</sup> and we have inferred that the concupiscible appetite is averse to pain (the opposite of pleasure).

Support for the concupiscible appetite being averse to pain is evident from prior texts in the Aristotelian tradition, since it is because of the concupiscible faculty's aversion response that, for example, zoophytes (plant-like animals) can still have voluntary responses to pain.<sup>61</sup> Though traditionally thought of as lacking the conceptual apparatus for full defensive, retaliatory irascible behavior, zoophytes shrink away from things their meager imaginations conceive of as painful. So concupiscible behavior averse to pain would be occasioned by imagining something as painful (an intentional object), and the likely result of such an aversion would be an attempt to avoid, escape, or turn away.

One might wonder whether there is some redundancy or infelicitous overlap in the fact that the concupiscible and irascible appetite both have some sort of response to pain/harm. To clarify this, we need to distinguish how pain and harm are relevant to both. For the concupiscible faculty, pain/harm is the final object of its *aversive* tendency (since individual faculties have both attractions *and* aversions, each with distinct final objects). For the irascible faculty, pain/harm is the intentional object that triggers an act of its attractive tendency towards the final object of dominance. In other words, what the irascible faculty really wants is dominance, and when we

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<sup>60</sup> See text cited above, footnote 56.

<sup>61</sup> Aristotle discusses zoophytes in *De Anima* 2.3. Themistius, commenting on that passage, makes it clear that they only have concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), yet are still able to voluntarily shrink away from pain. See *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima* (1996), p. 62.12-14

Avicenna's own discussion of zoophytes proceeds along similar lines, but does not draw quite as explicit a conclusion about their lacking irascible appetite as does Themistius. In *Healing: Psychology* 2.3, the chapter on the sense of touch, Avicenna incorporates zoophytes into his wider psychological scheme by drawing a basic distinction between two types of voluntary motion: motion in place, and motion from place to place (i.e., locomotion). He says that zoophytes' attraction and aversion responses entail that they have the sense of touch, and this explains why they are able to move in place.

*notice something* harmful, this is an occasion to exhibit irascible behavior towards the harmful object, so as to dominate it. On the other hand, harm is what the concupiscible faculty *tends away from*, so when we notice something harmful, this is an occasion to tend away from that intentional object with concupiscible, evasive behavior. So pain is relevant to the concupiscible faculty as the final object of its aversion, while pain is relevant to the irascible faculty as the intentional object of its attraction to dominance.

The intentional object and associated behavior for the irascible faculty's aversion to lowliness are a bit more difficult to tease out. Avicenna describes the irascible faculty's intentional object on account of its attraction to dominance as "harmful," "corruptive," or "qua obstacle." But whereas the opposite of qua pleasant (i.e., qua painful) makes good sense as an intentional object for the concupiscible appetite's aversive side, the opposites of harmful, corruptive, or qua obstacle (perhaps: beneficial, salubrious, or helpful) don't make sense as probable intentional objects for the aversive side of the irascible faculty. A disposition to avoid lowliness would not be triggered by something "cognized as helpful," without further qualification. What *would* trigger a response based on someone's aversion for lowliness? Presumably something like, "imagining x as in a position of dominance over oneself," or "imagining x as impossible to overcome." But this is far too specific to be the converse for what Avicenna actually says about what the irascible faculty is attracted to (again, all he says is that it is for some object cognized "as harmful," etc.). This seems to indicate a lacuna in how Avicenna describes the intentional object of the irascible faculty, which later Latin medieval authors take up. Aquinas, for example, thinks of the irascible faculty's positive response as triggered by something conceived of as, roughly, a "surmountable obstacle," while its negative response is triggered by something conceived of as an "insurmountable obstacle."<sup>62</sup> There is no reason to think Avicenna would reject this approach, but is not yet there in his sparse description of the irascible faculty's final object. Avicenna's work is, nonetheless, a major step towards clarity on these issues.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> The distinction is helpful, in part, because defensive or retaliatory behavior is not best thought of as a push away from some object. Rather, it is pull towards that which, as an obstacle, could be painful. On this distinction see Peter King (2012) 220.

<sup>63</sup> Avicenna's careful characterization of the nature of the concupiscible and irascible appetites is a systematization of some various lines of thought in his predecessors. We see in the Greek commentators and al-Farabi some reference to the idea of the irascible faculty as a faculty for retaliation, but more consistently animal movement is explained in terms of pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain (see Themistius, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima* (1996) 139, 112.33ff. In Farabi's *Political Regime* (1971) 33.8, the irascible faculty is narrowly associated with things like fleeing, loathing, or avoidance. In the *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170, the appetitive

### 1.2.3 Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite as Varieties of *Shawq*

A last thing we should notice from Avicenna's introduction of the motive faculty in the text discussed above (section 1.2) is his identification of concupiscible and irascible emotions as varieties of *shawq* (or more precisely, *al-quwwa al-shawqiyya* in *Psychology* 1.5), which is the Arabic translation of the Greek *orexis*/appetite. This is an important thing to notice because it paves the way for a major division between types of emotions. While Aristotle (and the Greek commentators following him) used the idea of appetite generically for all motive faculties (including *boulêsis*/will), Avicenna reserves *shawq* for the concupiscible and irascible faculties in *Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4. To look ahead a bit, Avicenna seems inclined to restrict the usage of *shawq* to concupiscible and irascible appetite, because he thinks of concupiscible and irascible appetites as responses to a perception of some sort of lack or vulnerability, especially pertaining to the external senses: things that would bring pleasure to the external senses signify concrete goods, and things that would bring pain to the external senses signify concrete obstacles or vulnerabilities.

As mentioned when discussing the Aristotelian background, the term *orexis* originally related to the idea of a literal reaching out for the sake of some concrete concern or lack. Avicenna would not have been aware of the Greek linguistic background per se, but he would be aware of the associations surrounding these two faculties and the generic idea of *shawq*.<sup>64</sup> For example, in the *Healing: Metaphysics* he describes God as having a will, but not *shawq*, because he is not in need of anything.<sup>65</sup> The focus on pleasures and pains of the external senses in particular is suggested by Avicenna's examples later in *Psychology* 4.4: "greed, avarice and lust" are given as examples of the "bestial concupiscible faculty," clearly in an effort to portray the concupiscible appetite as resulting in emotions oriented towards something like lower goods.<sup>66</sup>

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faculty (containing the concupiscible and irascible) is boiled down succinctly to that which moves us "towards [*ilā*]" or "away from [*an*]" an apprehended object. Appetites in Farabi are conceived of primarily as pulls (concupiscible) and pushes (irascible), with the ideas of defensiveness, attack, or retaliation being mostly absent.

<sup>64</sup> I am not arguing that the restriction of *orexis/shawq* to goods or harms of the external senses accurately reflects what is going on in Aristotle—just that this is how Avicenna seems to use and understand the terminology.

<sup>65</sup> Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* (2005) 8.7, p. 292.

<sup>66</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 196.

These distinctions between significantly different types of final objects have a basis in Aristotle's *Ethics*, where Aristotle distinguishes between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.<sup>67</sup> Avicenna, as we will see, makes things more fine grained by distinguishing between three broad types of objects to which we can be attracted: sensory, internal/imaginative and intellectual goods. In other words, there are different levels of goods, which are distinguished according to the types of faculties required for grasping them. Avicenna mostly discusses these distinctions in the context of a particular type of good, namely, pleasure: sensory pleasure (the final object of the concupiscible appetite), and imaginative or intellectual pleasure (the final objects of higher emotions). These distinctions would also apply to the irascible faculty's object: the final object of the irascible faculty is dominance, and while paradigm cases of irascibility (e.g., aggression, anger), are triggered by potential external threats, dominance itself seems to be an internal good—a good only grasped by a faculty higher than the external senses. But we will have to wait until section 1.4, below, to see what else Avicenna says about the irascible faculty. Likewise, intellectual goods will mostly be bracketed until chapter 2 of this dissertation, where we focus on uniquely human emotions. That said, Avicenna's distinction between animal emotions in response to external and internal pleasures will be clarified and verified and as we examine *Psychology* 4.4, presently.

### 1.3 Emotions Oriented Towards Internal Pleasures of the Imagination

In *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna takes up the motive faculty again, but in more detail: after reviewing the distinction between the two types of *shawq* (concupiscible and irascible appetite), Avicenna immediately proceeds to describe animal emotions that *seem* related to *shawq*, but which are better described as something “belonging to the imagination.” All of these states—those that fall under *shawq*, and those more related to the imagination—are emotions (*nizā'āt/ inbi'āthāt*). This is Avicenna's most in-depth explanation of emotions beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite, so it is worth unpacking in some detail. As we will see, what makes these emotions unique is that they respond to final objects of a different kind: objects of the internal senses. This

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<sup>67</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117b24-1118a1. For the interpretation of Aristotle as considering *epithumia* to be primarily concerned with pleasures of the external senses, see John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul*, 2.1-6 (2005) 253.20ff.

is contrasted explicitly with acts of the concupiscible appetite, which are attractions to objects of the external senses.

Before beginning the analysis of the relevant text from *Psychology* 4.4, it is worth saying a word about the structure of what is to come. The text from 4.4 shows that Avicenna makes a distinction between types of emotions (related to external and internal pleasure) in his central discussion of emotion. But to truly show that this is an Avicennian concept requires showing how this distinction between different types of emotions is supported by the distinctions he makes elsewhere in his writings between external and internal goods/pleasures. So my interpretation of the text from *Psychology* 4.4 in this initial section 1.3 is informed by other texts discussed in subsections 1.3.1-1.3.3.

Avicenna's discussion that introduces emotions related to internal pleasures spans three continuous paragraphs, but context helps clarify the obscurities, so we need to have the whole text at hand to begin the analysis:

[a] And we may find [*wa-qad najid*] in animals impulses [*inbi' āthāt*] not [just] for [*ilā*] the objects of concupiscible appetite [*shahawātihā*],<sup>68</sup> but also [we find] an inclination [*nizā'*] of the one who begat for [their] offspring, and of the one who befriends for the friend, and similarly their desiring escape from bonds and chains. This, even though it is not an object [*shahwa*] belonging [*li*] to the concupiscible faculty, it is a certain longing [*ishtiyāq mā*] for [*ilā*] an object [*shahwa*] owing to [*li*] to the imagination [*al-quwwa al-khayāliyya*].

[b] For [*fa-inna*], there is particular to the apprehending faculty—in what it apprehends, and in the things renewed through sight in regard to which it is transformed, or [other] forms, for example—a pleasure that is particular to it. So when [*fa-idhā*] it [the apprehending power] suffers the loss of that pleasure, it [the animal] longs [*ishtāqat*] for it naturally, then the decisive faculty resolves that the organs should move towards it, similar to how it resolves [to act] for the sake of concupiscible and irascible appetite, and for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good also.

[c] And so to concupiscible desire there belongs the increasing of appetite towards pleasure, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and to the irascible power there belongs the increasing of appetite

<sup>68</sup> Two notes on translating *shahwātihā* as “objects of the concupiscible appetite:

1) I take *hā* to refer to the concupiscible appetite, which is discussed in the sentence just prior to what is quoted here.

2) Taking *shahwa* to refer to an object requires more explanation. Sometimes this term is used to refer to lower forms of appetite (e.g., Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.3, p. 68). But if it meant that here, this first line would be saying something like, “there are inclinations for appetites,” which sounds something like a second-order desire, and is obviously not what Avicenna means. Lane's *Lexicon*, however, says that this term can sometimes be applied to “objects of desire,” citing Quran 13:4 as an example, where it speaks of “love of desires (*ḥubb al-shahwāt*),” where examples of desires include women, gold, and horses. So “desires” can also loosely refer to objects, in the sense of “objects of desire.”

towards dominance, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and likewise to the imagination [*lil-takhayyul*] there is also something [*mā*] particular to it, and to the inclining power the resolution to act.<sup>69</sup>

The basic thrust of [a-c] is that there is some set of emotions, similar to concupiscible emotions, but more related to objects of the imagination. The first thing to notice about these texts is all the ways in which he signals in [a] that he is picking out something new, distinct from concupiscible and irascible appetite. Specifically, the generic vocabulary he uses to capture what he is now discussing is broader than what he has used before. Concupiscible and irascible faculties were types of *shawq*, whereas this is a new kind of inclination (*nizā'*), distinct from concupiscible desire, under the heading of “impulses (*inbi'āthāt*).” He is careful to not call this *shawq*, though it is related (it is an *ishtiyāq mā*, or “some sort of longing,” a word derived from the same root). We do not want to hang too much on a couple of words, but in context he is clearly picking out a new category of emotions, something similar to but different from concupiscible appetite. Again, towards the end of [b] Avicenna compares the way that this new type of emotion, on the one hand, and concupiscible and irascible appetites, on the other, lead to movement. In making such a comparison, he affirms the difference between the two types of emotions. Finally, [c] summarizes the preceding, emphasizing that, broadly, three things have been discussed: concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite, and “something” particular to the imagination.

Avicenna tells us, in [a], that what distinguishes this new type of emotion from what has already been discussed is that it is more attributable to the imagination. By this, he cannot mean that the imagination itself is a type of motive faculty, since in an earlier part of 4.4 Avicenna reaffirms the distinction between the apprehending and motive faculties, saying that the apprehending powers have “nothing” of appetite.<sup>70</sup> What he must mean, then, is that the imagination is involved in a distinct or more central way with these emotions than with concupiscible appetite. This does not mean that imagination is involved in these emotions, and has *nothing whatsoever* to do with concupiscible appetite, since the intentional objects of the concupiscible faculty are those “imagined” to be pleasant, and we are eventually aware of perceptibles of the external senses in various internal senses. He is focusing on a difference in the *extent* to which imagination is involved, not *whether* there is imagination involved.

<sup>69</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 195.

<sup>70</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 194.

His examples of this new type of emotions in [a] are meant to explicate this new category of emotions. He mentions that animals have emotions towards things like distant friends and relations, and towards something as abstract as freedom when they are in captivity. One might think that what these examples have in common is that they are not oriented towards any type of pleasure at all: indeed, it might seem somewhat crass to think of seeking out a distant friend or relation just for the sake of one's own pleasure, and likewise with freedom. Seeking out friends and relations is distinctly others-oriented in a way that activities of concupiscible appetite are not. However, Avicenna does not take a stance on anything so specific about the character of these emotions. Rather, in [b] Avicenna elaborates, clarifying that what these emotions have in common is that they are inclinations oriented at the *imagination's* pleasures, as opposed to mere sensory pleasures. This can be seen in the details of the text as follows.

The transition word at the beginning of [b], *for/fa-inna*, tells us that this paragraph is meant to be in some way an elaboration of the new sort of emotion introduced in [a]. The second half of [b] is fairly straightforward, saying that there is a pleasure, or set of pleasures, particular to the imagination, and when they are absent, the animal soul can have inclinations for them, similar to how there are inclinations for concupiscible objects, irascible objects, and intelligible objects—the last of which we will say more about later. The italicized portion of [b], towards the beginning, is somewhat enigmatic: this new category of pleasure, is found “in what [the apprehending faculty] apprehends, and in the things renewed through sight in regard to which it is transformed, or [other] forms, for example.” This is a way of talking about the imagination, which is a kind of apprehending faculty. Given that perception is a kind of reception, it makes sense to talk of the apprehending faculty as “transformed” by the objects whose forms it *receives*, and its objects as “renewed,” in that they have their forms conveyed through increasing *levels of abstractness*, information moving from the external senses, to the imagination.<sup>71</sup> [B], then, is just a condensed way of describing what it means to grasp objects in the imagination, in contrast to grasping objects at the level of the external senses.<sup>72</sup> So this category of emotion

<sup>71</sup> For another usage of this term in the context of perception, see elsewhere in the Avicenna, *Remarks: Metaphysics* (1960) p. 256.

<sup>72</sup> All these inclinations at the animal level can be contrasted with that which is “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to good,” as mentioned at the end of text [b] discussed in section 1.3. This is a reference to the unique sort of goods the human rational soul is able to appreciate, discussed more at length in chapter 2 of this dissertation.



introduced in [a] has as its object a kind of pleasure that is available to the imagination, but not the external senses.

In [c], Avicenna's summary of the preceding paragraphs, he makes parallel claims about concupiscible emotions, irascible emotions, and these new emotions related to the imagination. Concupiscible appetite, he says, is oriented towards pleasure, irascible appetite is oriented towards dominance, and then there is "something particular to" the imagination. This last phrase on its own is concise to the point of being enigmatic, but in context he is clearly just referring to the unique class of pleasure he has picked out, towards which animals also incline. Thus, the main thrust of this passage is to distinguish emotions related to "external" pleasures (concupiscible emotions) and these new emotions more related to "internal" pleasures. This distinction between types of pleasures, which is the basis for a distinction between types of emotions, is borne out elsewhere in his works, as we will see presently.

### 1.3.1 Clarifying the Nature of External, Internal and Rational Pleasure

Avicenna's discussion of pleasure and pain at the beginning of book eight of *Remarks and Admonitions* provides framework that can help with understanding the types of emotions distinguished in *Psychology* 4.4. Over the course of his discussion in *Remarks*, he distinguishes between pleasures of the external senses, internal senses, and the rational soul.

He begins by pointing out that the majority of people make an incorrect judgment concerning internal and external pleasures: "It has occurred to the imaginations of the masses that the strongest and highest pleasures are those of sensation [*hiya al-hissiyya*], while what is contrasted with that are weak pleasures, all of which are of the imagination, [which they think of as] not being real."<sup>73</sup> His examples of the pleasures of sensation include drink and sex, while those of the internal senses include things like the pleasure of offering a gift to someone, or achieving victory in a game. Avicenna goes on to partially affirm, partially criticize this opinion of the masses: he affirms that there is a distinction between external and internal pleasures, but he denies that the external is more worthwhile. Proof of this is that we will often sacrifice external pleasure for the

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<sup>73</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 7.

sake of an internal pleasure, as when one gives their own food to a friend. This is prioritizing the internal pleasure of friendship over the external pleasure of food.

The superiority of internal and rational pleasures to external pleasures is further clarified towards the same section, *Remarks* 8.1. The overlap with *Psychology* 4.4 is especially evident in the examples he uses to describe animals having internal pleasures:

It has been made clear that internal pleasures [*al-ladhdhāt al-bāṭina*] are more lofty than sensible pleasures. And this is the case not only in rational beings, but also in speechless animals. For among hunting dogs there is the fact that they hunt, regardless of hunger, then grasp [the prey] for their master, and sometimes carry it to him. And the nursing animal prefers its offspring to itself, and sometimes takes risks [for the sake of] protecting [the offspring], greater than the risk-taking they take with regard to themselves.<sup>74</sup>

One of the examples Avicenna provided of the new type of emotion he introduced at in *Psychology* 4.4 (beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite) was the emotion of “the one who begat for [their] offspring.” Here there is a parallel in *Remarks*, since a nursing animal gets internal pleasure from taking great risks for their offspring, regardless of whether this means they lose out on some external pleasure. At the end of this section in *Remarks*, Avicenna briefly mentions that just as internal pleasures are higher than external, so intellectual pleasures [*al-‘aqliyya*] are higher than both.<sup>75</sup> This aligns with Avicenna’s offhand comment in *Psychology* 4.4 that the animal motive faculty also moves “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good.”<sup>76</sup> So the types of pleasures distinguished in *Remarks* correspond to the final objects of the varieties of emotions discussed in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, Avicenna’s distinctions between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4 parallels his distinctions between types of pleasures in *Remarks*.

What makes some pleasures external, internal, or rational, is whether they are the perfection of an external sense faculty, an internal sense, or the rational soul, respectively. Shortly after distinguishing the three types of pleasures in *Remarks*, Avicenna goes on to define pleasure as follows:

Pleasure is the perception and reaching of the attainment of that which, according to the perceiver [*‘inda al-mudrik*], is a perfection and good, insofar as it is such [*min ḥaythu huwa ka-dhālika*]. And pain is the apprehension and reaching of attainment of what is, according to the perceiver [*‘inda al-mudrik*], a defect

<sup>74</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

<sup>75</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

<sup>76</sup> See text [b] discussed in section 1.3.

and evil. [...] Every pleasure is related to [*tata' allaq bi-*] two things, a good perfection, and the perception of that [perfection], insofar as it is like that [*min haythu huwa ka-dhālika*].<sup>77</sup>

As mentioned above,<sup>78</sup> every faculty tends towards some final object. According to Avicenna, when that object is achieved, and we are aware of it having been achieved, we experience pleasure. This is clearly building upon Aristotle's definition of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.12 as something that supervenes on the "unimpeded activity of a natural process." The key difference between the two definitions is between whether the pleasure and pain consist simply in *undergoing* some activity (shared by both Avicenna and Aristotle's definitions), or awareness of and judgment *about* the activity (only in Avicenna's).

The pleasures of food are external pleasures, because they amount to doing what the faculty of taste is designed for. The pleasures of giving someone a gift, or winning a game (to use Avicenna's examples from above) are internal pleasures because they fulfill some capacity we have at a level of the animal soul, higher than the level of the external sense.<sup>79</sup> The faculties of estimation and memory also have objects that can be desired, and when those forms are acquired, or take shape (*takayyuf*) in the respective faculty, there is an internal pleasure particular to those faculties. Avicenna says that we could make similar descriptions of unique pleasures for the rest of the internal senses.<sup>80</sup> The pleasures of the rational soul include the attainment of truth, for the theoretical intellect, and the good, for the practical intellect. Avicenna also says that rational goods can include "receiving gratitude, and an abundance of praise, respect, and honor."<sup>81</sup> It is not totally clear whether those are meant to be goods particular to the theoretical or practical intellect, or if they are just obviously goods of some capacity in the rational soul that fall outside of the standard two-faculty distinction.

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<sup>77</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.3, p. 11 & 15.

<sup>78</sup> Section 1.2.1.

<sup>79</sup> It might seem odd to think of imagination as having a capacity that is fulfilled in some way when we play a game, or give a gift. One might think we were veering precariously close to something like Franz Gall's phrenology, where the fact that some people are good at chess means that they have a chess-playing faculty, while others do not. A major problem with Gall's view is that it posits faculties that are not common to all members of a species, and so ceases to be explanatory (see Fodor (1983) section I.3, p. 14 ff.). Avicenna does not go into detail about what all the sub-faculties in the imagination are whose activity amounts to internal pleasure, but whatever he would say about this, they would be common to anything with a sensitive soul. We are not in the habit of distinguishing such faculties, and they are not as obvious as the external sense faculties which have obviously distinct organs, but that does not mean they are not there to be actualized.

<sup>80</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 21.

<sup>81</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 25

One thing worth making clear is that the difference between external, internal and rational pleasures has to do with which faculties' perfection constitutes the *experience* of something as pleasant, not which faculty is involved in knowing *that* something would be pleasant. On the animal level, the judgmental faculty "estimation [*wahm*]" is involved in awareness *that* various things would provide pleasant experiences, even if those pleasant experiences are as different from one another as external and internal pleasures. Through estimation, a dog naturally judges that food would be pleasant to eat,<sup>82</sup> and estimation would similarly explain how an animal identifies its offspring as something worth caring for. Doing the latter would bring with it a type of internal pleasure, while the former is a pleasure of the external senses. To put the point conversely, the sense of taste doesn't judge *that* something would be pleasant, but when something appropriate is tasted, this constitutes a pleasurable experience. The external senses perceive objects according to their material, sensible properties (shapes, colors, sounds, and so on), while all properties like something's being good, beneficial or pleasant, and their opposites, amount to aspects that are perceived by estimation.<sup>83</sup> Estimation can judge that food is good (an external pleasure), and that friendship is good (an internal pleasure), which can in turn lead to emotions related to both sorts of objects. The same faculty—estimation—is involved in judging *that* two things would be pleasant, even if they would be pleasant experiences of generically different varieties, owing to the fact that they would be completions of different types of faculties.

In the *Psychology* 4.4 text from the prior section, Avicenna referred to internal pleasures as pleasures of the imagination, using the term "imagination" loosely. That being the case, it is worth clarifying this category of "internal pleasure" that is relevant to the discussion of emotions from another sense in which pleasure is sometimes talked about in relation to the imagination. As a reminder, in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna mentions a pleasure "particular to" the imagination, which is longed for when imagination "suffers its loss." This is his way of saying that internal sense faculties have particular perfections which they naturally tend towards, and which give pleasure to the subject when they are achieved. This is different than the sort of pleasure of the imagination Avicenna discusses in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, where he says we can long for an object of sense perception, based on the pleasurable vestige of its image in the imagination,

<sup>82</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 184.

<sup>83</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60 and 4.3, 182-3.

retained and recalled after the actual object is no longer directly perceived. That is, regardless of what sort of pleasure we are talking about (external, internal or rational), there is some pleasure involved in remembering the experience of that pleasure, which Avicenna describes as follows:

As for the imagination, it has a type of pleasure [i.e., it experiences pleasure in a way], except that imagination is a weak sensation, like a vestige from sensation, and it delights in recalling or in hoping. Most of what is hoped for coincides with what is remembered, especially hoping for structures/arrangements from prior sensed particulars, for there is pleasure in memory or hope following sensible pleasure [initially] observed/experienced, then recalled, then hoped for. For sensation pertains to the present, memory to the past, hope to the future.<sup>84</sup>

Just as we can experience some sensible particular as pleasant when in contact with it, we can recall the form of that same sense object, and our awareness of its form in the imagination conveys a similar, but weaker, kind of pleasure than the initial experience, which might lead us to long for the direct experience once again. Remembering a delicious meal can be pleasant, and make you want to have the same meal again. But this is not what is meant by a pleasure “particular to” the imagination in *Psychology* 4.4. It is one thing to long for and then experience an internal pleasure in the present, it is another thing to fondly *recall* an internal pleasure, and then long for it. The vestigial pleasures of imaginative memory are not equivalent to the present experience of an external, internal or rational pleasure. Often, remembered pleasures are less intense or vivid, but more importantly, they are simply not constituted by activations of the precise faculties of which they are memories.

A sub-variety of animal emotions towards internal pleasures of the imagination that Avicenna treats elsewhere are those towards aesthetic pleasure, especially musical pleasure. As Luis Xavier López-Farjeat has shown, there is a clear strand of thought in Avicenna’s *Healing: Book of Music* which discusses how animals perceive, incline towards, and take pleasure in aesthetic beauty, even though they cannot label it as such, or produce it.<sup>85</sup> Emotions related to music would be different than emotions related to external, concupiscible pleasures, because aesthetic experience is not the perfection of any particular external sense: neither the ear nor the eye have any capacity to perceive aesthetic pleasure on their own. Only once particular sensibles are arranged in the imagination is it possible for aesthetic properties, like harmony, to be appreciated. So while it might seem strange to think of brute animals as being moved to seek out

<sup>84</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, p. 100.

<sup>85</sup> López-Farjeat (2013) esp. p. 103ff.

aesthetic pleasure, we should remember that this is still something short of the full engagement with aesthetic beauty of which humans are capable. Moreover, it does not need to be a terribly complicated sort of aesthetic pleasure. We can easily imagine an animal being affected by a potential mate's colorful feather arrangement, and this is beyond the ability of any particular external sense to appreciate.

### 1.3.2 Varieties of Pleasures and Varieties of Emotions

To bring this discussion of pleasures back to emotions, we can now see how the distinctions Avicenna makes in *Psychology* 4.4 are grounded in these prior distinctions between types of pleasures. There are three major types of emotions: those concerning goods of the external senses, those concerning goods of the internal senses, and those concerning rational goods.

Despite the neatness of this organization, one might wonder why the organization matters. Avicenna does not provide an answer to this in his emotion texts, but we can make some inferences. On the one hand, it is likely that the impetus for making these distinctions is the same as the impetus for distinguishing faculties in the first place: trying to come up with a more orderly body of scientific explanations for common phenomena. Beyond this, it is also clear that emotions involving objects of the external senses would result in very different behavior from those that have internal and rational objects. You would not necessarily want to “acquire” your friend or relative, just because you long for them. Upon being told that there is a beautiful landscape around the bend, you might be moved to go appreciate it, but not consume it. On the other hand, inclinations towards pleasures of the external senses require direct contact for their satisfaction.

One might wonder, still, why it is necessary to distinguish these emotions related to internal and rational pleasures from emotions of the concupiscible faculty, rather than just noting that there is a difference between types of pleasures, and asserting that the concupiscible faculty responds to all of them. Again, Avicenna does not answer a question like this directly, but it is likely because these higher emotions are not found in all animals. That is, we have already noted that some animals, namely zoophytes, have the concupiscible faculty but not the irascible.<sup>86</sup> Presumably

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<sup>86</sup> See footnote 61.

they also lack these higher emotions, for the same reason (their diminished cognitive capacities). Where there are significantly distinct final objects, and separability in terms of existence, there is a good reason to insist on a distinction of faculties.<sup>87</sup>

To summarize, there are certain classes of objects that individuate major groupings of capacities of the animal soul. Some are objects of the external senses, some are objects of the imagination and intellect, broadly construed. Emotions towards pleasures of the first sort are acts of the concupiscible appetite. Emotions towards pleasures of the second and third sort are acts of higher capacities for emotion—more elevated than concupiscible appetite, and more related to the imagination and intellect, respectively.<sup>88</sup> The key thing to notice is that there are distinct classes of emotions, based on major differences in final objects, but still treated as similar in *Psychology* 4.4 insofar as they are inclinations.

### 1.3.3 Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation

Having looked at the *Rhetoric* text about pleasures remembered in the imagination in section 1.3.1, one might object to my interpretation of the texts in *Psychology* 4.4, arguing that in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna actually saying is something more along the lines of what he says in the *Rhetoric*. That is, one might think concupiscible and irascible appetite are appetites in response to objects one is aware of as *present and nearby*, whereas it is also possible to recall *distant objects* in the imaginative memory and be motivated towards them. On this interpretation, Avicenna's examples in *Psychology* 4.4 would actually just be referring to remembered objects (e.g., a desire for a friend or child *when they are not present*, or for *what life was like* outside of the bonds of captivity). When Avicenna refers to the idea of the apprehending faculty “suffer[ing] the loss of that pleasure,” he could be taken to be emphasizing the fact that the object is no longer present, but is recalled in the imagination.

Despite its simplicity, the major problem with this alternative interpretation is that Avicenna never suggests that concupiscible and irascible appetite are only for things the animal is aware of

<sup>87</sup> Avicenna's principle of distinguishing faculties based on objects occurs in *Psychology* 1.4, p. 34-38. The separability in existence argument is normally used to distinguish types of souls, or groupings of faculties, but it is also used to distinguish individual faculties at the beginning of section 4 of *Compendium on the Soul* (1875).

<sup>88</sup> Such a distinction between different types of pleasures at the level of the animal soul is seen later in al-Ghazali's distinction between biological, social/political, and intellectual pleasure. See Fakhry (1994) p. 203.

as present and nearby. There is, no doubt, a line of thought in the tradition, going back to Aristotle, which distinguishes animal from human appetites on the grounds that animal appetites are only concerned with what seems pleasurable *in the present*, but this is a different distinction.<sup>89</sup> Avicenna deals with this latter distinction in *Psychology* 5.1, and the idea is basically that humans can evaluate whether something is worth pursuing all-things-considered, whereas animals simply see a pleasure and go towards it, without consideration for how it fits into their larger goals. For this reason humans can decline present pleasure for the sake of the future. Concupiscible appetite is for anything that seems good to the animal soul in that moment, but this does not mean that object of appetite needs to be something the animal is aware of as present and nearby, and it would be odd if it did: most appetites involve things that are not present or nearby, as opposed to what is, which is the very reason why one is in a state of desire, rather than satisfaction.

## 1.4 Deepening the Category of Emotion: More on the Irascible Faculty

In the final part of his overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, Avicenna lists concrete examples of various types of emotions, which not only add to our understanding of previously distinguished types of emotions, but also introduce new types. We can view what this section does as *deepening* our understanding of previously distinguished irascible emotions, and then *widening* the category of emotion to include some pleasurable completion-states as types of emotions. This section follows directly upon the key text from *Psychology* 4.4, quoted at length at the beginning of section 1.3 above:

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<sup>89</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5-10.



Fear [*al-khawf*] and anxiety [*al-ghamm*] and sadness [*al-ḥuzn*]<sup>90</sup> are actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*]<sup>91</sup> of the irascible faculty with the participation [*bil-mushāraḳat*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. And following upon intellectual or imaginative conceptualization, there is fear if the irascible faculty is opposed. And if it does not fear, it becomes strong. Anxiety occurs to the irascible faculty on account of that which [at other times] causes anger, when something is prevented from defending against something else, or when one fears something else’s occurrence. And joy [*al-farah*] which belongs in the category of subduing, is the end/final cause [*ghāya*] for this faculty also.<sup>92</sup> Greediness [*al-ḥirṣ*], gluttony [*al-naḥam*], and lust [*al-shabq*], and what is similar to them, they belong to the bestial concupiscible faculty.

Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.<sup>93</sup>

In the first paragraph of this final section Avicenna deepens our understanding of what he has already discussed, showing how the irascible faculty’s tendency to achieve dominance results in different particular emotions, depending on how exactly some intentional object is conceived.<sup>94</sup> Our general inclination to achieve dominance takes on the specific character of fear when it is in response to a conception of some obstacle as especially imposing (and hence unlikely to be successfully opposed), anger or courage if in response to an obstacle we think we can be overcome, or anxiety if we simply know it cannot be overcome.<sup>95</sup> These different inclinations all

<sup>90</sup> It is noteworthy that anxiety and sadness are considered states of the irascible faculty. This might lead one to think that the irascible faculty is the faculty responsible for painful emotions. But it seems that most emotions involve some sort of lack for what is desired, and hence a certain amount of pain (e.g., recall how emotions concerning internal pleasures can involve “suffering a loss.” See Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 195, discussed in section 1.3 above). Anxiety and sadness are specific emotions, partially constituted by pain. But pain itself is a basic building block of many emotions.

<sup>91</sup> This could also be translated as “accidents” or “occurrences,” which would also be true, in the sense that these emotions are affections/passions happening to the animal or person. But translating it as “actualizations” highlights the relationship between these states, and the irascible faculty that is mentioned in what immediately follows. That is, emotions are just actualizations of the the various inclining motive faculties, not something over and above them. Again, emotions are not something produced by those faculties, in the way that a carpenter might use their capacity for woodworking to make a table. Rather, emotions are related to the experiencing subject in the same way that the *act* of woodworking is related to the carpenter.

<sup>92</sup> The statement that the irascible faculty seeks “joy in the category of subduing” coheres with the points we made in section 1.2.2 about the final objects of motive faculties. Just as reaching an object of the concupiscible appetite brings a kind of pleasure, so a certain kind of pleasure attends any instance of overcoming an obstacle. The difference is that while concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure qua pleasure, the irascible appetite seeks overcoming qua overcoming, and when this goal is achieved, one experiences pleasure. The state of the person fighting for the love of fighting is different than the state of the person fighting out of self-defense, even though both might lead to pleasure. They both seek overcoming, but under different aspects: one qua overcoming, one as a pleasure. In fact, the person fighting for the love of fighting would best be classified as seeking a kind of internal pleasure of the imagination, as opposed to a concupiscible object. So “joy in the category of subduing” is just another way of saying that “subduing” is the final object of the irascible faculty, and by definition, achieving a final object brings satisfaction.

<sup>93</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

<sup>94</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

<sup>95</sup> These different inclinations nonetheless fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these states that occur on account of being oriented towards dominance.

fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these are states that occur on account of our being oriented towards dominance.

One thing to notice is that, whereas Avicenna spent the lengthy prior section distinguishing different types of emotions that are similar to, but more complex than, concupiscible appetite (e.g., concupiscible emotions and emotions more related to the imagination), he does not do anything similar here. One might think it worthwhile to distinguish emotions associated with dominance over threats that would pain the external senses, from dominance over obstacles that would pain one inwardly. Indeed, in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*, following Aristotle, he provides examples of states we would think of as irascible, like anger, but which are associated with dominance over obstacles that would cause *inward* pain. For example, anger can be directed at a verbal slight or scorn.<sup>96</sup> Further, we can imagine obstacles to the internal pleasures Avicenna mentioned in *Remarks* 8, such as an obstacle to achieving victory in a game. This is clearly a different type of obstacle in comparison to actual physical threats.

Avicenna does not discuss why he focuses on the external/internal distinction when it comes to pleasure, but does not do the same for dominance over external/internal threats. But it seems likely that the reason behind this lack of distinction is that irascible faculty, even when it is seeking dominance over physical threats, *already* involves a higher level of cognition than concupiscible appetite. That is, while paradigmatic cases of irascible acts involve responding to physical threats, recognizing something as an obstacle already requires a more abstract type of judgment than just knowing whether something is pleasant or painful. This is why, as discussed earlier,<sup>97</sup> some animals with lesser cognitive capacities are taken to only have concupiscible appetite. External, internal and rational pleasures correspond to different clusters of faculties, and their perfections. But achieving dominance is the perfection, simply, of the irascible faculty. So while it seemed worthwhile to Avicenna to make a distinction between types of pleasures, there is apparently no reason to make a similar distinction between types of obstacles.

A second thing to notice from the first paragraph above is the idea that evaluations are necessary but not sufficient causes for emotion. This is implied by the fact that fear, distress and sadness

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<sup>96</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 3.1, p. 130.

<sup>97</sup> See footnote 61.

are said to be acts of the irascible faculty “with the participation” of the perceptive faculties, and presumably what is true of these acts is true for defining other particular emotions in general. To specify what fear is, you cannot just say, “it is a variety of irascible appetite.” Instead, you need to reference the associated intentional object, i.e., the way in which the pleasure or obstacle is cognized. This idea is just an extension of Avicenna’s general descriptions of the motivating side of the motive faculty (from *Psychology* 1.5, discussed in section 1.2 above), where he has already stated that the motive faculty is dependent on evaluative acts of a particular sort. The point here is related to Martha Nussbaum’s argument for the centrality of evaluation to emotion, where she claims that anything but the cognitive component of an emotion is too underspecified to be the essence of an emotion. Emotions just aren’t the sort of thing it is easy to put into words.<sup>98</sup> Avicenna would not agree with her view entirely, since he clearly thinks that the most central thing that makes anger what it is, for example, is that it is a type of moved-mover (an “actualization of” the motive faculty, in the words of the text above). Since it is possible to have the very same evaluative act with or without an emotion, the two things are distinct. But what allows us to *describe* a specific type of emotion is the cognition that causes it.

So in the first paragraph of the above text, Avicenna deepens our understanding of emotion, by showing how the single irascible faculty is posited to account for our tendency to seek dominance over a variety of threats, and by showing how cognitive evaluations are necessary, but not sufficient, causes of emotions.

## 1.5 Widening the Category of Emotion: Uniquely Human Emotions and Pleasurable Completion-States as Types of Emotions

In the final part of Avicenna’s overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, he briefly mentions two varieties of emotions: pleasure-states particular to the perceptive faculties, and states dependent on the rational soul. It is important to remember that this text comes directly after Avicenna’s listing of further examples of irascible emotions, as this shows that we are still in the middle of a discussion of types of emotions:

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<sup>98</sup> Nussbaum (2001) 29.

Enjoyment of company [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*min al-‘awāriḍ*]<sup>99</sup> of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.<sup>100</sup>

These two quick sentences represent two distinct types of emotions, and I only present them here together to highlight the flow of the text. That is, it is important to see that both sorts of emotions (perceptive emotions like “enjoyment of company and gladness,” and emotions related to the human faculties) arise for Avicenna as a continuation and conclusion of his discussion of emotions of the animal motive faculty, rather than as a new discussion of categorically distinct phenomena. The reason why this is important will become clear as we discuss the two halves in turn.

### 1.5.1 Human Emotions

In the second half of the above text, Avicenna refers to emotions of the rational soul, indicating that he will discuss them later. Indeed, the very next book of *Healing: Psychology* (book 5) is the section in the rational soul, and in the first chapter of that book (5.1), he identifies some uniquely human emotions, such as shame and wonder, caused by cognitions of which only humans are capable. Nonetheless, his mentioning them here in 4.4 indicates that he wants us to think of uniquely human emotions as acts of the animal motive faculty, despite their being caused by uniquely human types of evaluations. That is, he is in the midst of a discussion of the animal motive faculty, and by mentioning “states particular to the human faculties” here, as a continuation of the previous discussion, it suggests that these are animal motive states caused by human cognitive faculties.<sup>101</sup> This is significant, in that it entails that all emotion is fundamentally animal, in that all emotions are acts of the common animal motive faculty, regardless of how complex the judgments causing them are. Since this chapter is meant to be an analysis of Avicenna’s discussion of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, this brief mention of human motions could

<sup>99</sup> The term *‘araḍ/awāriḍ* literally means “occurrence,” and is the technical term for “accident.” I’m choosing to translate it as “actualization,” which is closer to the idea of “occurrence,” and seems more relevant to what Avicenna is trying to communicate here. That is, it captures the idea that particular emotions are occurrences that arise on account of a psychological potency (e.g., the concupiscible faculty is a potency *for* desire, and desire is an actualization of the concupiscible faculty).

<sup>100</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

<sup>101</sup> In other words, human emotions are not affective states of the rational soul. They are affective states of the animal soul, caused by cognitions of the human soul. This idea is reflected by Avicenna’s argument in the *Treatise on Love*, that the rational soul “partners with” and “makes use of” the animal motive faculty for its particular emotions. Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

not just be passed over in silence. But given how significant this idea is, these points, and human emotions more generally, will be discussed at length in chapter two of this dissertation.

### 1.5.2 Pleasurable Completion States

In the first half of the above text, Avicenna mentions two emotions, "enjoyment of company and gladness," calling them actualizations of the perceptive faculties, and in doing so indicates that the category of emotion can be widened to include pleasurable completion states. Given that Avicenna is in the midst of explaining and listing various types of emotions that involve the animal soul, there is no reason not to take these actualizations of the perceptive powers under that general heading as well.

To better understand the significance of these two emotions, we should first better understand them on their own. "*Surūr*/gladness," is used elsewhere as a generic term for pleasure, contrasted with pain.<sup>102</sup> Nothing too specific beyond the general idea of pleasure seems intended. The definition of "*istīnās*/enjoyment of company" is less straightforward. Given the linguistic form of the Arabic word (form 10), which often carries with it the idea of "seeking," and the root in that form (A-N-S), which refers to the idea of persons, one might think that it means something like "desire to be around people/sociability." This would make sense of its place in the chapter on emotions, but no classical sources attest to such a definition.<sup>103</sup> Instead, one of the main classical definitions is "enjoyment of company"—not *seeking* out people, but *enjoyment* once their presence is attained. The 12th century Latin edition of Avicenna's *Psychology* translates *istīnās* as "*solatium*/relief from distress," which might feel like a different notion altogether. But it makes sense as a translation if one considers that a primary way of finding consolation is to be around people. So *solatium* is a bit of a loose translation, but it supports taking Avicenna to be talking about enjoyment of company as a completion-state, alongside gladness. Both of these emotions, then signify pleasurable completion states.

<sup>102</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.3, 31-32. Although in *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) p. 158, Avicenna mentions *surūr* as follows: "As for youth, [again], they have a strong love for their family and brothers and relatives, because they are spirited, and they love gaiety [*surūr*]. And gaiety only occurs when there is health and friendship together." So it is possible that *surūr* here in *Psychology* it is meant to reflect the social connotations of *istinās*.

<sup>103</sup> Although there are examples in Lane's Lexicon which suggest the action of searching for people in a sparsely populated area.

Pleasurable completion states make sense as a new type of emotion, but they are importantly different from any other type of emotion Avicenna has mentioned. At the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna has said that perceptive faculties “have nothing” of appetite/*shawq*.<sup>104</sup> Cognitions cause appetite, but the two are acts of fundamentally distinct types of faculties. Moreover, the emotions we have been discussing thus far involve seeking things, like pleasure and dominance, whereas in a pleasurable completion state some object or perfection is acquired, not sought.<sup>105</sup>

This might seem to put Avicenna in a bind, but if we recall that throughout *Psychology* 4.4 we have seen Avicenna gradually *widening* our understanding of what can count as an emotion, this can be seen just as an extension of that project. Perceptive emotions do not involve *shawq*/appetite, because they are inclinations that do not involve any kind of lack, or reaching out: they are emotions of completion, where the object is already attained. But we could see completion-states as emotions in a wider sense, in that they directly affect behavior by orienting us towards some object (i.e., the thing being enjoyed). They incline us, in the words of some contemporary emotion theorists, to “keep going” in whatever it is we are doing.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, in *Remarks*, Avicenna says that experiences with the spiritual realm in this life bring with them a kind of pleasure that motivates one to pursue truth more fully.<sup>107</sup> Likewise, bodily pleasures affect behavior in that they *distract* us from such pure pursuits.<sup>108</sup> Apparently, appetite and pleasure-states can both be emotions, in a broad sense, even if pleasure states are not *appetitive*.<sup>109</sup> That is, the broader category for all these states is “emotion/inclination,” not appetite, so it is consistent for Avicenna to think of them all as emotions, while also affirming that appetite and perception are distinct.

Insofar as Avicenna is committed to a fundamental division between motive and cognitive faculties, including these pleasurable completion-states (which are "actualizations of the

<sup>104</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

<sup>105</sup> See above, section 1.2.1.

<sup>106</sup> See, for example, Matthen (2015) p. 179.

<sup>107</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16. In this text he uses the term *bā'ith* for “motivate,” a term we have seen in *Healing: Psychology* 4.4.

<sup>108</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16.

<sup>109</sup> In this we can notice a contrast with how pleasure states are handled by, for example, Aquinas, who considers pleasure to have the concupiscible appetite as its subject. What he means by this is that pleasure is a state of the concupiscible appetite, when it achieves its object King (1999) pp. 18-19. For Avicenna, pleasure is not necessarily tied to the completion of an appetite, though completing appetites (concupiscible, irascible, or otherwise) does bring pleasure, since pleasure occurs whenever *any* faculty achieves its object.

perceptive faculties") as types of emotions does create a kind of tension. An alternate way of reading the above text would be to say that Avicenna's mentioning enjoyment of company and gladness as acts of the perceptive faculty here is a way of reminding us that they are *distinct* from the sort of thing he has been discussing in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, he could just be choosing to mention some states that we *might* think of as emotions, in order to clarify that they are not. It would be as if Avicenna were saying, "as for states like these, they might seem to be emotions, but they're really just acts of the perceptive faculties."

Of course, such a reading would involve a tension of its own, since it would be a break from common sense to consider something like "gladness" to not be an emotion. Avicenna's predecessors in the field of psychology, like al-Balkhī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, included states like gladness and pain in their discussions of emotions,<sup>110</sup> and Avicenna himself groups joy (another pleasurable completion state) and pain with other emotions in his medical texts.<sup>111</sup> Indeed, part of why it makes sense to group pleasure and pain with appetitive and irascible emotions is because of the felt, bodily aspect to all such states. So it may indeed be that pleasurable completion states (and their opposites, pain states) do not fit neatly into the sort of explanatory schema offered by *Healing: Psychology*, centered around divisions of faculties. This is perhaps why Avicenna's more in depth treatment of pleasure and pain occurs in *Remarks*, as has already been discussed. But insofar as they could fit into the schema offered by *Psychology*, it makes sense to think of them as emotions.<sup>112</sup>

## 1.6 The Variety of Emotions Involving the Animal Motive Soul According to Avicenna

Now that we have seen the varieties of emotions Avicenna attributes to the animal, sensitive soul in *Healing: Psychology*—his most comprehensive overview of such matters—we can step back and consider his overall contribution. The preceding texts from *Psychology* 4.4 are sometimes

<sup>110</sup> Al-Balkhī discusses pleasure and pain as emotions in the beginning of chapter 4 of his *Sustenance of the Soul* (2005). A.B. al-Rāzī likewise discusses pleasure in chapter 5 of his *Spiritual Physick* (1950).

<sup>111</sup> Avicenna concurs with prior thinkers on this point at *Cardiac Drugs* (1984) 226.

<sup>112</sup> Still yet another way of reading the text would be to argue that when Avicenna says that gladness and enjoyment of company are "*min al- 'awāriḍ*" of the perceptive faculties, the "*min*" does not mean "among," but "on account of." In other words, enjoyment of company and gladness are emotions (acts of the motive faculty) that have perceptive faculties as a prior cause. This reading, however, leaves the status of these emotions even more ambiguous. It is unclear why Avicenna would need to mention this mundane fact, since all emotions have prior cognitive causes, and it does not give any new insight into the sort of state these emotions are.

meandering, but this befits the messy task of wrestling with the nature of emotion, and what emerges is an innovative, wide array of animal affective states, unified under the carefully honed central concept of “inclination”. To review, Avicenna has discussed the following as types of emotions:

- Acts of the concupiscible appetite, ordered towards pleasures of the external senses
- Acts similar to those of the concupiscible appetite, but ordered towards pleasures of the imagination (i.e., internal pleasures)
- Acts of the irascible appetite (higher and lower varieties)
- Pleasurable completion-states (and conversely, pain-states)
- Uniquely human emotions (i.e., affective states of the animal motive faculty, caused by cognitions of the rational soul)

The terms in *Psychology* 4.4 that are used generically to capture all of these states are *inbi`āthāt* and *nizā`āt*, both of which convey the idea that these emotional states are, at their core, something like impulses, inclinations, or motivations. Avicenna uses these terms early on in the key text we looked at from *Psychology* 4.4, when he says that “we find in animals impulses [*inbi`āthāt*] not [just] for their concupiscible pleasures, but also an inclination [*nizā`*] towards” internal pleasures.<sup>113</sup> These two Arabic terms, *inbi`āth* and *nizā`*, and words related to their Arabic roots, are used elsewhere by Avicenna and others in the tradition to connote something related to but broader than concupiscible or irascible appetite.<sup>114</sup> For example, when introducing the motive faculty in *Psychology* 1.5, Avicenna says that “the motive power insofar as it motivates is the *inclining* [*al-nuzū`iyya*], appetitive faculty.”<sup>115</sup> Al-Farabi and Averroes likewise use *nizā`* in a generic sense.<sup>116</sup> In 1.5, Avicenna uses a word related to *inbi`āth* to distinguish the motive faculty qua motivating (*bā`itha*) from the motive power in the muscles that actually moves (*fā`ila*). Of course, Avicenna also uses appetite/*shawq* to convey something generic, capturing both concupiscible or irascible appetite, but we have seen that this has a more narrow scope for him, and was not as useful as *inbi`āth* or *nizā`* for referring to all of the affective states listed above.

<sup>113</sup> See section 1.3, text [a].

<sup>114</sup> Helmut Gätje has suggested that *inbi`āthāt* and *nizā`āt* in Avicenna’s philosophy have roughly the same scope as the Greek *hormē* (impulse), used by some of Aristotle’s commentators and the Stoics in the context of emotions, which seems correct. See Gätje (1974) p. 359.

<sup>115</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

<sup>116</sup> See al-Farabi, *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170; also Averroes, *Epitome of the De Anima* (1950), pp. 96-100.



While it would be correct to call the above affective states *inbi 'āthāt* or *nizā 'āt*, it is *nizā 'āt* that seems to more precisely pick out the phenomena that belongs exclusively to the discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. This is because sometimes *inbi 'āth* has an even broader sense in Avicenna's writings than *nizā 'āt*, used to mean “something instinctive,” as when he uses the term to refer to the evaluative judgments made by the faculty of estimation in animals.<sup>117</sup> But in any case, both of these terms point to the fact that Avicenna thinks of emotions as states wherein animals (human and non-) are disposed to act in a certain way, without yet actually acting.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 182.

<sup>118</sup> What finally pushes us towards actual motion is a motive state called resolution, discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

## Chapter 2

### Avicenna on Uniquely Human Emotions

The goal of this chapter is to present Avicenna's views on the uniquely human aspects of emotional experience. Specifically, I will show that for Avicenna there is a sense in which human emotions are similar to animal emotions, and a sense in which they are unique. Human emotions are *similar* to animal emotions in that they involve activations of broadly the same psychological hardware, that is, the same motive faculty shared between animals and humans, albeit caused by a variety of higher cognitions. But because of those unique cognitive causes, we get distinctive activations of those animal faculties, and these constitute uniquely human emotions. In the same way that animals experience different appetites in response to different objects (different types of concupiscible and irascible acts being the main subdivisions), there are further shades of appetitive, motive activity brought about by human cognition. These are activations of the shared animal motive faculty, but they are not reducible to any emotions experienced by non-human animals (such as concupiscible or irascible acts).

Thus, human emotions are *unique*, both in terms of the more complex cognitions which *cause* them, and in terms of the specific shades of inclination, or motivation, which *constitute* them. To explain this distinction further, recall that in chapter one we saw Avicenna begin by describing concupiscible and irascible acts of the motive faculty, but then broaden our understanding of emotion by showing that there are other motive states that don't fall under the narrow categories of "concupiscible" and "irascible" (e.g., inclinations concerning internal pleasures). Likewise, human emotions are caused by cognitions involving the intellect, but they still activate the shared animal motive faculty, being constituted by motive states that are distinct from motive states that do not have intellectual causes (such as concupiscible and irascible acts, which do not have intellectual causes). Rather, the rational soul has cognitive faculties (i.e., practical and theoretical intellect), and these faculties can activate the very same motive faculty that is activated when we have more basic, animal emotions. And again, just because human emotions and animal emotions are activations of the same generic faculty, does not mean that they "feel" the same. After all, as we saw in chapter one, animals themselves are already capable of shades of affect (i.e., motive states) beyond mere concupiscible and irascible emotion.

## 2.1 Overview of the Evidence that Human Emotions Involve the Animal Motive Soul

The above schema is not presented unambiguously by Avicenna, but there are texts which could be taken as direct affirmations of it, and an accumulation of adjacent texts that suggest they should be taken as such. In other words, the above schema seems to underly his numerous texts that deal with the topic, though it is not stated explicitly. Before diving into the particulars, then, an overview of the evidence is in order, so that it is clear not too much weight is being put on any one text.

This chapter builds off of two key pointers Avicenna gives us in texts from *Psychology* 4.4 (discussed in chapter one of this dissertation). Firstly, we saw Avicenna say that the motive faculty actualizes in response to external pleasures and internal pleasures, both goods accessible to non-human animals. He immediately adds to this that the motive faculty is likewise triggered “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good,” which is to say, for intellectual goods only accessible to humans.<sup>119</sup> Throughout this enumeration of causes Avicenna has not shifted away from discussing the shared motive faculty—this is still a continuation of the overall goal in 4.4 of explaining the animal motive faculty. So this seems to be an indication that there are some uniquely human motive states (i.e., uniquely human emotions), constituted by activations of the shared animal motive faculty. Secondly, shortly thereafter, as he is widening our understanding of what sorts of things count as emotions, he mentions pleasurable completion states (e.g., enjoyment of company and gladness), and follows this by mentioning that “as for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.”<sup>120</sup> Again, given that this comes in the context of his enumerating various states of the animal motive faculty (i.e., emotions), it seems natural to take this as simply saying that there are also uniquely human activations of the animal motive soul, but that he is postponing talk about them (until 5.1, as we will see). If this were *not* a reference to uniquely human activations of the animal motive soul, there would be much less of a reason for him to mention it here. Unlike philosophers in the Latin West, Avicenna does not have any human faculty of the will, so there is no new faculty later introduced that this could be referring to. So neither of these points is

<sup>119</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 195.

<sup>120</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

unambiguous, but they begin to paint a picture of how uniquely human emotional life involves the animal motive faculty, a picture which the texts we will look at in this chapter support.

Before we turn to those new texts in detail, it is worth pointing out what we will see in them that is relevant to supporting the above picture. First, Avicenna's discussions of specific human emotions (from *Psychology* 5.1) and the practical intellect (from 1.5) together show that certain states of the practical intellect (i.e., virtues or vices) dispose humans towards or away from some uniquely human emotions. Avicenna specifically says that this is a way that the practical intellect is related to the animal motive faculty. So the virtues and vices here are states of the practical intellect, but they lead to uniquely human emotions, and those emotions (not the virtues and vices) are states of the animal motive faculty. Secondly, in Avicenna's *Treatise on Love*, he describes how the rational faculties "adapt" the lower faculties to their aims, this being a kind of "partnership."<sup>121</sup> The animal motive faculties are among those ennobled by their proximity to higher faculties in humans, and one result of this is emotions that non-human animals do not have. As cognitive faculties, the rational faculties are able to cause unique states of the animal motive faculties because of their unique goals and cognitions. The key thing to see in both of these texts is that human emotions are presented as a partnership between the rational faculties (as cause) and the animal motive faculties (as constitutive of the emotion), just as animal emotions are presented as a partnership involving the animal cognitive faculties.<sup>122</sup>

Of course, there are also places where Avicenna discusses human emotions and does not mention the animal motive faculties, so this is—again—not unambiguous. But Avicenna's numerous assertions and suggestions that human emotions *do* involve the animal motive faculty, and a dearth of texts to the contrary, strongly supports the idea that Avicenna has the previously-mentioned schema in mind. Moreover, it just seems in keeping with Avicenna's general habits as a philosopher to think in this way: wherever possible, Avicenna builds more complex activities on existing psychological faculties, and highlights ways in which the intellect depends on animal faculties.<sup>123</sup> There is ample evidence that some distinctly human cognitive capacities engage the

<sup>121</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256, 259.

<sup>122</sup> See text from *Healing: Psychology* 4.4 discussed in 1.4 above.

<sup>123</sup> As Avicenna says in *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, the practical intellect depends on the body and its faculties for "all" its actions, and the theoretical intellect is in mostly the same position (with an exception later made for the reception of intelligibles). See 5.1, 208.

internal senses, and the schema being described here would just be a parallel to that on the motive side of the soul.<sup>124</sup>

## 2.2 The Practical Intellect as a Motive Principle

The practical intellect is relevant to the discussion of emotions insofar as the practical intellect is a “principle of motion.” In chapter one we saw how Avicenna refers to appetitive faculties as motive *faculties*, strictly speaking. Motive *principle* is a more general category for Avicenna, comprising motive faculties (concupiscible appetite, etc.), and any cognitive faculties that can trigger those motive faculties. That is, to call a cognitive faculty a motive principle is just to refer to that cognitive faculty insofar as it is able to trigger acts of actual motive faculties. This distinction between motive principles and motive faculties (shown in the texts discussed below) helps clarify what is unique about human emotions, and what they have in common with animal emotions. That is, human emotions have a unique motive principle (they have a uniquely human cognitive causes), though they are ultimately activations of the shared animal motive faculty (albeit of a distinctive variety). He uses this terminology in two main places in *Healing: Psychology*. The notion of the practical intellect as a motive principle first arises in Avicenna’s overview of the human soul’s faculties in 1.5:

The practical [intellect] is a faculty that is the motive principle [*madba’ muḥarrrik*] for the human body towards concrete acts that are particularly associated with deliberation [*rawīya*]—deliberation, that is, in accordance with the demands of beliefs that are particularly associated with it [the practical intellect] about that which is conventional. And it [the practical intellect] has an activity in cooperation with [lit: an aspect in relation to: *lahā i’ tibār bil-qiyās ilā*] the animal motive/appetitive [*al-nazū’ iyya*] faculty, and an activity in cooperation with the animal imaginative, estimative power, and an activity proper to itself.<sup>125</sup>

From this text, it seems that for the practical intellect to be a motive *principle* is for it be related to motion, but not necessarily in as direct a sense as the motive faculty [*al-nazū’ iyya*], with which it is said to merely have a cooperative relationship. We will unpack the various cooperative relationships mentioned in the above text shortly, but for now we just want to continue laying out the basic terminology. To that end, we can see Avicenna again using the specification of “motive principle” in *Psychology* 5.1, just after giving a more detailed account of the practical and theoretical intellect:

<sup>124</sup> The chief example of this on the cognitive side of things is how Avicenna calls the imagination the cogitative faculty when it is engaged in carrying out functions for the intellect. See Black (2013).

<sup>125</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 45-46.

For each person has a sensitive judgmental faculty [lit: a sensitive judge], and an estimative judgmental faculty ([that operates] in the realm of imagination), and intellectual and practical judgmental faculties. And there are motive principles [*al-mabādi` al-bā`itha*] that are relevant to the faculty that resolves on the movement of the organs, and these are estimative imagination, the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other [non-human] animals have three of these [motive principles].<sup>126</sup>

Here he says that humans are able to make four types of “judgments”: sensitive, estimative, theoretical, and practical. Moreover, humans have four “motive principles [*al-mabādi` al-bā`itha*],” which play a central role in bringing about a resolution<sup>127</sup> to actual motion: estimative imagination, practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties.<sup>128</sup> As we saw when Avicenna initially distinguished the animal motive faculties from the animal apprehending faculties, there is a basic division between the motive and the apprehensive, so by calling all four of these faculties motive principles, he cannot mean that the faculties which show up in both of these lists are primarily motive *and* cognitive. Rather, practical intellect and estimation are primarily identified as cognitive faculties, but they are also more relevant to motion in some way than sensation and the theoretical intellect (which are left off this list), making the former motive principles, and the later not. The practical intellect is *not*, on its own, the subject of an inclination, or appetite, but it accounts for different types of judgments that result in different actualizations of the animal motive faculties. The appetitive faculties are motive faculties, and can be called motive principles, but “motive principle” is a broader designation than “motive faculty,” since the former includes cognitive faculties, while the later does not.

In a general sense, the practical intellect is related to actions, because it deliberates about what it is appropriate to do. Both the mode (deliberation) and the content (pertaining to action) distinguish the practical intellectual from the theoretical intellect. The Arabic word for deliberation, *rawīya*, is a translation of the Greek *boulēsis*. Unlike the theoretical intellect, the goal of the practical intellect is not to acquire universal information. Rather, information we already possess is used to make judgments that relate to action in the realm of the variable and corruptible. Nonetheless, Avicenna’s way of describing the practical intellect in the above text is quite broad, as there are multiple processes that affect what sort of action is ultimately taken. These multiple processes require that the practical intellect cooperates with other faculties, which

<sup>126</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

<sup>127</sup> On the distinction between “resolution” and “inclination” see chapter 3 of this dissertation. In brief, resolution is the motive state wherein we are resolved on a particular course of action, and which triggers concrete motion (unless there is an impediment) as opposed to merely inclining towards some end.

<sup>128</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

is why Avicenna says at the end of the above text that the practical intellect has an “aspect in relation” to several powers. This is just another way of saying that, because humans have rationality, they have the capacity to guide their actions by reason, and this capacity augments or makes use of other capacities already present in the animal soul.

Avicenna goes on to specify three ways that our ability to deliberate about action plays out, i.e., the “aspects in relation” to several powers that belong to the practical intellect. Avicenna presents them in following order: the practical intellect in relation to 1) the motive faculties, 2) imagination and estimation, and 3) the intellect itself (practical and theoretical):

[1] It cooperates with the animal appetitive faculty in the sense that<sup>129</sup> there occur in it [the practical intellect<sup>130</sup>] states [*hay' āt*] that characterize a human by which one is prepared for quickness of action or passion, such as shame [*khajal*], embarrassment [*hayā'*], laughter [*dahka*], crying [*bukā'*], and [other actions or passions] similar to those.

[2] It cooperates with the animal imaginative and estimative faculty in the sense that it joins to them when it is occupied with deducing methods of management in generable, corruptible matters and humans arts.

[3] And has an activity proper to itself wherein beliefs are engendered between the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect that relate to actions and [which beliefs are] commonly accepted, [being] widely known [*dhā' i' a*], like that lying is bad and injustice is bad—not by means of demonstration or anything like that [derived] from defined premises. The distinction [between these practical beliefs] and the primary intelligibles is set out in the books of logic, even though were [the beliefs of the practical intellect] logically considered, they would come from the intelligibles in accordance with what is in the books of logic.<sup>131</sup>

These are presented as three separate aspects, but they add up to a complete picture, showing how judgments of the practical intellect lead to acts of the animal motive faculty. Since acts of the animal motive faculty are equivalent to emotions, seeing how these three aspects relate this can help us understand how at least one variety of uniquely human emotions occurs.

Beginning at [3], the first thing deliberation needs to get off the ground is a universal judgment of some class of objects or actions as having some value. It is thanks to our capacity to engage in theoretical thought that we know things like “lying and injustice are bad,” to use Avicenna’s examples. In *Psychology* 5.1 Avicenna says that the practical intellect is “supplied by” the

<sup>129</sup> Lit: “its aspect in relation to the animal appetitive power is the respect, in view of which...” The same locution is used at the start of the following paragraphs.

<sup>130</sup> This “it” is ambiguous, but it seems to refer to the practical intellect, for two reasons: 1) rhetorically, there is a parallelism between the first and the second paragraph, and it is even more clear in the second paragraph that the “it” refers to the practical intellect. 2) philosophically, the character traits that govern human emotions would be states of the practical intellect, as discussed below.

<sup>131</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 46.

theoretical intellect for these, the major premises of syllogisms related to a practical matters.<sup>132</sup> The typical way of coming to such evaluative judgments is through something less epistemically strong than demonstration,<sup>133</sup> but as they are a type of universal judgment, they nonetheless are grasped by the theoretical intellect, and then supplied to the practical intellect.

Of course, universal judgments on their own cannot lead to action in the realm of particulars, which is why Avicenna clarifies at [2] that the practical intellect needs to cooperate with the internal senses, in particular imagination and estimation. Prior to cooperation with the internal senses, universal judgments of value are being used to label particular objects as worth pursuing or not, and to evaluate courses of action, or “methods of management,” as worth pursuing or not. But it is one thing to know that lying is bad, and this the practical intellect gets from the theoretical intellect. It is another thing to identify a particular instance of lying (actual or possible) as good or bad, and to in fact pursue or avoid it. This is why Avicenna later says, in 5.1, that the practical intellect needs, in all its actions, the body and its faculties<sup>134</sup>: the practical intellect does not need the body to deliberate in a general sense about what sort of actions are appropriate—this is its relation “to itself.” But the point of these general judgments is to judge particular objects and initiate action, and that cannot be done without dealing with particulars.<sup>135</sup>

Avicenna’s discussion of the practical intellect’s “aspect in relation” to the motive faculty at [1] focuses on the fact that the practical intellect can develop unique dispositions towards emotions that are not present in animals. He is not focused simply on the fact *that* the practical intellect causes acts of the motive faculty, which appears to be something he takes for granted. What he is focused on explaining here is one of the ways in which the state of the practical intellect (that is, the state of our habits of mind and beliefs about practical matters) can influence the motive faculty.

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<sup>132</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207.

<sup>133</sup> This is why Avicenna says that they “widespread” and become “widely known,” referring to the sort of premises they are: not scientific or primary premises, but premises accepted on the basis of authority or communal consensus. This is discussed more in chapter three.

<sup>134</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

<sup>135</sup> There is quite a lot summarized quickly in the text we are unpacking here, and much of chapter three will be dedicated to unpacking the particular cognitions that give rise to acts of the motive faculty. In this chapter we will mostly be taking for granted that animals and humans have the capacity to evaluate particular objects, and that these evaluations give rise to the emotions.



Just as animals can develop dispositions towards certain emotions without the practical intellect, so humans can develop a unique variety of dispositions because of the practical intellect. Some of the actualizations of the animal appetitive faculty mentioned above are emotions of the sort also experienced by animals, and some, as we will see, are uniquely human emotions,<sup>136</sup> but Avicenna's point here is not to go into detail about emotions as such. Rather, it seems that he is describing something like character traits, rooted in the practical intellect, which govern emotions. That this is the case is confirmed as he goes on in the following paragraphs of 1.5 to elaborate on how the practical intellect's relation to the body accounts for good or bad moral dispositions (*aklhāq*).<sup>137</sup> If the practical intellect is influenced by what is "above" it (the judgements of the theoretical intellect), good morals are developed. If influenced negatively by what is "below" it (the needs of the animal and vegetative faculties), bad morals are developed. Since the practical intellect is primarily a cognitive faculty, and influences the appetitive faculty insofar as it is a cognitive faculty, these character traits are probably constituted by firmly held beliefs, or habitual modes of thought. For example, if you firmly hold the belief that lying is bad, that is a kind of good character trait, and it will have implications for when you experience shame: if you yourself lie, and firmly believe lying is bad, you are likely to experience shame with little need for new deliberation. This "aspect" of the practical intellect, then, is just an extension of its standard, deliberative role.

More could be said about the topics brought up in the above text. We will examine the cognitions that give rise to inclinations and actual motion in chapter three in more detail, and moral dispositions in chapter four. But for now it is enough to see that the practical intellect is a cognitive faculty, and gives rise to motive states, unique to humans, thanks to its particular cognitions. It depends on the theoretical intellect to form evaluative judgments, and it depends on the internal senses to apply these evaluations to particulars.

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<sup>136</sup> See the next section of this chapter.

<sup>137</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 46-47.

## 2.3 Avicenna's Discussions of Specific Uniquely Human Emotions

The practical intellect's role as the highest motive principle might lead one to think it is obviously the root of all human emotions, but Avicenna actually spends time unpacking particular human emotions in a portion of 5.1 that is not explicitly related to either the theoretical or practical intellect. As mentioned earlier, Avicenna says in *Psychology* 4.4 that he will eventually discuss “states unique to the rational soul.” This seems to have been an indication that he would continue his discussion of states of the animal motive faculty (i.e., emotions), but with respect to cognitions that are uniquely human.

Avicenna begins 5.1 by discussing activities unique to humans, such as engaging in trade and linguistic communication. These are obviously activities unique to humans, but they do not necessarily involve uniquely human emotions. Trade can be a way of acting on concupiscible appetite, and linguistic communication could help fulfill an inclination towards the internal/imaginative pleasure of familial relations.

It is when Avicenna switches to talking about “affections [*infi' ālāt*]” unique to humans in 5.1 that he is clearly not just interested in behavior unique to humans, but in unique emotions. *Infi' āl* is another generic term Avicenna sometimes uses to circumscribe similar phenomena that fall under the heading of *inbi' āth* and *nizā'*. *Infi' āl* does not as precisely pick out the functional role that these phenomena serve in his psychology as does the idea of “inclination,” since it means more generally “passion,” or “that which one undergoes.” But it is a term that was in use to refer to emotions/inclinations prior to Avicenna, so it makes sense that he would use it here.

The uniquely human emotions discussed in 5.1 do not seem to be chosen with an eye to being comprehensive or systematic, but each emotion is analyzed with an eye to what makes the cognitions that cause it uniquely human. The discussion can be broken in roughly three sections: 1) a discussion of wonder and grief, uniquely human emotions that also have uniquely human physical manifestations, 2) shame, a uniquely human emotion in response to behavior grasped as bad according to social norms, and 3) fear and hope with respect to the future, emotions based on a sense of time that is uniquely human.

As we look through these three sections, there will be two main take-aways. Firstly, we will see that these uniquely human emotions all depend on uniquely human judgments, as would be expected. But secondly, Avicenna makes no mention of which intellectual faculty—practical or theoretical—is behind these emotions. The emotions do not all seem obviously related to the sorts of concrete actions practical intellect is posited to explain, so it is possible that some of them are inclinations humans have as a result of more theoretical judgments.<sup>138</sup> In other words, as will be discussed more in chapter 3, the practical intellect is posited primarily to account for engaging in deliberative thought, as when we construct practical syllogisms. Likewise, the theoretical intellect's proper act is grasping universal knowledge from the Agent Intellect. Neither of these activities seems to clearly capture what is going on in the judgments described below. We might make assumptions about which faculty is responsible for the judgments that cause human emotions, but ultimately this is something that Avicenna is not particularly concerned to specify. They are judgments of which only humans are capable, and that is sufficient to distinguish them from the judgments behind animal emotions.

### 2.3.1 Wonder and Grief

When Avicenna discusses wonder and grief, he is interested in showing that these emotions are caused by uniquely human cognitions, but also that they are accompanied by noteworthy, uniquely human physical manifestations:

One of the distinguishing characteristics of humans is that there follows upon his apprehension of rare/witty [*nādira*] things an affection [*infī'āl*] which is called wonder [*al-ta'ajjub*], and laughter follows [wonder]. And following his apprehension of harmful things there is an affection [*infī'āl*] called grief [*dajār*], which is followed by crying.<sup>139</sup>

Let us first consider wonder. On the surface, what Avicenna says here needs little explanation: when we see something rare, we wonder at it, and sometimes laugh (“Ha! Isn't that something!”). Avicenna discusses wonder extensively in the *Poetics* section of his *Healing*. Wonder is not limited to poetry, but turning briefly to that text can help give us more insight into the nature of wonder in general, and what makes it so distinctively human.

<sup>138</sup> Analogous to pleasure-emotions, caused by judgments of being in a completion-state, as discussed in chapter one.

<sup>139</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 204.

In *Healing: Poetics*, wonder arises in the context of how imaginative speech can affect humans. Generally speaking, imaginative speech, or speech that evokes images in the listeners, is the sort of speech found in most poetry. Avicenna's most sustained discussion of imaginative speech begins with a contrast of the sort of acquiescence caused by poetry with the sort of acquiescence caused by more scientific syllogisms:

Imaginative speech [*al-mukhayyil*] is speech to which the soul acquiesces [*tadh'an*], such that it accepts or rejects matters without deliberation, cogitation, or choice [*min ghayr rawīya wa-fikr wa-ikhtiyār*]. In sum, the soul is affected on account of [such speech] emotionally [*infi'ālan nafsāniyyan*], not through discursive thought [*fikriyyan*].<sup>140</sup>

When we connect with some bit of poetry, or hear a persuasive scientific argument, in both cases the soul acquiesces to something. But in the case of poetry, the images affect us emotionally, while scientific arguments cause what Avicenna terms “assent” (*taṣdīq*). To use Avicenna's example of imaginative acquiescence, if a poet describes so-and-so as a moon, because they are handsome, the listener may come to be convinced—in a manner of speaking—that that person is a moon, even when they know that this is literally false.<sup>141</sup> On the other hand, when someone is convinced by a scientific argument, they assent to the proposition as literally true.

Of course, this raises the question of just what constitutes imaginative acquiescence. In the prior text Avicenna glosses it as a kind of emotional affect, and shortly thereafter he fills out the picture.

Imagination is a kind of acquiescence, and assent is a kind of acquiescence, but imagination is acquiescence owing to the wonder [*ta'ajjub*] and pleasure caused by the speech, while assent is acquiescence owing to acceptance that the thing is as it is said to be.<sup>142</sup>

So when you acquiesce to the thought that so-and-so is a moon, the acquiescence is based on an imagination of the relevant image, but it is constituted by the fact that you wonder or take pleasure in the speech. Imaginative acquiescence requires a skilled poet to deploy images in creative and evocative ways,<sup>143</sup> but the acquiescence is achieved when the image stirs up an emotional reaction. To react emotionally to an image is to acquiesce to it.

<sup>140</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Poetics* (1973) 161.

<sup>141</sup> Black (1990) 212.

<sup>142</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Poetics* (1973) 162.

<sup>143</sup> Discussed at Harb (2013) 28-29.

In a section on imaginative propositions in the logical part of Avicenna's *Remarks and Admonitions*, Avicenna adds more to our picture of the role played by wonder: "Imagined propositions are such that, when they are stated, they leave in the soul an astonishing effect [*ta'thīr 'ajīb*] of tension or release [*qabḍ wa-baṣṭ*]." <sup>144</sup> The word translated as "astonishing" is derived from the same root as the word for "wonder" in the text from the last paragraph. The connection is unlikely to be an accident, and indeed it would make sense if this were a way of clarifying that wonder is characterized by feelings of both tension and release. Often the flow of great poetry is designed to do just that, and the release can itself lead to what Avicenna says is a characteristic physical manifestation of wonder, namely, laughter.

As for laughter itself, this is clearly something that comes after the emotion of wonder, but presumably Avicenna includes it here because of its uniqueness to humans. Laughter holds a notable place within Aristotelian works on psychology, because of Aristotle's statement in *Parts of Animals* that humans are the only animal that laugh. <sup>145</sup> *Parts of Animals* was translated in the 8th century, along with *History of Animals* and *Generation of Animals*, by Yaḥyā Ibn al-Biṭrīq <sup>146</sup>, so Avicenna would have been aware of this specification. In *Parts of Animals*, Aristotle mentions laughter as unique to humans due to the physical makeup of their diaphragm. Given Avicenna's focus on the cognitions leading to wonder and laughter here, it is plausible to take this as a suggestion that laughter is also unique to humans because of the sort of cognitions required to give rise to laughter. That is, we may laugh in response to the wondrousness of art, broadly construed, insofar as it thwarts expectations, surprises, grips us, and creates a kind of tension and release.

Returning to Avicenna's original definition of wonder in *Psychology* 5.1, then, we see that wonder is caused by an apprehension of rare/witty things, paradigmatically found in poetry. Wonder can be further glossed as a feeling of tension and release, which often leads to laughter, a uniquely human behavior. That Avicenna does not mention poetry in 5.1 suggests that wonder need not be limited to poetry. But the sort of creativity and rational activity that goes into poetry,

<sup>144</sup> *Remarks: Logic* (1960) p. 362 (Dunya). Here using Inati's translation (p. 127), modifying her translation of "distress or pleasure" to "tension or release."

<sup>145</sup> Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* (2002) 3.10, 673a.

<sup>146</sup> Ibn al-Nadīm ascribes a translation to Ibn al-Biṭrīq. This was doubted by Endress, but Hugonnard-Roche resolves those doubts and confirms the ascription at 'Les Livres sur les animaux d'Aristote' (2017) 173-4, footnote 3.

and thereby the sort of rational activity required to appreciate what is wondrous about poetry, makes it clear why this emotion would only be available to humans.

The other uniquely human emotion Avicenna discusses here is grief (*ḍajar*). This is the only time Avicenna uses this term in the context of emotions, so it is difficult to know exactly how to translate it, yet grief seems appropriate for several reasons. Lane's Lexicon gives numerous instances of translating *ḍajar* as being vexed, annoyed, frustrated, due to some sort of grief or loss. It appears to be a negative emotion, caused by the loss of something, especially a loved one. Moreover, Avicenna lists a characteristic physical manifestation following *ḍajar* to be crying, which does seem uniquely tied to grief. The Latins translated *ḍajar* as *anxietas*, which is of course an emotion that pervades human life<sup>147</sup>, and could lead to crying. But mere anxiety does not seem as uniquely human as grief: no doubt animals miss their loved ones when they are apart (we saw Avicenna describe as much in *Psychology* 4.4, which we looked at in chapter one)<sup>148</sup>, but there is no clear parallel in the animal world to what humans do in terms of funerals, lamenting and grieving (at least none that Avicenna seems to have been aware of).

In addition to these observations, comments in two predecessors suggest that grief over the loss of a loved one is likely what Avicenna may mean by *ḍajar*. The term *ḍajar* is used in al-Balkhī's *Sustenance of the Soul*, grouped together with *ḥuzn* and *ghamm*, (two other general negative emotions) and *ghaḍab* (anger), and opposed to pains that afflict the body.<sup>149</sup> On its own, this is not illuminating, but by seeing *ḍajar* associated with *ghamm* in a generic context, we can assume that there is some fluidity between the terms. Then, in a work written around the same period, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's *Spiritual Physick*, we see *ghamm* described as a kind of unbearable suffering caused by rational reflection on loss of a loved one.<sup>150</sup> *Ghamm*, according to Rāzī, is uniquely human, apparently both because of the unique bonds humans make with family and friends, and because of our ability to conceptualize a loss as a loss. Both of these points indicate that there was a notion of grief over the loss of a loved one as a uniquely human emotion floating around

<sup>147</sup> Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (1968) 5.1, vol. 2, p. 74.

<sup>148</sup> See chapter one, section 1.3, text [a].

<sup>149</sup> Page 515 in the Arabic text.

<sup>150</sup> Chapter 12, *Spiritual Physick*, page 23 in the Arabic edition. Avicenna mentions *ghamm* as an irascible emotion at *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 195. Discussed in chapter one, section 1.4.

prior to Avicenna, and it makes sense that that is what he would be referring to in this section under the heading of *dajar*.

Humans' propensity to cry is common throughout ancient discussions of emotions, but Avicenna seems to be the first to group it with laughter as a manifestation of a uniquely human emotion. Galen is the first to discuss the tear duct in detail, and he notes that one of its functions is to release moisture from the lacrimal glands.<sup>151</sup> His discussion makes no mention of this being unique to humans, since of course it is not. But animals moistening their eyes out of physical necessity is different from what it is like to cry, and Avicenna seems to pick up on the difference.

Today there is debate about whether humans are, in fact, the only animals that cry or laugh, and after many more years of animal observation it is by no means clear that these physical manifestations do signify uniquely human inclinations. But the fact that there is lively debate about these phenomena shows that it was astute for Avicenna to have pointed it out.

Avicenna does not state explicitly why he chose to group these two emotions together. The most obvious reason would be that wonder and grief are uniquely human emotions, known to be so because of the uniquely human cognitions that cause them (apprehensions of rare/witty wondrous things, and apprehensions of loss, respectively), *and because* they lead to apparently uniquely human physical manifestations. Not every uniquely human emotion Avicenna goes on to discuss also has a unique physical behavior associated with it, so that makes wonder and grief a suitable pair.<sup>152</sup>

### 2.3.2 Shame as a Response to Social Order

Avicenna's overview of uniquely human emotions continues with shame. He introduces the concept of shame by discussing the way that humans set up moral standards for communal benefit in a way that animals do not:

And something that is particular to humans is that there are some acts which it is not appropriate to do—for the sake of mutual association and what is beneficial. One begins to learn this when they are small, and grow

<sup>151</sup> Galen, *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body* (1968) 489-490.

<sup>152</sup> It is certainly going beyond what is explicit in the text, but one might speculate that these emotions are also the two key emotions associated with the poetic genres of comedy and tragedy, respectively. Though Aristotle's treatise on comedy was lost, Avicenna would have known that comedy and tragedy were two main poetic, dramatic forms, one typically leading to wonder and laughter, and the other to grief and tears.

up learning it, accustomed from youth to hearing that such-and-such is not appropriate to do, so that this belief becomes like an instinct [*ka-al-gharīzī*]. And there are other acts contrary to [the inappropriate ones], and the first are called bad, the latter good.

This is not the case with other animals. For if other animals abandon the acts which it is their wont [205] to do (like when a lion is trained not to eat its master or its offspring), the cause for this is not a belief [*i' tiqād*] in the soul or a kind of knowledge [*ra'y*], but rather a different kind of disposition [*hay'a*], e.g., that the animal prefers by nature the existence of what pleases him [i.e., food], and the survival of [the person who gives him food], such that the one who provides for him and who feeds him becomes pleasurable to him, because everything which is beneficial is by nature pleasurable to the one benefited. So the thing preventing [the lion's] tearing apart [its owner] is not a belief, but rather some disposition [*hay'a*], some other psychological state [*'arīd nafsāniyya*].

And it is possible that this state could occur due to nature [*jibilla*], or as a kind of divine inspiration [*ilhām ilāhī*], as in the love of every animal for its offspring. And this happens without any kind of belief at all. Rather, [this state] is like the imagining by some human [that] something is beneficial and pleasurable, or his distaste for something in whose form there is that which repels him.

Humans form complex societies, and standards have arisen in order to promote the common good. The way we typically come to learn these standards is not by way of logical proofs, but rather by education: we are told that something is wrong over and over, until this belief becomes ingrained in us.<sup>153</sup> This is an illustration of how "widely known" practical beliefs spread, something we have already seen Avicenna say is characteristic of the practical intellect's activity.<sup>154</sup>

This is not the most epistemically strong sort of belief, but it is more than non-human animals have. Non-human animals might seem to be cooperating for the common good at times, such as by not eating their masters, but what is actually going on there is something more basic and related to simple sensory pleasures and pains. Animals want to eat, because this gives them pleasure, and they know that their master brings them food, so their master is associated with pleasure. At no point are animals motivated by any kind of propositional belief, much less a societal standard. They just do what is in their interest, for the sake of pleasure.

Because of this cognitive difference, a difference in emotional experience follows. Avicenna uses the above insights to offer his analysis of the uniquely human emotion of shame:

<sup>153</sup> The way Avicenna discusses human moral development here is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of virtue, acquired as a second nature, by habitation, in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 2.1.

<sup>154</sup> See section 2.2.



And there follows from a person's awareness that someone else is aware that he did something which it is agreed upon that one should not do a psychological affection [*infi' āl nafsānī*] called shame [*khajal*]. And this is also one of the distinguishing characteristics of humans.<sup>155</sup>

The reason humans can experience shame, and brute animals cannot, is that animals do not set up moral standards for communal benefit. Shame occurs specifically when you know that you have done something wrong (according to agreed-upon societal standards) and you know that someone else also knows that you have done that same thing wrong. This would make shame different than guilt, which seems able to be felt even if no one else is aware. Shame requires the scrutiny and judgment of another person, and reference to agreed-upon standards. One does not typically feel shame as a result of the judgment of someone from another culture, with whose moral standards they are not in agreement. Non-human animals cannot feel shame since, of course, they do not have communal moral beliefs, or the capacity to form them.

### 2.3.3 Fear and Hope: Emotions Related to a Uniquely Human Awareness of Time

Avicenna concludes his discussion of uniquely human emotions by describing those that are in response to objects that might cause harm or pleasure in the future. The two names he uses for emotions that can be about future objects, fear [*al-khawf*] and hope [*al-rajā'*], are sometimes also used for animal inclination. However, Avicenna explains that certain types of fear and hope are unique to humans:

And when someone believes something in the future will harm them, there could occur to that person a psychological emotion [*infi' āl nafsānī*] called fear [*al-khawf*]. Other animals only have [an emotion concerning harm] in relation to what they think of as likely to occur in the present, and connected to the present.

And in contrast with [future-oriented] fear, humans have hope [*al-rajā'*], while animals have [hope] merely in relation to the present, and for that which is not far off from the present. That which animals do is rote, and because they are not aware of time nor that which pertains to it. Indeed, [what animals have] is a kind of instinct [lit: a kind of inspiration; *ḍarb min al-ilhām*]; for example, that which ants do in terms of moving provisions to their burrow (which signals rain) [this behavior is because] they imagine that there is something which is happening at that time, just like when an animal flees an opponent when it imagines that the other one is going to strike him at that time.<sup>156</sup>

Aristotle noticed the relevance of time to psychology in *De Anima* 3.10, saying that it is humans' ability to perceive time that allows them to resist now-oriented animal appetite, putting off such

<sup>155</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 205.

<sup>156</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 205-206.

immediate pleasures for the sake of future goods.<sup>157</sup> Avicenna is less interested here in conflicting inclinations, than in the fact that perception of time makes certain uniquely human emotions possible. It is the difference between the attempt to restrain a present concupiscible appetite out of considerations for the future (what Aristotle was focused on in *De Anima* 3.10), and having fear or hope about some possible pleasure or harm that does not yet exist (what Avicenna is focused on).

Avicenna explains elsewhere what he means by time, and human perception of it,<sup>158</sup> but it is uncontroversial in his tradition that humans have the ability to perceive time, and other animals in general do not.<sup>159</sup> Admittedly, some animals exhibit behavior where it looks like they are aware of time, and even seem to prepare for the future. Themistius, commenting on *De Anima* 3.10, speculates that this may be because select animals, like ants and bees, do in fact perceive time.<sup>160</sup> But in the above text Avicenna has a different explanation for that behavior: some sort of instinct prompts them to imagine that it is raining in the present, and presumably to imagine that it is just about to rain in the present, which provokes behavior that to us looks like preparation.

Despite Avicenna seeming to talk about present- and future-oriented hope and fear, it is perhaps just as likely that his point in this passage is that hope and fear—properly understood—are themselves uniquely human emotions, with animals simply having analogous emotions related to the present. We may sometimes call the animal analogues "hope" and "fear," but they are really something substantially different. Even in the above text, Avicenna never explicitly says that animals have hope and fear. He says that humans have hope and fear, which are future-oriented, and that animals also have emotions that are similar, but related to the present. Beyond the ambiguity of the above text, Avicenna's definitions of these emotions elsewhere in his work support thinking of them as uniquely human.

Avicenna discusses fear in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, and hope earlier in the *Psychology*, and both of these discussions focus on these emotions as future-oriented. The opening of his discussion of fear is as follows:

<sup>157</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5-10.

<sup>158</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Physics* (2009) 2.10-11.

<sup>159</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5ff.

<sup>160</sup> Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, p. 221, 120.10ff.

And as for fear, it is a pain [*huzn*] and agitation [*ikhtilāf*] of the soul, on account of [*li*] imagining an expected, debilitating evil either reaching [total] corruption or not. Not every evil is feared. For envy or a person's being licentious are among the sort of things that are not feared. Among evil things, that which is feared is that which will harm the one to whom it will occur, with corruption or pain, and it [the object of fear] is *something in the future*. As for that which has passed, or that which occurred, fear about it has passed away. And the object of fear is, despite its *being in the future, expected, i.e., close to happening*. For that which is far off is not feared. For that reason not everyone fears death, but rather only he fears it who is on the brink of it. So objects of fear, then, are those things which have the ability to inflict this sort of harm.

For something to be an object of fear, it must be some appropriate distance in the future. Fear is not about things in the present, but it is also not about things so far off in the future that they do not seem to be a reality. Death is certainly not a pleasant thought, but according to Avicenna, only those on the brink of death (for whom it is something expected) fear it. The rest of us, perhaps, just have angst or worry about death.

Avicenna's definition of hope earlier in the *Psychology* comes in the midst of his discussion of the estimative faculty and memory. Specifically, he is trying to show how connected the internal senses are, such that experiencing an emotion could arouse memories of something that previously caused that emotion, or how thinking of some prior cause of an emotion could re-trigger the emotion again. When he switches to talking about hope and wishful thinking, he does not draw these points as explicitly:

Wishful thinking [*al-amānī*] and hope [*al-rajā'*] also do that. And hope [*al-rajā'*] is different from wishful thinking [*al-umniyya*], for hope [*al-rajā'*] is the imagination of something with the judgment or belief that it *probably [will] exist*, while wishful thinking [*al-umniyya*] is the imagination of something and the desire for it [*shahwatihi*] along with the judgment that [*it*] *would cause* pleasure [*iltidhādih*] if it came about. And fear [*al-khawf*] is opposed to hope [*al-rajā'*] by means of contrariety, and despair [*al-ya's*] is the opposite of [wishful thinking]. And all of these are judgments belonging to estimation.<sup>161</sup>

Both wishful thinking and hope are future-oriented emotions, directed at good objects. But hope, according to Avicenna, brings with it the expectation that the good in question will probably exist, whereas wishful thinking just has the expectation that the good in question would cause pleasure. So hope is a bit more expectant, wishful thinking a bit more like daydreaming. In any case, hope, like fear, is defined as fundamentally future-oriented.

But, of course, animals wait for their food with expectation, and they shrink away from their master's rod, which is why in the above texts Avicenna does not deny that animals have

<sup>161</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 187.

something like fear and hope. So what is the difference? If it were just a matter of degrees (something in the near future versus the far off future) that would not be much of a difference.

The key difference seems to have to do with the idea of expectation. When animals wait for food in the present, the focus is on wanting the food, not the expectation that it will occur. When animals "fear" their master's discipline in the present, they are aware that the bad thing is in fact about to happen. There is no reckoning up of probability and expectation-forming, there is just the reality that they are about to be punished.

It is worth mentioning that there is a system of classification of emotions developed prior to Avicenna—by the Stoics—that likewise makes key divisions in relation to time. Nonetheless, it is not obviously a forerunner to the specific distinctions Avicenna makes in this passage. That is, the Stoics (whom Avicenna knew second hand, mostly via Galen) generally held to a fourfold classification of basic emotions, divided according to object (good or bad) and time (present or future). An emotion towards the good in the present is called pleasure, towards a good in the future is called desire. An emotion towards something bad in the present is pain/distress, towards something bad in the future is called fear.<sup>162</sup> The difference between this set of distinctions, and the one Avicenna is unpacking in *Psychology* 5.1, is that pleasure and pain/distress have to do with the actual occurrence of some good or harm. There is no expectation. Whatever analogous emotions Avicenna thinks animals have to future-oriented fear and hope, they are not pleasure and pain/distress.

To summarize, the emotions Avicenna points out here, unique to humans, are distinguished as follows: wonder and grief, which are typically accompanied by laughter and crying, respectively, shame in response to others being aware of your violating social norms, and future-oriented fear and hope (which may just be standard fear and hope). In Avicenna's descriptions of these emotions, explanatory emphasis is placed on the intellectual acts that precede them, but he does not specify whether it is the practical or theoretical intellect at work. Presumably it is some combination of the two.

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<sup>162</sup> Knuuttila (2004) 51-52.

## 2.4 Pleasures of the Rational Soul

The third broad category of uniquely human emotions Avicenna discusses are pleasures of the intellect, and here again Avicenna does not specify whether he has the theoretical or practical intellect in mind. As discussed in chapter 1, a pleasurable emotion occurs when a faculty attains some completion, and the agent is aware of having done so, while pain is awareness of some defect or lack of completion. So a pleasure of the theoretical intellect is what happens when the theoretical intellect performs its function of grasping intelligibles. This is an activity that does not seem to involve the practical intellect. So, whereas the unique emotions in the prior section (shame, wonder, etc.) were not clearly assigned to any intellectual faculty in particular, and may be interpreted as belonging to the theoretical intellect, the practical, or a combination of both, these human emotions are more clearly emotions of the theoretical intellect alone.

In *Remarks and Admonitions* Avicenna discusses intellectual pleasures of the theoretical intellect as the highest sort of pleasure. It is the highest sort of pleasure, both because of the nature of the object being apprehended, and because of the nature of the faculty apprehending that object. Avicenna describes various things that fall under the scope of the theoretical intellect's object: the First Truth, celestial substances, and indeed the whole of existence, in the sense of the various essences that exist, free of material attachments.<sup>163</sup> These objects are more abstract and stable than the objects of sensation, and to grasp them requires a faculty more able to penetrate to those depths.

When any of those objects are grasped by the theoretical intellect, humans experience the highest pleasure available to them, in this life or the next. Of course, it is more difficult to experience the pleasures of the theoretical intellect in this life, because we are prone to be distracted by the body, but Avicenna insists that we do get glimpses of it nonetheless, if we work hard at reducing those distractions.<sup>164</sup> Some people might question whether such pleasures are actually more intense than those of lower faculties, but to this Avicenna simply responds that they must be the sort of people who are weighed down by worldly distractions.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9.

<sup>164</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.15-16.

<sup>165</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.2.

Despite the fact that the theoretical intellect does not attain its specific acts of grasping intelligibles through a physical organ, when that is done in this life these acts nonetheless have an effect on lower faculties. An example of this comes early on in *Healing: Psychology*, in the midst of Avicenna's initial effort to define the soul as a substance and first actuality of the body. There, he explains the soul's relationship to the body in a way that highlights the effects from distinctly human emotions on the vegetative faculties. The point of this in context is just to show that the human soul's potential separability does not prevent it from having important connections to the body in this life. The complex passage has been numbered throughout for the sake of reference below:

And the governance of the soul over the body causes the strengthening of the faculty of *growth* and its weakening, in view of [1] the soul's awareness of propositions [*qaḍāyā*] that it [2] hates or loves with a hate that is not at all bodily. And that is when there is [3] occurring to the soul a certain assent [*taṣḍīqan mā*], and that is not at all that which affects the body insofar as it is a belief, but rather there follows from that belief [4] the affect [*infī'āl*] of joy [*surūr*] or pain [*ghamm*], and that also is one of the psychological apprehensions, and does not occur to the body insofar as it is body, [5] and [that joy or pain] affects the *growing, nutritive* power such that there occurs in it, on account of the occurrence that first occurs to the soul—let that be intellectual joy [*al-farah al-nuṭqī*—a strength and effectiveness in its act, and on account of the contrary occurrence—let that be intellectual pain [*al-ghamm al-nuṭqī*], in which there is no physical pain—a weakness and an impotence that corrupts its effectiveness. And perhaps the temperamental disposition will be broken down through that [weakness and impotence].<sup>166</sup>

To clarify, humans sometimes experience intellectual joy and pain, the terms he uses at [5]. At their core, these are intellectual acts, and as Avicenna says they do not occur to "the body insofar as it is a body ([4])." Intellectual joy and pain are caused by some sort of assent to a proposition ([1, 3]), which is also something that is "not at all bodily ([2])", but it is not specified whether he is talking about the practical or theoretical intellect. Presumably intellectual joy (a type of pleasure) or pain could be caused by either faculty reaching one of its completion states (i.e., doing that which they are uniquely suited to do).

The key thing to see for our passages is that the assent and intellectual joy or pain, despite being in themselves intellectual and non-bodily, have an effect on the body, described at ([5]). Intellectual joy causes a "strength of effectiveness" in the vegetative faculties, whereas intellectual pain causes a "weakness and an impotence" in the vegetative faculties. The only further description Avicenna gives of what he has in mind here is that because of intellectual pain, we might experience some sort of breakdown or corruption of our temperament. But it is

<sup>166</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.3, 31-32. Emphasis mine.

not difficult to fill in the blanks: as a medical doctor, Avicenna's basic point is probably just the observation that positive and negative emotions affect the whole person. Examples are most easily identifiable in what we know today about the negative physical effects of mental distress: stress can affect fertility, digestion, and more.

The way that higher pleasures are integrated with the body in this life for humans can be contrasted with discussions of pleasures experienced by celestial substances, and God, which Avicenna never refers to with the language of "passion (*infi'āl*)" that would imply passivity, or bodily affect. In particular, in the *Metaphysics*, in the midst of Avicenna's account of the attributes of God (i.e., the Necessary Existent), he says that God experiences pleasure in apprehending God's own nature. In keeping with the above definition, this means that God is in a state of perfection, and being aware of this is pleasurable. Indeed, paralleling his descriptions of human intellectual pleasure above, Avicenna says God's pleasure is of the highest sort, because it is the greatest perfection apprehended by the one who is most able to apprehend things.<sup>167</sup> As to the pleasure of the celestial substances, one place this comes up is when Avicenna describes the sort of pleasure humans will have once their rational soul is no longer associated with a body. He says that it is difficult to grasp this sort of pleasure, but that we know it will be like that which the celestial substances currently experience.<sup>168</sup> The pleasures of God and celestial substances are indeed pleasures, as they fall under the heading of "awareness of a perfection," but they do not really pertain to the discussion of emotions as such, presumably because they involve no bodily passion (i.e., no passivity).

## 2.5 Ennobling of the Lower Faculties by Higher Faculties

The foregoing senses in which humans' emotional life goes beyond animals' emotional life can be supplemented by some further distinctions made by Avicenna in an early work, *Treatise on Love*. That is, in *Treatise on Love*, Avicenna discusses how various higher faculties ennoble the lower faculties to which they are joined. The ennobling of the lower by the higher can take many forms, from correcting, to providing unique goals, to providing better methods of obtaining goals. This relationship is not necessarily exclusive to an emotional context (since, e.g., sensation

<sup>167</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 8.7, 297.

<sup>168</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 9.7, 352.

is also ennobled by proximity to the intellect), but it provides us with language for further describing, and perhaps gives us further instances of, the intellectual faculties functioning as motive principles. To the extent that the intellect corrects, or provides reasons and goals for different activations of the animal motive faculty, this adds to our picture of how Avicenna understands human emotional experience. Though Avicenna does not explicitly draw the connections in his later works (which we have been discussing) to what he discusses here, it is possible for the concepts discussed in *Treatise on Love* to shed light on what is going on in some of the previously discussed aspects of uniquely human emotional experience.

The *Treatise on Love* is so called because its broader goal is to show how everything—from inanimate objects to celestial bodies—moves on account of a love for that which is suitable for it. Avicenna's basic point here is teleological: everything flows from God, the source of existence, and naturally desires to return to God. That is, everything, owing to the sort of thing that it is, tends towards the Good to the extent that it is able. It is suitable for rocks to tend downwards, and to this extent they partake of the Good. Plants' characteristic acts—nutrition, growth, reproduction—reflect the Good, insofar as they aim at preservation of the species, which is an imitation of divine eternity.<sup>169</sup> Humans, here the subject of our focus, naturally desire knowledge, which is much closer to the nature of the Good.

What the *Treatise* has to say about uniquely human emotional life primarily comes up as an explanation of the senses in which animal appetites are integrated with the rational faculties involved in human pursuit towards the good. The issue he appears to be concerned with is that—having just described the objects of love for the vegetative and animal faculties—it seems as though humans, with still yet a third set of faculties in their nature, will be pulled in too many directions. He gets around this by arguing that, when combined in the same subject, lower faculties are ennobled, and thereby subordinated to the highest faculty's goals. The following passage is his most explicit statement to this effect:

Every one of the psychological faculties, whenever it is joined to a higher, more noble faculty, there occurs in it [lit: passes over into it] an increase in refinement and nobility, on account of this connection and the height of [the higher faculty's] beauty, such that actions proceeding from the lower faculty experience an increase, either in terms of number, or excellence of mastery, or elegance of their method and quest towards their end. For every higher faculty has an ability to support the lower and strengthen it, and to prevent the lower from

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<sup>169</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 267. Also discussed in section 4 of his *Compendium: Psychology* (1875).



harm in such a way that it causes the lower to receive an increase of beauty and nobility [...] like the support of the concupiscible animal faculty for the vegetative faculties, and how the irascible faculty protects [the vegetative faculties] from something that could harm their matter (though they cannot prevent the vegetative faculties' natural tendency towards degeneration) [...] and likewise the rational faculty adapts the animal to its goals.<sup>170</sup>

In this text, we see how the various faculties work together in several ways. First, higher faculties help the lower faculties by *defending* them from harms. For example, the animal soul helps the nutritive faculty (in animals) avoid harm (the nutritive faculty in plants get no such help). A plant is defenseless against something that wants to make a meal of it, but the digestive tract of an animal is somewhat more secure, since it is protected by the same instinct to flee a predator that every other part of the animal benefits from. Second, higher faculties provide *better methods* to achieve lower goals, as with how humans acquire nourishment much more efficiently than most animals, from the way we store food, to the way we cook it. Finally, lower faculties can be given *more objects* than they would otherwise have. For example, animals only know to eat what instinct tells them to, but humans have invented all manner of new dishes.

All these modes of integration of the higher and lower can be summed up by the phrase in the last line of the text, where Avicenna says that higher faculties “adapt (*tawfiq*)” lower faculties to higher goals. Avicenna elsewhere calls this a “partnership (*ishtirāk*).”<sup>171</sup> This adaptation or partnership does not essentially change the lower faculties, but it does integrate them with the higher. Of course, Avicenna acknowledges that sometimes lower faculties are disordered and need reigning in,<sup>172</sup> so the ideal form of this integration is not a given.

Of particular interest for our purposes here is the sense in which the rational faculties can provide different objects for the animal motive faculty. Avicenna’s discussion in *Treatise on Love* seems to suggest two ways in which we can understand this. First of all, intellectual faculties can provide uniquely human reasons for the pursuit of concupiscible and irascible objects. Normally, the concupiscible appetite is actualized when we are thinking about some pleasure to the external

<sup>170</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 254. The points made here are an elaboration on Aristotle's analogy between defining the soul and defining figure, in *De Anima* 2.3. Alexander of Aphrodisias, introducing similar issues, puts it as follows: “For this reason, even though there are many soul powers in [living] things in which the rational power is present, the soul constituted from them all is one, because no subsequent power can occur without the power that comes before it. Rather, they all belong to it as parts, where successive [powers] are joined to the preceding ones and the preceding ones are because of this expanded and developed.” See *On the Soul: Part I* (2012) section 30.

<sup>171</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

<sup>172</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 259.

senses, the irascible when we are thinking about some obstacle that would cause pain to the external senses. In non-human animals objects are presented in the imagination more or less at random, involuntarily (“*min ghayr qaşḍ.*”)<sup>173</sup> Humans, however, can attempt to rouse their own appetites for physical pleasure or dominance for more noble reasons, such as preservation of the species, or defending a city, and they can do so at will (i.e., self-control). Insofar as these are inclinations, they are not uniquely human. They are actualizations of the specifically same sort of inclinations that animals can have, just stirred up intentionally.<sup>174</sup> But insofar as animals are not able to govern inclinations in this way, the phenomenon is uniquely human.<sup>175</sup> That makes these sort of acts of the motive faculty unlike the particular uniquely human emotions from section 2.3, which do not seem to be activations of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, strictly speaking.

On the other hand, the intellect sometimes governs the animal motive faculties according to its own objects, in a way that goes beyond simply providing different reasons for concupiscible and irascible appetite. Recall from chapter one that in *Psychology* 4.4, in the text discussed in 1.3, Avicenna briefly mentioned that the animal motive faculty can be actualized “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good.” No further explanation is given for this sort of remark in 4.4, or anywhere else in Avicenna’s later works, about what this means. But in the *Treatise on Love*, after describing the way that the intellect can guide the concupiscible and irascible faculties, he mentions something similar:

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<sup>173</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

<sup>174</sup> As we will see in chapter 3, objects can be evaluated in a natural, instinctual way, or a rational/deliberative way.

<sup>175</sup> Another example of the higher being integrated with the lower is between the vegetative faculties and the concupiscible appetite. the generative faculty is oriented at reproduction of the species. The concupiscible appetite, likewise, while it is *ultimately* oriented towards sensory pleasure, often seeks to find sensory pleasure in acts related to reproduction. A major difference between the generative faculty and the concupiscible appetite, however, is that the concupiscible appetite is a faculty for pursuing goals in a voluntary manner (*bil-ikhṭiyār*), whereas the vegetative faculties act in a natural, involuntarily way (*bi-naw’ ṭabī’ī*; note that this does not mean vegetative faculties are not psychological, since not every psychological faculty relates to volition). When in partnership, however, Avicenna says the vegetative faculties can concur (*tuwāfiq*) with the concupiscible appetite, such that it *seems* vegetative faculties reach their goal in a voluntary manner. In other words, when partnering with a voluntary faculty pursuing the same generic sort of goal, vegetative faculties experience the benefits of voluntary action, which means seeking a goal on one’s own terms, in one’s own way. A plant cannot choose when to blossom and scatter seed, but animals and humans can choose mates. Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 217.

And acts could proceed from a person, from the core of their rational faculty, such as the conceiving of intelligibles, inclination [*nizā*] towards important matters, love of the next life and [love of] being close to the noble one.<sup>176</sup>

These activities, which we could summarize as seeking intelligibles and seeking the divine, are objects to which non-human animals simply do not have access, and therefore cannot experience emotions towards. We can see the connection of this passage to 4.4 because, summarizing still further, these things are objects which it would be appropriate to call good.

The good, as Avicenna defines it in his *Rhetoric*, is that which is sought for its own sake.<sup>177</sup> We can understand this in two ways. Firstly, in this context, the good is that which is not sought merely for the sake of pleasure. While there is a broad sense of “good” which Avicenna will sometimes use to refer to sensible objects, and activities which are done well, he does not use the term “good” when discussing the final objects of strictly animal inclinations. Rather, as we have seen, they are for the sake of external and internal pleasure, or dominance. Humans, on the other hand, have the capacity to seek out that which is good in and of itself. Of course, experiences of the good (intelligibles and the divine) are pleasant, but they are not sought for that reason. The second way of understanding the good is as that whose goodness is not dependent on anything else. In this sense, God is the true good.<sup>178</sup> It is not always clear which sense of good Avicenna is using when he refers to uniquely human objects of inclination, but what is clear is that he thinks such uniquely human objects of inclination exist. We have inclination towards the good insofar as it is presented to the animal motive faculty as something “to be sought after,” in the language of *Psychology* 1.5.

Avicenna’s discussion of the integration of higher and lower faculties, then, covers cases where rational faculties modify preexisting concupiscible and irascible appetites, and cases where uniquely human objects are pursued, resulting in truly uniquely human inclinations. The former seems more relevant to the discussion of the practical intellect as motive principle in section one, and the latter to our discussion of uniquely human emotions in section two, but ultimately the discussion in *Treatise on Love* stands on its own as a distinct contribution to Avicenna’s thoughts on human emotional experience.

<sup>176</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

<sup>177</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.3, p. 80.

<sup>178</sup> Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 263.

In his later works, Avicenna does not repeat his in-depth discussion of the fact that lower faculties are integrated with higher faculties, but he takes it as a given and applies the framework. One place he does mention it explicitly is at the beginning of his analysis of the estimative faculty, in *Psychology* 4.3:

Animals, and animal-like humans, only follow estimative judgment in their acts, even though for the human there could occur—to his senses and [lower] faculties, because of the proximity of reason—that which almost makes their internal senses rational, contrary to beasts. And on account of this, [humans] attain things which other animals do not attain—benefits [*fawā'id*] like composite [*mu'allafa*] sounds, composite colors and smells, and composite tastes, and hoping and wishing. And this is because it is as though the light of reason emanates, roaming about over these faculties.

And the imaginative faculty also in humans becomes a subject for reason, after being [merely] the subject for estimation in animals, so that humans can make use of the sciences. And memory is also beneficial in the sciences, as with the experimental, which memory attains to, and the particulars of astronomy, and suchlike.<sup>179</sup>

Animals and humans both have the faculties of estimation, imagination and memory. In animals these faculties perform their basic functions, involving the grasping and retaining of intentions and forms. But humans are able to make use of these basic functions to carry out more complex activities. In the second paragraph, regarding imagination and memory, it seems clear that Avicenna's point is that reason requires their grasp of particulars, past and present, for the data of sciences.

Similarly, his point about estimation in the prior paragraph seems to be that reason takes the basic information given to it about particulars by estimation, and makes use of this in more complex thoughts. Avicenna speaks above of the "benefits" of composite objects, and hoping and wishing.<sup>180</sup> Throughout the rest of the chapter, he comes back to estimation as that which tells us of something being beneficial or harmful, so presumably his point is that humans making use of reason can make judgments about the value of some complex object, or benefits and harms in the future. For example, an animal could perhaps judge whether all the individual ingredients for some dish on the menu at a fine dining restaurant would be good for it to eat, and would likely even be inclined to eat a slice of gourmet quiche, but they would not be able to appreciate it as a gourmet, culinary achievement.

<sup>179</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 183.

<sup>180</sup> We discussed the text on hoping and wishing in section 2.3.3 of this chapter, above.

In all these examples of from *Psychology* 4.3, the ennobling of the lower faculties by the higher involves reason making use of the lower faculties' basic functions. The lower faculties are transformed, not essentially, but by being wrapped up in a larger, more complex project.

## 2.6 Conclusion

What we see, then, having looked at all these cases of uniquely human emotional experience, is that some aspects of human emotional life are unique in that they are ways of ennobling the same sort of acts or impulses already found in animals, while others are unique in that they do not fit as well under the heading of animal concupiscible and irascible appetite. The former would include instances of when practical judgments lead to actions that depend upon, or govern, animal appetites, while the later would include cases of uniquely human emotions (e.g., shame and wonder), inclinations towards the good in and of itself, and intellectual pleasures. But all of these cases seem to involve the cooperation of the rational faculties (as a cause) with the animal motive faculties (as constitutive of the emotion). Avicenna's picture of human emotional life, then, is well integrated with his account of animal emotion, but keenly attentive to the wide variety of emotions it seems humans experience, beyond those experienced by animals.

## Chapter 3 Emotions and Resolution to Act

### 3.1 Introduction: emotion is not sufficient for action

A major theme we saw from the texts discussed in chapters one and two is that all the states we would want to call “emotions”—whether belonging to all animals or specific to humans—are understood as acts of the animal motive faculty qua inclining (i.e., emotions are inclinations, or impulses, towards objects). This raises the issue for Avicenna of how we get from inclination to actually carrying out an act. After all, at the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna makes it clear that his primary purpose in this text is to explain actual voluntary motion,<sup>181</sup> and to incline towards some object or course of action is not the same thing as to actually move. Unpacking Avicenna’s way of dealing with the relation between inclination and actual motion involves seeing how the various parts of his overall schema for voluntary action fit together, and helps clarify emotions’ role as inclinations. Up until this point, we have primarily been discussing one branch of the motive faculty, namely, the *inclining* motive faculty. That is the branch whose acts constitute emotions. But in this chapter we also need to discuss the second branch of the motive faculty, called the *resolving/decisive* faculty.

What this chapter will show is that emotions tend towards, but are not sufficient to cause, voluntary motion. Emotions are caused by one sort of cognition, an evaluation, but there needs to be a further, practical judgment in order to bring about what Avicenna calls the “resolution-to-act.” The term “resolution (*ijmāʿ*)” is how Avicenna refers to the motive faculty when it reaches a stage where it necessarily causes motion, provided there are no external impediments. Each of these branches of the motive faculty has its own type of cognitive cause: evaluations precede emotions, while practical judgments precede resolutions. There are uniquely human ways of evaluating something (which lead to uniquely human emotions) and ways of evaluating things that all animals share (which lead to common emotions). Then, there are uniquely human ways

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<sup>181</sup> “Since we have spoken of the apprehensive animal faculties, it is appropriate for us to discuss the animal motive [*muḥarrikah*] powers. We say that the animal, unless it has an appetite for [*yashitāq*] something with an appetite that it is aware of, or that it imagines, or [even] that it is not aware of, it is not impelled towards seeking that thing through movement.” Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

of making *a practical judgment* (which leads to resolution), and there is an analogue to this on the animal level (which also leads to resolution). So there is an initial judgment<sup>182</sup> (an evaluative judgment<sup>183</sup>) which leads to the motive state called emotion/inclination, followed by a second judgment (a practical judgment), which leads to the motive state called resolution. In such a schema, emotions play an important role in setting goals and focusing attention, but they do not ultimately determine what we do.

Although Avicenna uses this schema consistently, there is no one place where he attempts to unpack it directly, in all its detail. Moreover, there are some places where he elides certain components, especially when it is not the main subject under discussion. So, the analysis here will rely on several key discussions, each of which individually only gives part of the picture, but which nonetheless fit together. Avicenna is clear enough in the separate texts that it seems reasonable to believe we are describing a schema he has in mind, rather than imposing something from the outside.

In discussing resolution alongside emotion, we are following Avicenna's lead, who most often discusses the two topics alongside one another. Presumably one reason for this is that getting clear on both aspects of the motive faculty together (emotion and resolution) helps clarify each aspect individually. Since emotion and resolution are both closely related acts of the motive faculty, it would be easy to erroneously map the role of one onto the other. So while some of this discussion will focus on resolution, and the cognitions behind resolution and emotion, Avicenna nonetheless thinks this is relevant to clarifying the role of emotion.

## 3.2 Inclination is distinct from resolution

The distinction between two branches<sup>184</sup> of the motive faculty—inclination and, as we will see shortly, resolution—shows that, for Avicenna, there is more nuance to the four factors involved

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<sup>182</sup> “Judgment [*ḥukm*]” is often used as a generic term for Avicenna, interchangeable with “cognition.”

<sup>183</sup> In what follows, “value” and “evaluation” are not meant to have strictly ethical overtones. Sometimes evaluations could fall in the domain of what we might call ethical judgments, as when we have done something we believe to be wrong, and then feel the emotion of guilt. But most animal emotions are just caused by variations on the judgment that something is pleasant or painful, wholesome or corruptive, for the perceiver.

<sup>184</sup> Avicenna sometimes uses the term “branches” to distinguish “sub-faculties” of a generic faculty. If we want to stick with the language of powers/faculties, we should technically call resolution a sub-faculty of the motive faculty, and I discuss this distinction below in this same section.

in voluntary motion than just what we looked at in chapter one. As a reminder, the four factors required for voluntary movement in the Aristotelian schema, to which Avicenna generally subscribes, are as follows:<sup>185</sup>

- 1) unmoved-mover: the cognized object, a practical good represented to the subject in some way
- 2) moved-mover: the motive faculty, which acts in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole.<sup>186</sup>

As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out in reference to Aristotle, this four-element schema, found in Aristotle's *De Anima*, leaves some things unspecified<sup>187</sup>. In particular, it does not specify in what way exactly a practical good is represented to the subject, and how we account for all the cases where we seem to want something, but don't actually *do* anything about it. In the *De Motu* Aristotle goes into more detail, distinguishing various ways in which the object can be cognized relevant to action, and explaining how we get from inclination to actual motion. Avicenna would not have had access to the *De Motu*,<sup>188</sup> but we nonetheless find him nuancing parts of the four-element schema of voluntary motion in a similar way. What Avicenna ends up affirming, in brief, is that there are two of types ways in which the unmoved-mover (the practical good) is grasped, which lead to two distinct types of moved-movers (inclination, then resolution). That is, there are two types of cognitions related to practical goods, which lead to two different acts of the motive faculty, before the means of motion are actually engaged.

The two types of moved-movers<sup>189</sup> are distinguished in the following text, which occurs towards the beginning of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* 4.4, just before Avicenna explains the various types of emotions that we looked at in chapter one:

<sup>185</sup> As in chapter 1, the "moved-mover" terminology is just used initially to show the parallels between Aristotle and Avicenna, but in what follows I leave it behind and adopt more Avicennian terminology.

<sup>186</sup> Some of their precise terminology differs. Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

<sup>187</sup> Nussbaum (1983) 136-137.

<sup>188</sup> Gutas notes this at (2014) 361, n. 5. We know from Averroes that there was a summary of Aristotle's works on animals by Nicolaus Damascenus, including some material on the content of *De Motu*, that was translated into Arabic. But it is not extant, so it is impossible to say to what it included, and to what extent it may have influenced Avicenna. On that, see Zonta (1999) 61, 65.

<sup>189</sup> I am using Aristotle's "moved-mover" terminology to refer to appetites and resolution. Though Avicenna starts the text below with a generic use of appetite, that is not used to include resolution. So "moved-mover" is the best terminology we have to group together appetites and resolution (other than the even more generic "acts of the motive faculty").



And appetite [*shawq*] may vary.<sup>190</sup> For among [different kinds of appetite] there is that which remains weak, and there is that which strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjib*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—though resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] is not the same as appetite. Appetite might strengthen towards something yet there be no resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] towards movement at all, analogous to when the imagination grows strong while there is no appetite for what is in the imagination.

And when the resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] happens properly, the locomotive powers (whose function is simply to contract and expand the muscles) obey—though this is not the same thing as appetite, nor [is it the same as] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]. For someone prevented from movement is not prevented from having a strong appetite, nor from resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—but [when constrained] he will not find obedience from the other powers, whose only function is locomotion, and which are in the muscles.<sup>191</sup>

Here Avicenna is making the point that there are three distinct acts of the motive soul: appetite (i.e., inclination/emotion), resolution, and locomotion. He shows that these are distinct by showing how it is possible to have a full actualization of one without the others. For example, it is possible to have an emotion, even a very strong emotion, yet still not have the resolve to do anything about it. Again, one could be resolved to take some sort of action, yet be physically prevented from doing so (e.g., because they are in captivity).

Avicenna is not always clear about how we should categorize *al-ijmā'*, in terms of its being merely an activity of an existing faculty, or a distinct faculty/capacity, but it seems the available evidence suggests the latter. He does not mention *al-ijmā'* in his initial enumeration of faculties in *Psychology* 1.5, but in 4.4 and elsewhere he does use the term faculty (*quwwa*) to refer to *al-ijmā'*: "The resolving faculty [*al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya*] follows the previously mentioned [emotional] faculties, so that when their inclination grows strong, it resolves to act."<sup>192</sup> Moreover, in a previous section of *Psychology*, 1.4, he specifies that some things which make actions different do not thereby necessitate the positing of new faculties, such as: differences in movements of the will (you can will to move to point A or point B, but you do not need two locomotive faculties to do so), states of the organs used (someone with an impaired memory does not have a different kind of memory, just an impaired one), external impediments (if you put on tinted glasses, this does not change the basic structure of the visual faculty), strong/weak or positive/negative manifestations of the same activity (we can believe, be certain, and doubt, from the same faculty).<sup>193</sup> His concern to show in the above text that *al-ijmā'* is *not* merely the same as

<sup>190</sup> Not yet having made careful distinctions between types of animal emotions, Avicenna is using the term appetite [*shawq*] here loosely, simply with the goal of sketching how emotion can lead to action. As we saw in chapter one, his more technical way of referring to emotions is with the terms *inbi'āthāt* and *nizā'āt*.

<sup>191</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 195. Emphasis mine.

<sup>192</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 196.

<sup>193</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.4, 33-34.

strong inclination suggests that he has the last of these points in mind: if *al-ijmā'* were equivalent to a strong appetite, we would not need to posit two distinct faculties—but it is something more than strong appetite. So while Avicenna does not single out *al-ijmā'* in his overview of psychological faculties, there is evidence that he thinks it is worth considering a distinct faculty.

Granted, there are cases where Avicenna is not careful with this distinction, and sometimes refers to the appetitive faculty itself as resolving, but these should not be taken to override his more focused discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. For example, the following text from his *Marginal Glosses on Aristotle's De Anima* blurs the lines between inclination and resolution:

And he [Aristotle] says that by appetite, he does not mean the trivial appetite that increases and diminishes and goes away and differs, but rather decisive, resolving appetite [*al-shawq al-'azmī al-ijmā'ī*]; for it moves necessarily if there is no impediment. This is not like the appetite of the ascetic, for that is merely concupiscible desire, along with which there is not the decisive resolution [*al-'azm al-ijmā'ī*] whose course of action is from the intellect [*allādhī huwa min al-'aql mashyuhu*]<sup>194</sup>.

Here Avicenna is commenting on *De Anima* 3.9, 433a9, where Aristotle discusses how some people are especially good at controlling their desires. These are the self-controlled, the *egkrateis* in Greek, which is here discussed under the heading of those who are ascetics, or pious devotees (*nāsik/nussāk*). Since Aristotle does not make a clear distinction between his faculties of appetite and resolution, Avicenna follows suit, calling the difference between the ascetic's inclination and one who acts on their inclination the difference between “mere” appetite and “decisive, resolving” appetite. So this blurring of lines here makes sense, given that Avicenna is glossing Aristotle, who himself did not make this distinction. Moreover, there certainly is a sense in which both inclining appetite and *al-ijmā'* are sub-faculties of the more generic animal motive faculty. So depending on how finely we want to slice faculties, inclination and resolution could be more or less identified.

*Al-ijmā'*, or *al-quwwa al-ijmā'iyya*, is sometimes referred to as the “decisive faculty,” sometimes the “resolving faculty.”<sup>195</sup> Here I will prefer translating *al-ijmā'* as “resolution,” because “decision” has cognitive overtones, and Avicenna is clear that *al-ijmā'* is not a cognitive function. Clear evidence for that is the fact that he introduces *al-ijmā'* in his discussion of motive

<sup>194</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947) 113.19.

<sup>195</sup> See, for example, Marmura usage of the translation “decisive” in 4.2 of *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005).

faculties, and consistently refers to *al-ijmā'* as part of (*min*),<sup>196</sup> or belonging to (*li*),<sup>197</sup> the motive faculty.

Nonetheless, the term is used in a cognitive sense in other contexts, and these usages can shed some light on its application by Avicenna. For example, *al-ijmā'* is also an important term in Islamic law, signifying the unanimous—and therefore binding—agreement of a group of authorities on some moral or doctrinal issue.<sup>198</sup> The thread common to various usages of *al-ijmā'* is that of resolving on one choice out of many, selecting between different options, and the idea that that selection is final, or settled. Though for Avicenna this cognitive selection happens prior to the motive resolution (and after an emotion), resolution is the state of the motive faculty where one is no longer merely inclining to one option, leaving the door open for another. The motive faculty is, as the name suggests, *resolved* on a particular course of action.

One particularly striking text that illustrates the distinction between resolution and cognition occurs at the beginning of Avicenna's section on the animal motive faculties in his *Remarks and Admonitions*:

As for voluntary motion, it is more lively [*ashadd nafsāniyyatan*], and it has a determining, resolving [*'āzim mujammi'*<sup>199</sup>] principle, [which is] acquiescent and passive to [*mudh' inan wa munfa' ilan' an*] imagination, or estimation, or intellect [*khayāl aw wahm aw 'aql*], from which proceeds the irascible power, which pushes away from harm, or the concupiscible, which attracts to it that which is necessary or the beneficial for animals. The locomotive faculty, which stretches out in the muscles, obeys it, and is subservient to those commands.<sup>200</sup>

What is noteworthy about this text is that the resolving faculty is clearly linked with appetite and inclination as an “acquiescent and passive” counterpart to cognitive principles of imagination, estimation and intellect. So even though resolution is active in the sense of directly activating the means of motion in the muscles, it is nonetheless responsive to cognition, just like inclination. This coheres with what we saw in the previously quoted text from *Marginal Glosses*, that decisive resolution gets its “course of action” from the mind, but it is motive, rather than cognitive.<sup>201</sup>

<sup>196</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.3.

<sup>197</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195.

<sup>198</sup> Bernand (2012).

<sup>199</sup> According to vowelings in the edition.

<sup>200</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement, 25, page 435.

<sup>201</sup> See above, footnote 193.

So it seems appropriate to render *al-ijmā'* as “resolution,” keeping in mind that this is non-cognitive, and always a resolution *to act*, not simply resolution *that* some action would be good to do. That is, it is not a mere thought, but a decisive resolution towards action caused by a thought. This leads directly to the next issue that is central to clarifying how inclination and resolution fit into the schema for voluntary motion: the differing cognitions that trigger each of them.

Looking at the differing cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution in Avicenna’s psychology will show him to have a coherent picture of how they fit together. This coherent picture has not always been recognized, as prior comments by Gätje and Van Riet on the term *al-ijmā'* in Avicenna have shown. Both point out that the Latin tradition had a difficult time translating *al-ijmā'*, variously using *desiderium*, *voluntas*, *effectus*, or *optare*,<sup>202</sup> blurring the lines between inclination and resolution, and sometimes even using *consensus communis*,<sup>203</sup> suggesting a conflation of Avicenna’s use of *al-ijmā'* with the Islamic legal use. Gätje reports that in the 20<sup>th</sup> century some scholars have tried to understand *al-ijmā'* as related to the Stoic notion of *synkatathesis*—a kind of cognitive assent—which Avicenna might have absorbed in some manner through Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Stoic-inspired writings.<sup>204</sup> A close look at the cognitive causes behind both inclination and resolution will show that Avicenna is consistent in distinguishing inclination from resolution, and in holding that both are states of different branches (different sub-faculties) of the motive faculty, rather than themselves types of cognitions.

### 3.3 Different cognitions for different motive faculties<sup>205</sup>

Though emotion and resolution are not cognitive, the cognitions that trigger them constitute an important part of understanding their place in Avicenna’s schema for explaining voluntary motion. In other words, emotions and resolution are acts of the motive faculty, each caused by a

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<sup>202</sup> Gätje (1975) 360.

<sup>203</sup> Van Riet (1967) 646.

<sup>204</sup> Gätje (1975) 356.

<sup>205</sup> Avicenna sometimes refers to one “motive faculty” as a generic way of referring to the cause of inclination, resolution, and locomotion. But, as we have seen, he sometimes discusses a more specific branch, or sub-faculty, behind each of the three acts (i.e., the resolving faculty, the appetitive faculty, the locomotive faculty), and these sub-faculties are sometimes described as motive faculties (though none of them individually constitutes *the* motive faculty). So we can talk about *the* motive faculty, and motive faculties, without contradiction.

different type of cognition that is distinct from the motive act, and precedes the motive act. Moreover, there is an order to all these acts, with resolution occurring last, preceded by a practical judgment, which practical judgment in turn must be preceded by a relevant emotion, caused by some evaluation.

Avicenna's clearest explanation *that* there are cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution, and that they differ, is in *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2. It is part of Avicenna's explanation of the concepts potency and actuality, specifically natural principles of motion versus voluntary principles of motion, paralleling Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Theta 5. Avicenna's way of framing the issue and his choice of what to focus on seems to be a true development unique to him, as there was little in the way of source material other than Aristotle's text itself.<sup>206</sup>

The core issue in this text, for Avicenna, is how to best conceive of the distinction between capacities for motion that act automatically upon encountering a suitable object (natural faculties), and those that do not (voluntary faculties). That is, some capacities, like fire's ability to heat, operate automatically when put in proximity with something capable of being heated. Other capacities, like a doctor's ability to heal, do not operate automatically. Upon encountering a sick person, a doctor might heal, but might not, and this fact needs explanation.

As it turns out, there are two things that explain this. That is, specific voluntary abilities, like the ability to heal or not heal, depend on two things. First is the fact that we have cognitive faculties that are "powers over a thing and its opposite," a notion that will be unpacked shortly. Secondly, in addition to these cognitions, there is what Aristotle calls "appetite" or "choice," or, in Avicenna's language, various states of the motive faculty. So the fact that a doctor treats a patient or does not treat a patient in a given situation is due to their ability to have complex cognitions, which are followed by states of the motive faculty. We will unpack the core Avicennian text that deals with these issues by breaking it into three parts.

Avicenna begins by distinguishing the two types of capacities he plans to discuss. As mentioned, the essential distinction is between natural/automatic capacities and voluntary capacities. In the

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<sup>206</sup> The only Greek commentaries translated into Arabic on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* were the Book Delta portions of the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius (Bertolacci (2006) 73). And while al-Farabi's *Aims of Aristotle's Metaphysics* was helpful in orienting Avicenna towards the work as a whole, it does not contain analysis of this specific section.

text on which Avicenna bases his discussion, Aristotle labels the former non-rational, and the latter rational.<sup>207</sup> Avicenna broadens those labels, considering natural/automatic capacities to be those *not* related to cognition, while voluntary capacities *are* related to cognition:

[a] [To turn to] those powers that are principles for motions and actions,<sup>208</sup> some are associated with reason and imagination, while some are not associated with these. Those associated with reason and imagination are of the same genus as reason and imagination. For it is almost the case that man and not-man are known by one power and that it belongs to one power to imagine pleasure and pain and, in general, to imagine a thing and its opposite. Likewise, these powers themselves are, in their individual instances, each a power over a thing and its opposite.<sup>209</sup>

Here Avicenna first makes a distinction between powers that are principles for motion which are “associated with” reason and imagination, and those which are not. He immediately clarifies this locution, “associated with,” saying that he means faculties that could be considered rational or imaginative in some generic sense, and those that are not. In other words, he is making a distinction between cognitive faculties at the level of both the animal and human soul, on the one hand, and non-cognitive faculties, on the other.

Avicenna wants to point out that part of what makes cognitive faculties able to be principles of voluntary motion is that they are “powers over a thing and its opposite.” Of course, as Avicenna's examples illustrate, cognitive faculties are powers over a thing and its opposite even when they are not functioning as motive principles. Avicenna's first example of being a power over a thing and its opposite is just the ability to know and not know someone, which is not a cognition directly related to motion. These two acts are opposite, and they can both be performed by the same cognitive faculty. He also discusses our ability to sense both pleasure and pain by the same sensitive faculty. So there seem to be two possible ways of being considered a “power over a thing and its opposite”: on the one hand, if a power has different types of acts with respect to one and the same object (to know x or not know x), or if a power has the ability to know one thing, but also know its opposite (to sense pleasure, but also pain). These are illustrating the broader notion that is also at play when cognitive faculties are principles of motion: a doctor's

<sup>207</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006), 1048a.

<sup>208</sup> As we saw in chapter two, section 2.2, something can be a principle of motion, but not necessarily a motive faculty. “Principle of motion” is a broader category, including motive faculties, and the cognitive faculties that serve as proximate causes for the motive faculties.

<sup>209</sup> [a-c] are a continuous text taken from Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005), 4.2.10-11. The translation used here is Marmura's, slightly modified.

medical knowledge consists of the knowledge of how to treat a patient, but also how to harm them. A builder knows how to build, but also how to tear down.

Given that cognitive principles of motion are powers over a thing its opposite, Aristotle argues that we need “something else” in order to actually enact motion. When a natural faculty encounters its appropriate object, it acts automatically (e.g., fire burns wood without any choice involved). By that logic, a doctor can heal or harm, but without some further factor, it seems that they would attempt to perform both actions upon encountering some patient, which is of course absurd. The same faculty cannot do x and not-x at the same time. For Aristotle, the thing that makes the difference is “appetite” or “choice.”<sup>210</sup> A doctor could do both, but will in fact only desire or choose one. Avicenna would broadly agree with this, but for him, the picture is more complex. In this *Metaphysics* text, Avicenna is not explicitly concerned with what accounts for settling on one opposite or the other (e.g., treating or harming).<sup>211</sup> Rather, he is concerned to articulate how the capacity for healing as a whole could move from the cognitive level, to the level of concrete action. In other words, how do we get from judgment, to action.

To fully account for the fact that a doctor sometimes treats a patient, and sometimes does not treat a patient, we need to appeal to the states of the motive faculty. Avicenna continues in *Metaphysics* 4.2 as follows:

[b] In reality, however, it would not be a complete power—that is, a principle of change, complete and in actuality, of one thing in another (inasmuch as [the latter] is another)—unless the will conjoins it [*iqtarana bi-hā al-irāda*], impelled either by an estimative belief [*i’ tiqād wahmī*] that follows an appetitive or irascible imaginative act [*takhayyul shahwānī aw ghaḍabī*] or by an intellectual belief<sup>212</sup> [*ra’y ‘aqlī*] following intellectual thought [*fikra ‘aqliyya*] or the conceptualization of an intellectual form [*taṣawwur sūra ‘aqliyya*]. Then, if that will, still not being a will that [only] inclines [*irāda mumīla*], but a decisive will [*irāda jazima*] (namely, the one which constitutes the resolution [*al-ijmā’*] that necessitates the movement of the organs), conjoins [the power, then the latter] becomes necessarily the principle of necessitating action.

<sup>210</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a.

<sup>211</sup> As we will see in section 3.6 below, such decisions for Avicenna are cognitive. In the *Metaphysics* Theta 5 text, Aristotle seems to suggest that it is the motive state itself (appetite or choice) that determines which of the “opposites” is pursued. But for Avicenna, it is the practical judgment that determines what is in fact pursued. Of course, Aristotle elsewhere has discussions of practical judgment, so it is probable he is just being concise here, and would not have a problem with Avicenna’s more fleshed out view.

<sup>212</sup> Marmura had “opinion” for *ra’y*, but the following text from *Psychology* suggests “belief” or “knowledge” would be better: “Knowledge [*ra’y*] is belief that is settled, while opinion [*ẓann*] is belief one is inclined towards, along with the admission that the alternative might be true. And not everyone who opines believes, just like not everyone who senses thinks, or everyone who imagines opines or believes or knows.” *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207-208.

In this text, Avicenna orders some of the factors involved in voluntary motion in a way that is consonant with his psychological works (looked at in chapters 1 and 2), and more explicit in this regard. In general, Avicenna orders various psychological functions in text [b] in order to show the relationship between different types of cognitive and motive faculties. When Avicenna says that “will [*irāda*]” must join to the cognitive faculties in order for motion to actually occur, this “will” is a standard, generic term, referring to any branch of the motive faculty associated with voluntary motion, in the same way that “power associated with reason and imagination” was used generically earlier in the same passage for various cognitive faculties. What we see in text [b], then, are basically two processes, two ways for cognitive principles of motion to lead to actual motion:

	Stage 1 <sup>213</sup>		Stage 2	
Process leading to action	Cognition 1 <b>(evaluation)</b> →	Motive Act 1 →	Cognition 2 <b>(practical judgment)</b> →	Motive Act 2
<b>Animal</b>	Imaginative act	Inclining will (emotion)	Estimative belief	Resolved will
<b>Rational</b>	Conceptual act	Inclining will (emotion)	Intellectual belief	Resolved will

The chart relates to the text as follows: the two processes described in the above text are how voluntary motion takes place at the level of the animal and rational soul, respectively.<sup>214</sup> The column “Cognition 1” contains the two cognitive principles of motion that get the process started (imagination and conceptualization), followed by the factors Avicenna says need to come after them, respectively, in order for actual motion to occur. Midway through text [b] Avicenna makes a clear distinction between two processes, one where an estimative belief follows an imaginative act, and another where a rational belief follows a conceptual act (or an “intellectual thought,” as he paraphrases). What the second cognitive act (the estimative or intellectual belief, respectively) leads to in both processes, according to text [b], is a *resolved* will, as opposed to a merely

<sup>213</sup> The items in bold in this chart are terms supplied by me, based on the analysis that will follow in this chapter. So, to be clear, I am not saying that everything in this chart is found in the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text. Calling cognition 1 “evaluation” and cognition 2 “practical judgment” is due to what Avicenna says about these stages in other texts which, again, we will look at in the remaining sections of this chapter. But the terms in bold are included here to help see how everything is meant to fit together.

<sup>214</sup> Avicenna does not use the terms “animal” and “rational” in the above text, but they accurately capture what level of psychological faculties (animal or human) are being used in a given series of cognition and action.



inclining will. Prior to the second cognitive act, the first cognitive act (the imaginative or conceptual act) merely leads to an *inclined* will, which corresponds to inclination, or emotion. Avicenna does not here describe these components (i.e., the belief and motive states) in more detail because, individually, they are all discussed at more length in the psychological texts. His main point in this section is just to show what the something else is that enables a cognitive principle of motion to actually enact motion, as part of an overall voluntary capacity. That additional faculty is the resolved will, *al-ijmā'*.

Again, all that this *Metaphysics* text shows for our purposes is that there is a sequence of cognitive and motive stages involved in voluntary action. Other texts, which we will exam later, show more about the character of each cognitive and motive stage. However, to look ahead a bit, we could call both cognitions 1 and 2 types of judgments. Cognitions at stage 1 are merely *evaluative* judgements: judgments that something, e.g., would be pleasant, or would be painful. No course of action is tied to these judgments, which is why all that results from them is inclination. But when we proceed to cognition 2—which is a *practical* judgment wherein we decide on a course of action—this second cognition can lead to the resolved state of the will which actually triggers action.

Distinguishing *al-ijmā'* as a “something else” necessary for a cognitive principle to enact motion is a development on Avicenna’s part.<sup>215</sup> The Arabic text of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that Avicenna would have had access to, at least as it is preserved in Averroes’s *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, makes no mention of *al-ijmā'*. Rather, the phrase (in Greek) that describes the additional motive component as “that which is decisive [*kurios*]” is rendered (in Arabic) as the “true ruler [*al-masūd al-ḥaqqī*].”<sup>216</sup> That is, Avicenna would have read that the motive faculty (in particular appetite/*shawq* and choice/*ikhtiyār*) is the true ruler when it comes to whether powers associated with reason act or do not act. While Avicenna would acknowledge the importance of appetite (which refers to inclination) and choice (which refers to the judgments of the practical

<sup>215</sup> That Avicenna is making a development may not be obvious at first, since recent work on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Theta renders the Greek of Aristotle’s way of referring to desire and choice as “that which is decisive [*kurios*].” Since *al-ijmā'* is sometimes rendered the “decisive faculty,” this could make it seem like Avicenna is in some way getting the core of his idea for *al-ijmā'* from the Aristotle text, even if Aristotle did not present it so explicitly. See the translation at Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a and Nussbaum’s discussion of the term at (1983) 139, 146, and 150.

<sup>216</sup> Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (1973) 5.2, Book Theta, p. 1149.

intellect), there is no mention of *al-ijmā'* in the Arabic of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, nor even a clear distinction between inclination and resolution. Rather, in Aristotle's text, we just have the equivalent of inclination, and this alone somehow makes the difference between whether a doctor would choose to heal or not. If Avicenna were speaking loosely, he would broadly agree with something like that. But in texts [a] and [b] above he is careful to distinguish inclination from resolution, since it is not merely having an emotion that makes the difference in whether the doctor heals or not, it is having a resolution to act.

One phrase in text [b] that needs explanation is how this additional motive component finally makes it so that the voluntary power in question is a "complete power." Avicenna goes on to unpack this idea in the remainder of his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in *Metaphysics* 4.2. There are several paragraphs which follow, but their first two sentences sum up the idea:

[c] For we have shown that, so long as a cause does not become a cause in terms of necessitation whereby a thing is necessitated by it, the effect would not come into existence through it. Before this state, the will [*al-irāda*] would have been weak, [resolution] [*al-ijmā'*] not having taken place.

For Avicenna, a power is called a complete power when an effect is necessitated by the power, given the appropriate circumstances.<sup>217</sup> He says he has already argued for this, likely referring to an earlier section in the same book, *Metaphysics* 4.1.10, where he argues that if a cause, *x*, were a "complete cause" of *y*, yet *x* did not necessitate *y* when *x* and *y* coexist, then the only thing that would make the difference in terms of whether *x* is a cause of *y* is whether *y* exists or not. Since that is absurd, *x* is a complete cause for *y* only when *y* is necessitated by *x*.

A cognitive principle for motion, like the doctor's knowledge of how to heal, does not on its own necessarily cause motion, so it is not a complete cause for motion. It is only with something additional, namely, *al-ijmā'*, that we get a complete power, from which motion follows necessarily, assuming there is an appropriate patient and no impediments. When the will is "weak"—when it is mere "inclination," as described in text [b]—action will not take place, even when the appropriate object is at hand. Of course, cognitive faculties are not always thought of as principles of motion. It is possible to just imagine or conceptualize something, with no relation at

<sup>217</sup> McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015) 161, 174.

all to motion. But insofar as cognitive faculties imagine or deliberate *about* action, they are principles for motion, and only complete when accompanied by a resolution.

Avicenna’s concluding analysis in [c] shows that the idea of some act being necessary is not opposed to the idea of it being voluntary. Avicenna concludes his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in 4.2 by saying that when resolution accompanies a cognitive principle for motion, the subject would “then act by necessity.”<sup>218</sup> What precisely is necessitated was mentioned earlier, in text [b] when Avicenna says that the resolution-to-act [*irāda jazima*, translated by Marmura as “decisive will”] “necessitates the movement of the organs.” A doctor is not bound to conclude that treating some patient is the right thing to do, but once they do so conclude, and then have resolution to heal, they will act to treat the patient when in proximity to the patient. Of course, the cognitive faculties and the resolving faculty are themselves complete capacities in their own domains, and so certain cognitions or resolutions are necessary in appropriate circumstances.<sup>219</sup> In other words, when all the necessary causes are in place to trigger a cognition, or a resolution, these faculties don’t need an additional “something else” to activate—they activate necessarily. It is not random that a doctor with a certain web of beliefs would determine that healing is the best course of action. And there is no indication that the resolving faculty is self-determining or self-moving—it is responsive to cognition under normal circumstances. So necessity seems to run straight through the process. [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] describe different aspects of the process leading up to voluntary motion, and resolution is needed as an additional “something else” in the context of this wider process. But on their own, none of these powers needs an additional “something else” to perform its specific function. This highlights the fact that the key difference between voluntary and involuntary motion for Avicenna is not that one involves necessary actualization of faculties, and the other does not. Rather, one involves cognitive and motive faculties, while the other does not.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 4.2.11.

<sup>219</sup> This is not to say that appetites can occur without cognitions, just that, given a certain cognition, an appetite is bound to happen.

<sup>220</sup> You could argue that, on this view, if we had a detailed enough understanding of someone’s web of beliefs, we would be able to predict what they will conclude is good for themselves or not in a given situation, in the same way that we could predict what type of nuts an oak tree will produce. Even if this is true, a key difference would remain between the two cases, in that the latter is entirely predictable based on the nature of thing (oak trees always produce acorns), whereas nothing about the nature of a human being tells you how a particular human being will actualize their powers over opposites. For an interpretation of Avicenna’s texts that relate to the issue of human freedom, see McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015).

The preceding analysis of *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 has shown that cognitive powers are principles for motion only insofar as they work through the motive faculties. In clarifying what he means by this, Avicenna shows that there are two levels as which cognitive powers can trigger motive faculties: first by making the motive faculty *incline* towards some object, and then by making the motive faculty resolved towards some course of action. When there is resolution, this is when there is a complete principle of motion, necessitating movement of the muscles and organs.

In order to get a better grasp on the distinction between inclination and resolution, and how one leads to the other, we need to delineate in more detail the cognitive causes by which each occur. Since Avicenna is not focused on clarifying the cognitions themselves in *Metaphysics* 4.2, in what follows I want to show that other Avicennian texts fill in the picture, and that Avicenna endorses the following schema:

[Stage 1] First, some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover) is judged as having some sort of value (i.e., an evaluative judgment), which can lead to an emotion/inclination (e.g., food is seen as beneficial, then desired).

[Stage 2] Then, some practical judgment is made about a course of action, which can lead to a resolution-to-act (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action).

To be clear, the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text mere shows *that* there is a progression of cognitions and motive states, but I think other texts fill in the picture in this way. Some cognitions lead to inclinations, others lead to resolutions-to-act. The evaluation in [Stage 1] and the practical judgment in [Stage 2] are supposed to correspond to what is mentioned under Cognition 1 and Cognition 2, respectively, in the above table. In other words, two types of evaluations (one at the animal level, one human) lead to inclination, and two types of practical judgments (one at the animal level, one human) lead to resolution. In the following sections, I will explain the components of [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] in more detail, showing that these distinctions are ones Avicenna is interested in making, and what they amount to.

### 3.4 Emotions for means, resolution for ends

The distinctions made in [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] can be seen as a development of Aristotle's distinction between ends of motion versus means of motion. In other words, it seems plausible

that Avicenna is making the distinctions in [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] as a way of building on notions already found in Aristotle. To be clear, Avicenna himself does not make this connection explicit, but it is worth briefly mentioning here as a way of showing how the above analysis of the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text coheres with the broader picture seen elsewhere.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*—a text Avicenna would have had access to, despite not writing a text of similar scope—Aristotle says that “[virtue] determines the end and [practical intellect] makes us do the things that lead to the end.”<sup>221</sup> The general idea here is relevant to the discussion of emotions because virtues determine ends to the extent that some of them govern appetites and emotions, and therefore what we are inclined to pursue or not pursue.<sup>222</sup> The practical intellect, on the other hand, decides how to pursue that which emotions incline towards. If someone is disposed to feel merciful to another person (i.e., they have the virtue of being merciful), helping that person in need of mercy becomes an object towards which they incline. Exactly what emotions we have is governed by the sort of dispositions or virtues we have, but it is *because of the emotion* that we are actually oriented towards some end in a given situation. So emotions orient us towards ends, as described in [Stage 1] but do not determine the means to the ends. Upon having an emotion, a practical judgment of the sort, “I ought to help them in such and such a way” could lead to action. This determines the means. The practical judgment shifts the focus from the value of the object (in this case, helping someone), to how the subject ought to carry out the act. Avicenna’s schema, as summarized by [Stage 1] and [Stage 2], likewise has a place for judgments that determine ends (and lead to emotions) as well as judgments that determine means (and—according to Avicenna—lead to resolution).

One text where we see Avicenna using means and ends language in the context of voluntary motion is, again, in *Healing: Metaphysics*. In 6.5.4-6. Avicenna’s main goal is to show that all voluntary motion has an end. Say there are two points, A and B. In some cases the end is identical with what the motion itself achieves, as in simply having the desire to move from point A to point B. Here, the end is to move, and the end is achieved through that very motion. In other cases, the motion is in the service to some other goal, like meeting up with a friend at point B. In order to meet with a friend at point B, you still need to move from point A to point B, so the

<sup>221</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 6.13, 1145a.

<sup>222</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 2.5, 1106a.

motion (the means) *looks* the same as in the previous case, but the *end* differs. Avicenna's main point is that in both cases there is a goal, and a means to serve that goal, even in cases where the goal and the means to the goal are difficult to distinguish, as in the first case.

What this shows for our purposes is that the idea of an end—the object of inclination—is not the same as the means of movement towards that object. It is one thing to desire to meet up with a friend, it is another to resolve on concrete steps to get to them. Even the case of desiring to get from point A to point B requires actually resolving on doing those actions. The two steps—desiring an end and resolving on a practical course of action—are distinct.

### 3.5 Evaluations lead to inclination

What triggers emotions is just an evaluation of some object, without any decision about a particular course of action. That is, emotions are triggered when we judge<sup>223</sup> some object to have a certain value. The evaluative judgment happens first, and the emotion follows (assuming there are no impediments—see chapter four for more on emotional dispositions). To be clear, “value” and “evaluation” are not meant to have strictly ethical overtones here. Sometimes evaluations could fall in the domain of what we might call ethical judgments, as when we have done something we believe to be wrong, and then feel the emotion of guilt. But most animal emotions are just caused by variations on the judgment that something is pleasant or painful, wholesome or corruptive, for the perceiver.

The main place we see evidence of emotions being caused by evaluations is in the opening to Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty. He tends to describe emotions as caused by things “imagined to be” beneficial or harmful, not by decisions that something ought to be pursued or avoided through a particular course of action. This can be made most clear by referring back to the table in chapter one where we broke down Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty.<sup>224</sup> There we see that, in *Psychology* 1.5, concupiscible appetite responds to that which is “imagined to be necessary or beneficial,” and again, “imagined to be beneficial” in 4.4. The irascible appetite actualizes in response to that which is “imagined to be harmful or

<sup>223</sup> Again, “judgment [*hukm*]” is often used as a generic term for Avicenna, interchangeable with “cognition.” So to *judge* something as having a certain value can just be to *imagine*, or *perceive* it as having a certain value.

<sup>224</sup> See chapter 1, section 1.2.

corruptive,” in 1.5, and “imagined as an obstacle” in 4.4. The word for “imagined” in all these cases is *mutakhayyal* and his purpose in using it will be clarified shortly. But the consistency with which the locution “imagined as” is chosen to discuss the cause of inclinations, and *not* used to discuss the cause of resolution (as we will see), strongly suggests that he intends to contrast merely imagining something as harmful or beneficial with making a practical, imperative judgment.

Avicenna’s writings provide two ways of better understanding the locution “imagined as having some sort of value,” which require keeping straight two usages of words related “imagination.” On the one hand, for something to be “imagined as having some sort of value,” is for it to be an evaluation that is undergirded by images in the imagination, and affects appetite via those images. On the other hand, something can be evaluated in various ways, the two main divisions being “imaginatively” or arrived at through discursive, reasoned thought. So the phrase “imagined” in “imagined as having some sort of value” picks out that this evaluative process is *undergirded by images*, meaning that these judgments are about something inscribed in the imagination. But the evaluative process itself comes in *various modes* (all undergirded by images), one of which modes is called “imaginative,” and the other which is called “discursive” or “reason-based.” These modes of evaluation refer to how exactly the object (inscribed in the imagination) is evaluated—whether using reason (“discursive”), or not (“imaginative”). The next two sections will examine the key texts where these distinctions arise, so as to get a better understanding of [Stage 1], where evaluations trigger emotions.

### 3.5.1 Evaluations are about particulars

All evaluations that lead to emotion are undergirded by images in the imagination because they are in response to particulars, and the sensitive faculties required to perceive particulars are loosely referred to as “imagination.” Avicenna makes clear that imagination is necessary for any particular inclination in a text from his *Remarks and Admonitions*. The text comes from a supplement he added to the psychological part of the *Remarks*, in which he consolidates some issues he discusses in much greater detail in his *Healing: Metaphysics* 9.2, focusing here on their relevance to psychology. To be specific, he distinguishes the different types of volitions belonging to celestial beings and humans. In making these distinctions, human voluntary motion

is described in ways that emphasize the role of imagination. The distinctions he makes about the volitions of celestial beings are necessary for understanding the discussion of human volition.

The motion of celestial bodies, moving in their circular orbits, is identified as voluntary rather than natural because it has more than one sort of movement with respect to its object. In keeping with the description of voluntary motion from *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 as stemming from a cognitive power, which is power over a thing and its opposites,<sup>225</sup> Avicenna says that because the motion of the celestial bodies is circular, it by definition goes away from *and* towards its object and this is enough to be sure that it is voluntary, not natural.<sup>226</sup> Natural motion would only go either towards some object, or away from it. For example, rocks will always fall down, never up. But celestial bodies repeatedly switch between the two types of motion with respect to the same object, owing to some sort of volition.<sup>227</sup>

Avicenna next clarifies that the movement belonging to the “first body,” or the outermost sphere, is also voluntary—even though it does not move in terms of position. To make that claim he first needs to make a distinction between types of voluntary motion: sensible and intellectual.<sup>228</sup>

Sensible volitions are directed at sensible intentions, and intellectual volitions are directed at intellectual intentions. Intellectual intentions are defined as those which “are predicated of many, being unrestricted.”<sup>229</sup> As examples he provides “son of Adam,” or “human being.” He does not define sensible intentions, but we know from other similar discussions in *Psychology* that sensible intentions are particular,<sup>230</sup> in that what is being conceived cannot be predicated of a whole species (Adam himself, as opposed to human being in general).

Avicenna then makes use of this distinction to show that the volition of the first body is “intellectual,” being directed at a general intention, contrasting this with the volitions of humans and animals, which are sensible, in that they are directed at particulars. That the first mover’s volition is directed at a general intention is manifested in that it seeks position in general, rather

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<sup>225</sup> See section 3.3.

<sup>226</sup> Avicenna discusses the objects of the celestial souls at length in (2005) *Healing: Metaphysics* 9.2.

<sup>227</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 26, p. 438.

<sup>228</sup> This distinction is of course compatible with other divisions Avicenna makes, such as dividing voluntary motion in terms of in place or from place to place. For the later distinction, Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) beginning of 2.3.

<sup>229</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 27, p. 438.

<sup>230</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60. Emphasis mine.



than specific positions. The notion of position "in general" makes sense if we remember that the first body, the outermost sphere, is beyond even the sphere of the fixed stars, and does not have any planets or particular bodies inside it that move from place to place.<sup>231</sup> Rather, its motion is just the rotation of its entire area, which therefore would amount to no particular motion.

Avicenna admits that this is difficult to conceive of, but the next section, on particular volitions, is more familiar, and directly bears on the nature of the evaluations that can trigger inclination in animals and humans.

Animal and human motion (in contrast with volitions of the first body, but *similar to* volitions of the other celestial bodies) involves particular movements, and is due to cognition of particulars.

Avicenna initially bases this claim on what he takes as an axiom:

No particular, determined thing proceeds from universal knowledge. For [universal knowledge] is, of course, only determined to this particular rather than on account of some determination joined to it. This [the proceeding of some particular thing from the universal] does not happen through [universal knowledge] alone.<sup>232</sup>

Before any concrete action can be taken, universal knowledge must first be related to some particular object. As Avicenna goes on to illustrate, the cause of an animal seeking food is not simply its considering food in general to be nourishing, but considering this particular thing nourishing. In his words, "the desiring animal [...] desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition."<sup>233</sup> There first needs to be imagination and appetite towards a particular, and only then is it possible for concrete action to be conceived of and resolved upon.

But, of course, there is a sense in which it seems that we *do* incline towards general objects, and Avicenna immediately faces this objection. Playing devil's advocate, he notes that animals, when hungry, can be satisfied by multiple specific instances of nourishment, suggesting that they do not have one particular type in mind to begin with, but rather something general. For example, if a dog is hungry, it will not care which of two bowls of dog food it is offered. Continuing to play

<sup>231</sup> Discussion of the "first body" at Davidson (1992) 45, 74.

<sup>232</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 442-443.

<sup>233</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 443-444: "[443...] The desiring animal, [who desires] nourishment through its animal faculty, desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition. [444] And then it seeks nourishment through its movement."

devil's advocate, he adds a related worry: when desiring to cross some distance, it seems that we want something quite general (that is, crossing the entire field), which is then carried out by crossing bits and pieces of it. In both cases, it seems that the initial object is general, not particular.

Avicenna's response to both of these worries is to argue that specific objects can be pursued via related actions and related objects, without this meaning that there was some first, more general object of desire, of which the objects of these related actions are species. This core of this response, which he makes explicit at the end of his discussion, is as follows:

We say also that we might draw a universal conclusion from universal premises [...] <sup>234</sup> then we follow that with a particular conclusion from which proceed appetite and volition, particularized by a kind of estimative determination [*al-ta' ayyun al-wahmī*]. Then from there the motive power proceeds towards particular movements, which [movements] become the object of volition [*murāda*], for the sake of the initial object of volition. <sup>235</sup>

In this text, Avicenna is focused on the distinction between cognitions that orient us towards some initial object of pursuit, and the particular cognitions and movements that actually constitute the pursuit of that object. As such, there is some overlap between [Stage 1], evaluations that set goals (which are now discussing), and [Stage 2], practical judgments that set means to goals (which we will discuss shortly). But the general idea seems to be that once there is an inclination towards the “initial object of volition,” then practical judgments—according to the process described in section 3.3—settle on a course of actions, which become objects that are then sought for the sake of that initial object of inclination. Object-evaluations are oriented at particulars, and they are sought through particular actions, determined by practical judgments.

With this in mind, we can understand his responses to the above worries about seeking nourishment and crossing a distance. To the worry about multiple instances of nourishment being acceptable to an animal, he simply says this “does not mean that that [universal knowledge] is represented to it [as the object of desire].” <sup>236</sup> Presumably what he means is that the animal initially desired some particular instance of nourishment. Towards the end of a series of actions of nourishment-seeking it will finally encounter some object it knows to be nourishment. Though

<sup>234</sup> A universal conclusion is different from a universal volition. A universal conclusion is a precursor to particulars volition in humans. A universal volition is something that only the first body is capable of, as described above.

<sup>235</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 445-448.

<sup>236</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

slightly different than what it had initially imagined, it will nonetheless make something akin to the practical judgment, “I ought to eat this thing to satisfy my initial appetite.” We can notice similarities between the actual objects we encounter, and the particular objects we initially desire, and so fulfill the initial inclination. Even if this reasoning process requires noticing similarities that rely to an extent on a more general concept, this does not show that the initial object of desire is general.

His response to the worry about crossing a distance is more extended:

And similar to [the prior worry], in crossing a distance particular limits are represented to someone, which they intend, and perhaps that representation [of the distance] would be cut off, and perhaps its existence [i.e., the existence of the representation] would be renewed in some manner, by a renewal of continual, connected motion. And that does not prevent individuality and particularity in the representation, just as it does not prevent motion.<sup>237</sup>

His point here is that an initial volition—to cross some distance—is carried out by a series of more discrete, but equally particular volitions, based on successive representations. Once you get started crossing a distance, the initial representation and desire to cross it is inevitably “cut off” as your focus is turned to navigating the new particulars of the path. In navigating these particulars, the initial representation is renewed “in some manner,” in that your more specific goals bear some relation to the initial goal. For example, first you desire crossing the distance as a whole (which is itself a particular), then you desire getting to the tree that is a third of the way across the distance, then you desire getting to the rock that is two thirds of the way across the distance, and so on. In any case, the fact that an initial desire is carried out by a series of smaller actions does not show that the object which actualized inclination in the first place was a universal. The broader view of the distance was still a view of a particular distance.

To summarize, Avicenna’s discussion in *Remarks* shows that emotions occur in response to particular cognitions by diffusing the worry that having an initial goal—to which successive actions are related—somehow means that the initial object was a universal. This way of moving voluntarily is similar to that of the celestial bodies, insofar as it is based on particulars, but different than that of the first body, which moves simply on the basis of general knowledge. Actions in animals and humans can be related to an initial particular object, whose representation

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<sup>237</sup> *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

either persists or is replaced, while nonetheless allowing a connected, coherent series of actions for the sake of that initial particular object.

The passage therefore shows that particular representations in the imagination undergird the evaluations that cause emotion. A similar point is articulated, though not defended, in a brief passage from Avicenna's *Discussions* [*al-Mubāḥathāt*], when Avicenna's interlocutor asks, "How do we understand the idea that the appetitive and resolving faculties are corporeal?"

Avicenna's answer is as follows:

Estimative resolution is the faculty arrived at by the influence of the particular, such that [the particular] moves it [estimative resolution] towards causing motion insofar as it is affected/moved by the particular. And this is on account of corporeality. And the appetitive faculty enters into this, for there is conveyed to it [the appetitive faculty] a taste, or smell, or an imaginative memory of suchlike, and it is affected/moved towards seeking.<sup>238</sup>

The point being made here about the evaluations that trigger emotions also applies to resolution: emotion and resolution are rooted in the corporeal, in the sense that the cognitions that cause them are about particulars, known via the internal senses that make use of bodily organs. This is true whether emotion and resolution are about things currently being sensed, or simply recollections. In the sense of being based on particulars, emotion is based on corporeal imagination. That this is also asserted for the cognitions that undergird resolution shows that it is not something that makes the evaluations undergirding emotions particularly unique. But the point nonetheless helps us understand what Avicenna means when he says that inclinations are in response to something "imagined with some value."

The texts we have looked at in this section support the general idea that all emotions are undergirded by particular imagination. One possible concern about this conclusion, though, would be when it comes to the human emotions discussed in chapter two. After all, if there is one place where Avicenna is at pains to say that the soul is better off without the body and its corporeal faculties, it is with the intellect. Yet even here, the sense in which the intellect operates independently from the body and its faculties is quite restricted. Attaining to universal knowledge is a special act, between the human intellect and the Agent Intellect alone. But even for this act, the soul depends on embodied faculties for its "principles," to prepare it for that

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<sup>238</sup> Avicenna, *Discussions* (1995), section 861.

reception.<sup>239</sup> In most other cases, Avicenna falls back on the general Aristotelian dictum that “the soul never thinks without an image,” which is especially apparent given the pains he takes to show that most of human thought makes use of the “cogitative faculty”—which is just another way of referring to “imagination” when made use of by the intellect.<sup>240</sup> So, given that 1) Avicenna says that emotions in general depend on particular imagination, in the texts we have seen in this section, and 2) Avicenna elsewhere says that acts of the rational soul generally depend on the imagination, save for intellection, it seems reasonable to assume that the evaluative judgments triggering humans emotions would likewise depend on imagination. Textual evidence aside, this seems intuitive: for example, the human emotion of shame would be triggered by a judgment of a particular act as wrong, and as publicly vilified. But we should be clear that this point about human emotions involves making an inference based on Avicenna's explicit texts, and is not a point made explicitly by Avicenna himself.

### 3.5.2 Evaluations can be imaginative or reason-based

All evaluations that lead to emotions appear to be undergirded by particular imagination, but not all such evaluations are “imaginative,” since “imaginative” is one of the two in which evaluations can take place, alongside “cogitative.” The distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluation is the distinction between an evaluation that proceeds with the aid of reason (cogitative), and that which proceeds via the internal senses alone (imaginative). Cogitative evaluations are not always correct, but they involve a discursive process that imaginative evaluations simply do not.

Avicenna’s division between imaginative and cogitative evaluations is clearest in two texts from his *Healing: Rhetoric*. The first comes in the midst of his describing various sources of human action, as part of an attempt to distinguish acts that constitute wrongdoing from those that do not, in order to help rhetoricians paint their subjects in a positive or negative light<sup>241</sup>: some acts are unintentional and involuntary [*bi-ghayr qasd wa-irāda*], and thus not blameworthy, such as those due to chance, nature, or compulsion. The category of intentional, voluntary acts, on the other

<sup>239</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.3, 222-223. For a discussion of intellection in Avicenna, and its relation to the body, see Black (2014), 325.

<sup>240</sup> For a discussion of the general Aristotelian principle in the Arabic context, see Black (1990) 189 and Black (2013), 79-80.

<sup>241</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96ff.

hand, includes acts due to habit (since we have control over which habits we develop) and those due to appetite. Under the category of intentional, voluntary action, he makes two further distinctions: between acts in response to objects evaluated *imaginatively*, and objects evaluated *rationally* (i.e., using reason, though not necessarily correctly). This division is most evident in the second of the following two paragraphs, since Avicenna initially uses some language from the text on which he is basing the discussion (Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), and then clarifies the matter in his own terminology:

As for the acts that are from the will, they include [*min-hā*] those [...] that follow upon animal appetite [*shawqan ḥayawāniyyan*], either desire for pleasure, and this is the concupiscible power, or desire for repelling and overcoming, and this is the irascible power. And among them [appetite-based acts]<sup>242</sup> there are those that follow upon cogitative desire [*shawqan fikriyyan*], or those that follow upon rational desire [*shawqan mantiqiyyan*].<sup>243</sup>

And it seems that what is meant by “cogitative [*al-fikrī*]” is what proceeds from cogitation [*al-fikr*] towards any goal whatsoever, even though the goal is not rational or good [*ghayr ‘aqlī aw ghayr jamīl*], and [what is meant by] “rational [*al-mantiqī*]” is what proceeds towards the good and the rational. So it seems that what is [actually] meant by “cogitative” is “imaginative,” and by “rational,” “cogitative in the proper sense.”<sup>244</sup>

Avicenna encounters some difficulty here in his effort to clearly articulate the distinction between types of evaluative bases for emotions, while remaining faithful to the distinctions in Aristotle's text as it appears in Arabic. Thus we see him, in the second paragraph, modify a way of speaking from the first paragraph that he finds imprecise. Prying apart why Avicenna shifts his vocabulary over the course of these two paragraphs will help us see exactly what his core point is.

In the original Greek of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the distinction is simply made between rational and non-rational appetites, identifying concupiscible and irascible appetite with non-rational. In the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, however, two distinctions are made: first, between *cogitative* desire and rational desire, and then between *non-rational* and rational desire, with concupiscible and irascible appetite being given as examples of the non-rational. So the Arabic text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* text makes it seem as though “cogitative” and “non-rational” are

<sup>242</sup> Here Avicenna, less careful than in *Psychology* 4.4, seems to be using the term appetite [*shawq*] to refer to inclination in general.

<sup>243</sup> Note that *shawq* is here being used generically to refer to any state of the motive faculty, qualified by adjectives like “rational” or “cogitative.” As we saw in chapter one, in his explicitly psychological texts, Avicenna tends to reserve *shawq* for referring to the sorts of concupiscible and irascible appetites shared by all animals.

<sup>244</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96.

different ways of talking about the same category of emotion, to be contrasted with what is rational. What follows is a translation of the problematic Arabic rendering of Aristotle's text:

[Among acts involving appetite] there is that which is for the sake of *cogitative* desire [*al-shahwa al-fikriyya*], and what is for the sake of rational [*al-mantiqiyya*] [desire]. Volition is thought-based and rational [when] the agent only wills that which they think to be good. As for *irrational* appetites, they are irascible and concupiscible appetite.<sup>245</sup>

Since cogitative and non-rational are parallels in this text, it appears they are being used as two different ways of talking about the same sort of phenomena. But for Avicenna "cogitation" is the way of referring to the sort of thought process wherein reason makes use of the internal senses,<sup>246</sup> so it just does not seem right to lump cogitation together with the non-rational. Thus, the first paragraph of Avicenna's text from *Healing: Rhetoric*, above, follows the terminology of the Arabic Aristotle more closely, but he corrects this in the second paragraph, saying that "imaginative" is what should replace "cogitative" as that which is "irrational," in opposition to the "rational." Aristotle's original text merely distinguishes between rational and irrational desires, so Avicenna's clarification has the advantage of being closer to what the original text intended. In other words, Avicenna must have noticed that the Arabic text he was looking at infelicitously seemed to use the term "cogitative [*fikriyya*]" to describe a process that does not involve reason.

So it seems that Avicenna is interested in being clear when it comes to the difference between emotions with imaginative/non-rational cognitive causes, and those with cogitative/rational causes. Of course, this raises the issue of just what is the substantive difference between those two types of underlying cognitions. Avicenna gave a partial answer above, when he says that the first type of emotion (eventually relabelled as imaginative/non-rational) proceeds towards "any goal whatsoever," while cogitative/rational emotions proceed towards what has been identified as good. But more is said about the substance behind this distinction in a second text from *Healing: Rhetoric* that comes shortly thereafter.

In the section of his *Rhetoric* immediately following the distinction between different types of acts, Avicenna describes what pleasure is, again for the sake of improving the rhetorician's understanding of the motivations of their audience. Avicenna distinguishes pleasures as rational

<sup>245</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96. Emphasis mine.

<sup>246</sup> See Black (2013).

or non-rational, the difference corresponding to the way in which something is evaluated as worth pursuing or not. A non-rational pleasure is defined negatively, as having been evaluated as worth pursuing *without* any kind of discursive thought:

And what is longed for [*al-mushtahā*] has a pleasurable quality, whether [it is] a rational [*nuṭqiyya*] pleasure or a non-rational pleasure. The non-rational [object of desire] is what desire [*shawq*] is directed towards without being due to cogitation [*fikra*] or belief [*ra'y*] or analogy [*tamthīl*] that has clarified whether it is necessary that one pursue or not pursue it. And this [desire towards non-rational objects] is what pertains to nature and sensation.<sup>247</sup>

If non-rational pleasures are those things longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do not* involve cogitation, belief, or analogy, then, by implication, rational pleasures are longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do* involve cogitation, belief, or analogy. Not every one of these terms is fleshed out here in detail but, broadly speaking, he clearly means to contrast two things: on the one hand, any kind of process where one uses some sort of discursive thought to arrive at an evaluation, as opposed to the evaluation arising due to the natural operations of the internal senses.

We can say more about the second type: “nature and sensation” are provided as examples to illustrate how non-rational evaluations are arrived at. In other words, animal faculties are hardwired to evaluate certain objects as pleasant or painful, without any need for discursive thought. When an animal sees food, that image is joined to the intention of pleasure in their memory or instinct, and they want to pursue it. This is based on experience, to be sure, but it is not based on any discursive process—it is automatic.<sup>248</sup> In contemporary terms, we could think of merely imagining something to be beneficial or harmful as “construing” it to be so, or “entertaining the thought that” it is so, without making a considered judgment that this is the case.<sup>249</sup> These are imaginative/non-rational cognitive causes for emotions.

It is worth making two clarifications about the initial *Rhetoric* text quoted above, related to what imaginative and cogitative desire are not, respectively. First of all, cogitative desire is always towards that which is determined to be “good and rational,” but this does not mean that the agent will necessarily be correct that their goal is good. Avicenna’s emphasis has been on the discursive process behind cogitative desires, not their validity. Secondly, although non-rational,

<sup>247</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, 100. Emphasis mine.

<sup>248</sup> In contemporary terms, these would not be reasons on a reason internalist view. See Tappolet (2016) 164.

<sup>249</sup> Deonna & Teroni (2012) 55.



imaginative desire can proceed towards “any goal whatsoever,”<sup>250</sup> this does not mean that the agent could pursue something that it has evaluated as *not* good, all things considered. It is a truism in Avicenna’s tradition that no one pursues any object unless they think it is worth pursuing, in some way. Again, by saying that imaginative desire proceeds towards “any goal whatsoever,” the emphasis seems to be on the unguided nature of the process leading to the evaluation. So to call a desire cogitative/rational, or imaginative/non-rational, relates more to the *way* in which an evaluation is arrived at.

Avicenna makes use of the distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluative bases for emotion in at least two other texts. First, there is Avicenna’s discussion in *Metaphysics* 6.5 about how no voluntary action is pointless, because voluntary action is always in response to some emotion, and that emotion is always for some object. Key for our purposes is where Avicenna says that this object is grasped either imaginatively or cogitatively:

Hence, the proximate principle of every psychological movement is a motive power in the muscle of the organ, and the principle that comes after it is desire—desire, as you have learned in the *Psychology*, being necessarily consequent on some [act of] imagination or cogitation [*takhayyul aw fikr*], so that the most remote principle would be either imagination or cogitation [*takhayyulan aw fikran*].<sup>251</sup>

He goes on to classify actions that proceed from imagination or cogitation, respectively, with special attention to how we should think about acts that proceed from imagination. If imagination alone is involved, and there is thus no discursive thought, we call the end towards which an act is directed “trivial” and the act itself “haphazard.”<sup>252</sup> There is still an end, or an object, but it would merely be due to “nature and sensation.”

Finally, the distinction between imagination and cogitation is evident in a text from Avicenna’s *Notes* [*al-Ta’līqāt*] titled “Explaining [the Necessary Existent’s] Volition [*bayān irādatihī*].” The main purpose of this particular discussion is to clarify the sense in which the Necessary Existent has volition, but along the way voluntary action in general is explained in such a way as sheds light on imaginative versus cogitative evaluation, especially in the following passage:

<sup>250</sup> This is the way he describes what he initially calls deliberative desire, but which he corrects as imaginative in the last sentence. So this descriptor more truly applies to imaginative desire. See text above in section 3.5.2.

<sup>251</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.7.

<sup>252</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.10, 12.

[E]very action that proceeds from a will, the principle of that will is either knowledge [*ilm*] or opinion [*ẓann*] or imagination [*takhayyul*]. An example of what proceeds from understanding is the action of the geometer or physician. An example of what proceeds from opinion is being cautious of that in which there is risk, while an example of what proceeds from imagination is seeking something that appears to be either noble or excellent in order that a likeness to the noble or excellent thing is obtained.<sup>253</sup>

For our purposes this text can be seen as augmenting the merely twofold distinction between imagination and cogitative thought, subdividing cogitation into processes that lead to knowledge or opinion. Avicenna does not explicitly say that knowledge and opinion are meant to be grouped together, in contrast to imagination, but they fit well with the description of discursive/reason-based evaluations that we have seen in this section. Consider Avicenna's examples: to *know* something as good is to have a deep grasp of why it is the way it is, such as a geometer or physician have of their objects. One's reasons are firm and have been made explicit. To believe something as good *according to opinion* is to have a reason for preferring one thing over another, but to admit that the other option is possible. This is a firmly grasped reason, but it is still explicit. On the other hand, when something is construed as good according to the imagination, there is no mention of reasons—something simply “appears [or seems: *yushbih*]” worth pursuing, and that is that. Appearances are not necessarily wrong, they are just not based on discursive thought.

So in the last two sections we have seen two senses in which imagination relates to emotion. On the one hand, all emotions are triggered by evaluations, insofar as those evaluations are based on particulars conceived in the imagination (even if higher faculties are also involved in the evaluative process). On the other hand, some emotions are based on *imaginative* evaluations (not involving discursive thought), while others are based on cogitative evaluations (which do involve discursive thought). Both these senses in which imagination is involved are important for an overall understanding of Avicenna's views on emotion. In Avicenna's initial definition of the inclining motive faculty, when he says that emotions are due to "imagining" some object as worth pursuing or not, it seems most likely that he has the former sense of imagination in mind.

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<sup>253</sup> Avicenna, *Notes* (1973) p. 16. Avicenna goes on to show that while most voluntary actions are passive, in the sense that the agent is acted upon in forming an evaluation of it as worth pursuing, it is possible for knowledge-based volition to not be passive, this being characteristic of the Necessary Existent (to be more specific, the NE's volitions are active in the sense of being creative—its actions produce the object of its volitions). So voluntary action can be rooted in a cognition that is active or passive, which McGinnis and Ruffus takes to correspond to the difference between the act being free or determined. For more on the later point, see McGinnis & Ruffus (2015).

That is, he is simply pointing out that inclinations/emotions are caused by evaluations of particulars.

For the purposes of this chapter, this confirms that Avicenna indeed has the view expressed in [Stage 1]: some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover), imagined as having some sort of value, is what leads to an inclination/emotion (all other things being equal). In the next section, we will see how different cognitions are involved in [Stage 2], leading to the resolution-to-act. As a reminder of what we are building towards: when both [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] are finished being fleshed out in detail, we will have a better sense of the role that emotion plays in a broader theory of action.

### 3.6 Practical judgments lead to resolution

Once a subject has an emotion/inclination (*nizā 'inbi 'āth*) towards or away from some object, triggered by an evaluative judgment ([Stage 1]), they are in a position to determine what to do about that object. Now we are at what I previously labeled as [Stage 2], wherein Avicenna describes how we form a judgment about what to do or not do, which leads to the motive state called resolution (*al-ijmā'*). In the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text we looked at earlier, the cognitions leading to resolution were simply described as estimative and intellectual beliefs, which does not tell us too much about what they are actually like. In this section, I want to show that based on what Avicenna says elsewhere, the label “practical judgment” would indeed be the most helpful way to refer to the judgments made at this stage, whether animal or rational.

Avicenna describes practical judgments, particularly with reference to the rational soul, in *Healing: Psychology* 5.1. This section builds off of the general sketch of the practical intellect in 1.5 that we looked at in chapter two, on human emotion, but in it the nature of practical judgments and their relation to the resolution-to-act is more fully unpacked. The main thing that we need to see in this text is that not just any judgment leads to a resolution-to-act, but only the conclusion of a practical syllogism, or the analogue to a the conclusion of a practical syllogism at

the animal level.<sup>254</sup> In the language of Aristotle looked at earlier, it is this cognition which determines the *means* to achieve some end.

To be clear again about the sequence of acts: although practical judgment and resolution-to-act are technically *post*-emotion, these acts are all closely related, and part of the same overall theory of action. Getting clear on practical judgments and resolution-to-act ([Stage 2]), which *follow* emotions, will help us confirm the role played by emotions described in prior sections. One reason it makes sense for Avicenna to think of emotions merely as inclinations caused by evaluative judgments ([Stage 1]), is precisely because he distinguishes these other acts ([Stage 2]), which follow emotions, and help to actually bring about concrete action.

Avicenna introduces his discussion of practical judgments with a contrast, clarifying that judgments of theoretical intellect are *not* essentially related to action:

[a]<sup>255</sup> Humans have governance in particular matters and in universal matters. In universal matters there is only belief, even if it is about action. For one type of belief is the universal belief about how a house should be built. From this [universal] belief alone and primarily, however, there will not issue the enacting of a particular house. For actions deal with particular matters, and issue from particular judgments, and that is because the universal, insofar as it is universal, is not related to this rather than that. Let us postpone explanation of this, relying on what will come to you in the metaphysical art, in the last part.<sup>256</sup>

Here, human thought about universal matters is contrasted with deliberation about particular matters. Beliefs on a universal level can be about action in general, and could theoretically apply to many particulars and situations. But enacting motion requires selecting and interacting with one set of particulars, with “this rather than that,” so universal beliefs are too general to have immediate implications for what one ought to do. You can have a general belief about the best way of building houses, but without deciding to build a particular house nothing will get done. You can believe that apples are nutritious and worth eating, but without deciding to eat this particular nutritious apple, you will never eat any apple at all.

<sup>254</sup> The animal equivalent to a practical judgment is not the same thing as the conclusion of a practical syllogism, since animals cannot reason discursively. Non-human animals do, however, have cognitions that settle on courses of action. Avicenna says this in an aside at the end of the a text discussed below: “If this [the practical intellect] judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmā’ iyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals (*Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207).”

<sup>255</sup> The texts labeled [a-e] are a mostly continuous section from *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 206-207 (ellipses noted at text [d]).

<sup>256</sup> The “postponement” Avicenna mentions refers to further discussion of universals qua universals, which he returns to in the *Healing: Metaphysics* 5.2, but this is his primary explanation of the difference between universal and practical judgments.

With the universal judgments of the theoretical intellect determined to be insufficient for prompting action, Avicenna contrasts this with the sort of judgments that *can* lead to action, these being the particular judgments of the practical intellect:

[b] Humans have, then, a faculty concerned with universal matters and another concerned with deliberation [*al-rawīya*] in particular matters, about what should be done and not done, about what is beneficial and harmful, beautiful and ugly, good and bad. And that [is done] through a type of syllogism and reflection, [which can be] correct or faulty, whose goal is to produce a belief [*ra'y*] about some particular, future thing from among that which is possible. For one does not deliberate about whether or not to do things that are necessary or non-existent, nor [does one deliberate about whether or not to do things] pertaining to what is past [because] the past cannot be enacted. If this faculty judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals.<sup>257</sup>

In this last sentence Avicenna says that the judgments described in this paragraph lead, directly, to an actualization of the resolving faculty, not mere inclination. He does not specifically say that judgments of the practical intellect lead to acts of the resolving faculty, *as opposed to* inclination, but the distinctions from the immediately preceding book 4.4 (examined above in chapter 1), are supposed to be fresh in our minds. So he has just finished describing emotion and its causes in 4.4, and now in 5.1 is describing how to get from emotion to resolution, via practical judgments. At the end of this section (text [e] below), he again connects practical judgments to the resolution-to-act, with no mention of emotion, showing that he is indeed meaning to talk about the cognitions leading to *al-ijmā'* here.

The thought process leading to practical judgments, at the human level, is described in text [b] as syllogistic, but involving syllogisms of a different sort than those leading to universal judgments. Avicenna says that the syllogisms constructed by the practical intellect have two features: 1) they are “about what should and shouldn’t be done,” and 2) they are about the particular, future, and possible. To unpack the first point, Avicenna is not saying that the practical intellect is the only human faculty involved in determining what should and shouldn’t be done, or that it alone can think about particular, future, or possible things. As we have seen, the theoretical intellect can indeed make descriptive judgments about good or evil in a general sense, such as that all apples are nutritious. But with the aid of estimation and imagination, we identify particulars as this or that (i.e., this is an apple, that is not), and then the practical intellect is posited specifically to account for identifying what we should do about those evaluative judgments. That is, the

<sup>257</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207.

practical intellect does not judge things as good or bad—it rather judges courses of action about those things.<sup>258</sup> The practical intellect can do other things, and is involved in other processes. But the foregoing function is the way that the practical intellect is most relevant to moving us from inclination to action.

If practical judgments are going to be coherent, Avicenna specifies above that the courses of action identified as good or bad need to be in the future, and possible. Since the conclusions drawn by the practical intellect involve action, it wouldn't make sense to draw those conclusions about things in the past (“I will spend more time studying for that last exam”), or courses of action that are impossible (“I will give out lots of square circles as party gifts”). We can have such thoughts, but presumably these would be the “faulty” acts of the practical intellect, which he mentions in [b]. What Avicenna describes in this text is, as he says, the “goal,” or the ideal operation of the practical intellect.

From here, Avicenna goes on to describe the relationship between the theoretical and practical intellect in light of the practical intellect's goal of arriving at conclusions about what ought and ought not be done. He begins by emphasizing that the practical intellect does not do this entirely on its own:

[c] And this faculty [the practical intellect] is supplied by the faculty that deals with universals, and from there it [the practical intellect] takes major premises concerning what it deliberates about, and draws conclusions in the realm of particulars.

Avicenna does not provide examples of how this works, but we could take for example the following simple practical syllogism: apples are healthy, this is an apple, eat this apple. Avicenna says that the major premise of such syllogisms (in this case, “apples are healthy”) would be “taken from” the theoretical intellect, which deals with universals. Even though this major premise is here used in a practical syllogism, the aim of this premise, considered on its own, is truth (i.e., it simply provides universal knowledge). On the other hand, the conclusion, “eat this carrot,” aims at action. Avicenna consistently relates notions of benefit and harm, and their synonyms, to the practical intellect, even though the theoretical intellect can make general

<sup>258</sup> This is of course not the only role that the practical intellect has in Avicenna's psychology. Since “judgment” is a generic term for Avicenna, there are other things we could call “judgments of the practical intellect.” But I am using the term “practical judgment” to capture this specific role that Avicenna highlights, and which is central to the theory of action being described here (namely, making judgments about what we should or should not do).

judgments about benefits and harms, because the practical intellect is concerned with commanding the pursuit of benefits and avoiding harms, while the theoretical intellect is concerned with affirming truth, and rejecting falsehood. The concepts Avicenna repeatedly associates with both faculties have to do with their *goals* as faculties (truth vs. action), not the *content* of the premises they make use of.

In the penultimate section of Avicenna's discussion of the practical intellect, he elaborates on the structure of the practical syllogism, in comparison to the sort of syllogisms the theoretical intellect constructs. The first few sentences are a review of what has already been said, but about halfway through he provides new details by distinguishing the "principles" of both faculties:

[d] The first power belonging to the human soul is a power related to intellection, and so it is called the theoretical intellect. And the second is a power related to action, and it is called the practical intellect. The former pertains to truth and falsehood, the latter to good and evil in particular matters. The former pertains to the necessary, the possible and the impossible, the latter to the evil, the good and the morally permitted. The principles of the former are the primary premises, and the principles of the later are well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises]—the ones that are not among the strong experiential [premises] [...]

When Avicenna says that the principles of the theoretical intellect are "primary premises," he is referring, as defined in *Remarks and Admonitions*, to propositions "that are necessitated by the essence and instinct of a clear intellect, and not by any cause external to it."<sup>259</sup> In other words, propositions like "the whole is greater than its parts," are axiomatic in the sense that their truth is automatically assented to, once they are understood.<sup>260</sup> Assent to them is given because they are grasped as necessarily true in themselves, on the basis of the essences under consideration, not on the basis of any external evidence.

On the other hand, Avicenna says that the principles of the practical intellect include those that are "well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises]." Each of the descriptors in this sentence refer to a different type of premise, or a different way of knowing a premise.<sup>261</sup> Avicenna elsewhere discusses each of these types of premises in more detail, but his point here seems simply to be that the sort of premises involved in practical syllogisms are not known with axiomatic certainty. When discussing "well known" premises in *Remarks*, such as that "stealing the wealth of others is an ugly act and that lying is an ugly act which must not be pursued,"

<sup>259</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119.

<sup>260</sup> "Axiomatic" is Inati's word. See Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119, footnote 5.

<sup>261</sup> Black (2013a) 124.

Avicenna says that these are premises whose acceptance is typically brought about thanks to our social and moral upbringing.<sup>262</sup>

These weaker premises are still “taken from” the theoretical intellect, in the language of [c], above, in that they are general premises initially accepted by the theoretical intellect, and then made use of in a practical syllogism. The practical intellect is not posited for every aspect of a practical syllogism, but rather for the unique ability to draw a conclusion that makes some general value judgment into an imperative for an individual in a particular situation. These non-axiomatic premises are “principles” of the practical intellect in the sense that they are the premises the practical intellect needs in order to perform its unique function of drawing practical judgments.

In the conclusion to 5.1’s discussion of the practical intellect, Avicenna reaffirms that he has been discussing specifically the sort of cognition undergirding the transition to the motive state of resolution. At the same time, he reaffirms the point that this same sort of function exists, albeit via a different mechanism, in animals:

[e] For there is in humans a sensible judge, and an estimative judge in the realm of imagination, and an intellectual and practical judge. And the motivating principles that belong to [*al-mabādi’ al-bā’itha li-*] humans’ faculty that resolves upon [*quwwatihi al-ijmā’iyya ‘alā*] the movement of the organs are imaginative estimation [*wahm khayālī*], the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other animals have three of these.

Of the four main types of cognitive faculties, two of them (estimation and the practical intellect) make judgments oriented especially towards causing an act of the resolving faculty. Judgments of the imagination and judgments of the theoretical intellect may provide data or premises to estimation and the practical intellect, but on their own imagination and theoretical intellect do not trigger resolution. When Avicenna says that other animals “have three of these,” he means that estimation alone, without the practical intellect, is responsible for the analogous sort of practical judgments in animals that lead to resolution. Again, this analogous judgment in animals is not the conclusion of a practical syllogism, but it nonetheless settles on a course of action. This coheres with the what we saw Avicenna say towards the start of this section in *Psychology*, that just as resolution follows practical judgments for humans, so it “follows judgments of other

<sup>262</sup> Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 122.



faculties in animals.”<sup>263</sup> Likewise, this coheres with the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text we looked at earlier (text [b], section 2) which said that the judgment prior to a resolved will can just be a kind of “estimative belief [*i‘tiqād wahmī*],” when resolution is reached without the involvement of rational faculties.<sup>264</sup> These texts are not linked in a straightforward way, but the general picture is the same in both, with analogous practical judgments on the animal and human level able to lead to resolution.

Avicenna is not explicit in any text in his corpus about the precise role estimation plays in non-human animals for the sake of bringing about resolution. Of course he has plenty to say in *Psychology* 4.4 about how animals make general value judgments<sup>265</sup>: some knowledge of harms and benefits is built into animals as instinct, some is learned through experience.<sup>266</sup> But it is not clear whether these are meant to be merely evaluations, such as can lead to emotion, or whether they are the animal analogue to practical judgments. In any case, it is clear that he thinks estimation is the “greatest judge [*hākīm*]” in animals, and that estimation, by way of an “upsurge of imagining [*inbi‘āth takhayyulī*],” produces something analogous to the intellect’s practical judgments, despite not sharing in the human ability to construct syllogisms.<sup>267</sup>

In text [e], the conclusion, Avicenna has emphasized the importance of both emotion and practical judgment as causes of resolution-to-act, because if either of these things are missing, there can be no resolution. Judging something to be worth doing, but having no initial inclination to do it, provides no motive state for the practical judgment to help push into a resolution, while having an emotion without a practical judgment is bound to remain mere inclination. Sometimes Avicenna will talk about the practical judgment alone as a proximate cause of resolution-to-act, and sometimes he does a similar thing with emotion, as in a text from 4.4 we looked at earlier, where inclination “strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjīb*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā‘*].”<sup>268</sup> The different emphases in each makes sense, since both inclination and practical judgment need to come together if there is going to be resolution.

<sup>263</sup> See section 3.6, text [b].

<sup>264</sup> See chart in section 3.3 of this chapter.

<sup>265</sup> Again, “value” and “evaluation” are not meant to have strictly ethical overtones here. See explanation at the beginning of section 3.5.

<sup>266</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 183-184.

<sup>267</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 182-183.

<sup>268</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195. Discussed at the beginning of the section 3.1, above.

The preceding analysis of the text on the practical intellect in 5.1 has confirmed the general picture summarized in [Stage 2]: some practical good (the object, unmover-mover), represented as part of a practical judgment, can lead to a resolution-to-act<sup>269</sup> (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action<sup>270</sup>).

### 3.7 Conclusion: reviewing the distinctions

We can summarize the distinctions that have been made as follows. Inclination and resolution are two separate acts of the motive faculty (or two separate faculties, depending on how finely faculties are being parsed), and they are triggered by different cognitive processes. Those two cognitive processes are as follows:

- Evaluative judgments: cognitions that ascribe value to objects/ends in some way
- Practical judgments: cognitions that decide on a course of action to take regarding some evaluated object/end

Evaluations lead to emotions, practical judgments lead to a resolution. Avicenna's standard way of describing the evaluation that leads to inclination involves the phrase that something is "imagined as having some sort of value." We have understood the sense in which imagination is relevant to the evaluations that cause emotion along two lines:

- Evaluations are cognitions that involve particular imagination.
- Evaluations can ascribe value to their objects via imaginative/non-rational or cogitative/rational processes.

When Avicenna says that emotions are triggered when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he probably does *not* have the second sense sense of "imaginative" involvement in

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<sup>269</sup> Avicenna is aware that any illustration of the factors involved in voluntary movement is going to seem overly simplistic, as this one may have. In his *Healing: Physics* (2009, trans. McGinnis) 1.15.5, he says concerning volition that "it is difficult to produce the cause completely, for the will is incited to act [only] after a number of factors are fulfilled, the enumeration of which is not easy. Also, one might not even be conscious of many of them so as to include them in the account." A single decision of the practical intellect, such as that planting a garden would be good, does not lead to actual planting without a number of further judgments, influenced by numerous factors, conscious and unconscious. But the general schema could be applied to any of these intermediary judgments and actions, as well.

<sup>270</sup> One might challenge Avicenna's analysis of action along the following lines: it seems that something else is still needed, even after the practical judgment, to instigate action. It seems possible to "decide" to go get a snack, but then merely incline towards getting a snack. One can "decide" to lose weight, but not actually do anything about it. Avicenna does not respond to this sort of worry, but I suspect he would say that, if we haven't actually acted, then either there is some impediment (some countervailing judgment or habit), or we have just misdescribed what is going on in the cognition (we were really only judging that it would be pleasant to eat a snack, or to lose weight, but we have not really personalized that evaluation into a command).

mind. That is, the evaluations leading to emotions can be imaginative or cogitative, where imaginative means "lacking discursive thought." But this does not apply to all evaluations (since cogitative evaluations *do* involve discursive thought), so it wouldn't make sense to interpret this as what Avicenna means in the phrase "imagined as having some value." On the other hand, all emotions (animal and human) are in fact based on cognitions that engage the imagination for the sake of particularity. So when Avicenna says that emotions are caused when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he is merely emphasizing the particularity of the evaluation leading to emotion.<sup>271</sup>

Going back to some of the earlier understandings of *al-ijmā'*,<sup>272</sup> it should be clear that the Latin tendency of sometimes translating *al-ijmā'* with terms that capture inclination was a mistake, since inclination and resolution are distinct. Moreover, *al-ijmā'* in Avicenna does not have any particular association with *al-ijmā'* in Islamic legal theory. It describes a state of the motive faculty, not the coming together of various faculties in any way that resembles a number of legal judges coming together. We could think of motion in fact occurring at the point where cognition and motive faculties finally "come together" to cause movement, but this is not precisely what Avicenna picks out by the term *al-ijmā'*. Finally, there is no obvious Stoic influence on Avicenna's concept of *al-ijmā'*. On the contrary, given that it is motive, rather than cognitive, it seems uniquely unsuited to be a successor to the Stoic concept of *synkatathesis*. It might be that the *practical judgment* leading to *al-ijmā'* fulfills a similar role in Avicenna's psychology as *synkatathesis* does in the Stoic tradition, but the practical judgment is, of course, something distinct from *al-ijmā'* itself.

Avicenna's formulation can be seen as a development of Aristotle's ends-means distinction, in that emotions focus us on some evaluated end, while resolution enacts motion according to the means clarified by a practical judgment. Avicenna is not always careful about making these distinctions, which is understandable, since he is really just talking about two different branches, or functions, that follow from the one animal motive faculty, and he is introducing a new concept (resolution) alongside older terms (e.g., appetite) that previously were used to capture everything

<sup>271</sup> Being based on particulars is not unique to the evaluations behind emotions, since practical judgments engage the imagination as well (see section 3.5.1, above.), but it is nonetheless an important feature of his explanation of the evaluations behind emotions.

<sup>272</sup> See end of section 3.2.

in this conceptual terrain. But despite the fact that in some places he glosses over the careful distinctions he makes elsewhere, we should take seriously his careful distinctions when considering his overall schema. Emotions, then, according to Avicenna, are best thought of as varieties of inclination, which orient us towards objects or goals, but are not in themselves directly action-guiding.

## Chapter 4 Physiology in Avicenna's Affective *Psychology*

In this chapter, I will present the aspects of physiology found in Avicenna's philosophical and medical texts that are relevant to his affective psychology. I will not be examining everything Avicenna says in his medical texts about the physiology of specific emotions, or specific cures for emotion-related maladies. Rather, what follows is an examination of the way physiology is incorporated into, or appealed to, in Avicenna's philosophical analysis of the general nature of emotion.

What Avicenna has to say about the physiology of emotions in his affective psychology can be categorized under three headings: physiology underlying occurrent emotions, dispositions for emotions, and effects of emotions. By physiology of an occurrent emotion, I mean the matter, or organ, that underlies the core notion of an emotional "impulse," or "inclination," that we examined in chapter one. To look ahead, all emotions have their seat in (i.e., are localized in) the heart, and the vital spirit that is in the heart, despite having dispositions and effects localized elsewhere in the body.<sup>273</sup> As for the second and third topics to be discussed, Avicenna actually has comparatively more to say about the physiology about *dispositions* for emotions (which are prior to emotions), and the characteristic physiological *effects* of emotions (which follow).

These latter two aspects of physiology are best framed by prior distinctions Avicenna makes in his philosophical psychology, and can be seen as responses to two corresponding points of discussion among his philosophical predecessors (especially Aristotle and the Stoics, as will be shown). First, Avicenna's focus on physiology when it comes to emotional *dispositions* is in part a response to the need to explain why the same evaluative judgment sometimes causes an emotion, sometimes not, and, when it does, why the emotion varies in strength. For example, your physical state partially determines whether seeing someone with a pleasant thing you want will give rise to envy. As for Avicenna's focus on the physiology of emotional *effects*, this is due

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<sup>273</sup> Avicenna is not explicit about how exactly we should classify this matter (in terms of being the "seat," "subject," "organ," and so on), but one thing that does become clear is that it should probably not be referred to as the "material cause" of an emotion. That is because, for Avicenna, the material cause is part of the essence of the thing (McGinnis 2010, 41), and to the extent that Avicenna does address this issue, he refers to emotions as embodied, but "primarily of the soul (see discussion in 4.5.1 and 4.5.4 of this chapter)." Emotions are necessarily embodied in some sort of matter, but what matter in particular does not appear to be part of the essence of an emotion.

to the sort of changes he thinks, properly speaking, do and do not underly occurrent emotions. For example, one might think of turning red as a core component of what it means to experience shame. But since, as mentioned above, Avicenna thinks that the matter underlying an occurrent emotion is specifically the heart, and the vital spirit in the heart, he would consider turning red merely a possible effect of shame. Drawing the line where he does is not simply a verbal issue, but reflects what Avicenna thinks constitutes the essence of an emotion.

One distinction that will recur in Avicenna's texts that follow is the distinction between psychological states that are “primarily of the soul,” and those that are “primarily of the body.” Emotions are states that are best characterized in terms of the faculties of the soul. That is, they are states of the motive soul, caused by cognitions. They are embodied, of course, and localized in the heart, but they are primarily psychological. Physiological dispositions and effects, on the other hand, are primarily of the body. They can be fully described in terms of the material elements of a living body (i.e., temperaments, humours, physical aches and pains), despite the fact that they only exist due to the fact that the body is a living, ensouled body. I mention this at the outset because a big reason for distinguishing the physiology underlying *occurrent* emotions from emotional *dispositions* and *effects*, is this distinction between states that are primarily of the body, versus primarily of the soul. Emotions are states that are primarily of the soul and, as embodied psychological acts, they of course have an underlying physiology. On the other hand, the physiological dispositions and effects Avicenna discusses are *different* states, states that are primarily of the body, and not to be identified with the physiology underlying occurrent emotional states.

## 4.1 Avicenna’s writings on the physiology of emotions

In addition to the philosophical texts that frame Avicenna’s discussion of emotions, there are three texts that have specific things to say about the physiology of emotions: section 5.8 of Avicenna’s *Healing: Psychology*, the *Canon of Medicine*, and his *Cardiac Drugs. Psychology* 5.8 is the final section of Avicenna’s main work of philosophical psychology, and it is an overview of the human physiology relevant to psychology.<sup>274</sup> Much of the chapter is taken up

<sup>274</sup> *Psychology* 5.8 is obviously found in a work overtly concerned with philosophical psychology, but in and of itself it is primarily concerned with physiology. I don't mean to make a strong claim about how this particular text should be classified, just that it has specific things to say about the physiology of emotions.

with the question of whether there is one organ that has priority over all the other organs, that being the heart (à la Aristotle), or whether there is more of a cooperative foundation for life's activities between the heart, brain and liver (à la Galen). Avicenna takes a middle-way between Aristotle and Galen, saying that the heart, with the vital spirit, is in some sense the source of life, but that the brain and liver have governance in different domains. So Avicenna calls the heart "the principle" (*al-mabda'*), while also allowing that other organs can be principles of more specialized activities. As we will see, 5.8 is primarily valuable for the discussion of emotions insofar as it clarifies where occurrent emotions are localized.

The *Canon* is, of course, Avicenna's systematic, influential work on the nature of medicine, along with the causes of diseases and their treatments. It is comprised of five sections, of which the first and third are most relevant to the discussion of emotions.<sup>275</sup> The first is relevant for its discussion of the vital spirit, which is referred to frequently when discussing the dispositions and effects for emotions, while the third is relevant because it contains Avicenna's discussions of some mental illnesses, the most detailed of which concerns melancholy.

As Avicenna explains at the outset of the *Canon*, medicine has both a theoretical and a practical component. This is not a distinction between, say, thinking about medicine versus going out and actively performing it. Rather, the distinction is between different types of principles: those that need to be known in order to understand the the treatment of disease and maintenance of health, and then the concrete principles for doing so.<sup>276</sup> For example, you need to understand what a liver is, in general, before you are able to understand the specific instructions for diagnosing and treating its ailments. The theoretical component of medicine thus contains discussion on roughly the same level of generality as what we found in the *Psychology*, albeit restricted to the general theory needed for the art of medicine. This means that some of Avicenna's discussions of emotions in the *Canon* give us insight into the general nature of emotions, not just the treatment of emotional disorders.

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<sup>275</sup> There is so far only a critical edition of the first book of Avicenna's *Canon*, published by Vikas in 1982. For the rest, the standard version to use is that edited by al-Qashsh in 1987, which is a more readable version, with commentary and index, of the 1877 Būlāq (non-critical) text.

<sup>276</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.1.1, 33-34.

The *Cardiac Drugs* is a much shorter treatise than the *Canon*, focused on the workings of the heart, along with its particular ailments and treatments.<sup>277</sup> *Cardiac Drugs* is thought to initially have been a stand-alone treatise, but has been inserted both into the *Canon* and the *Healing: Psychology* at different points. More recently, *Cardiac Drugs* has been inserted into English translations of the *Canon*, as a way of supplementing the *Canon*'s discussion of the vital spirit.<sup>278</sup> However, there was a premodern tradition, apparently begun by Avicenna's disciple Jūzjāni, of including *Cardiac Drugs* after section 4.4 of *Healing: Psychology*. As described by Tommaso Alpina, some Arabic and Latin manuscripts reflect this tradition, though modern critical editions of the Arabic *Healing: Psychology* do not. Simone Van Riet's modern Latin edition of the *Healing: Psychology* does include *Cardiac Drugs*, albeit as an appendix to the work as a whole. In any case, the impetus for attaching *Cardiac Drugs* to *Psychology* 4.4 is Avicenna's own remark, at the end of 4.4:

And we have discussed in our books of medicine, to a degree of detail and accuracy not found in any predecessors, the reason for the dispositions [*isti' dādāt*] of different people—on account of their natural temperament [*jibilla*] and their different states [*aḥwāl*]*—to joy, depression, anger, gentleness, rancor, calmness, and suchlike. So let someone read [about such things] there.*<sup>279</sup>

As has been shown in previous chapters, 4.4 is where Avicenna gives his most fundamental, general account of the nature of emotion, as part of a discussion of the motive soul. As this text makes clear, though, there is more to be said about emotions, which can be found in Avicenna's medical texts. Avicenna's *Canon* does contain some discussion of emotions, but it makes sense to take the above text as pointing us towards *Cardiac Drugs* in particular. As a percentage of the text, *Cardiac Drugs* is much more focused on emotions, and in particular on the sort of dispositions for emotions to which Avicenna's concluding remark refers.

<sup>277</sup> There is no critical edition of *Cardiac Drugs*, though the Arabic version used here (ed. al-Bābā) is based on three different manuscripts. See Alpina (2017) 371.

<sup>278</sup> For example, this choice is described in Bakhtiar's introduction to Avicenna, *Canon* (1999), lxvi. Texts from *Cardiac Drugs* are also inserted into the edition of Gruner (1973). See final note on page 122, introducing the insertion of *Cardiac Drugs* which follows.

<sup>279</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4. 201.



## 4.2 The nature of the vital spirit

Before looking at how Avicenna distinguishes between the subject of occurrent emotions, their dispositions, and their effects, we need some context for the terminology he uses in those discussions. In particular, Avicenna frequently links emotions to the vital spirit, [*rūḥ*], also called the vital faculty [*al-quwwa al-ḥayawāniyya*]. For example, the following text begins Avicenna's discussion of the vital spirit in the *Canon*:

As for the vital faculty [*al-quwwa al-ḥayawāniyya*]—and they mean by this, the power whereby if it occurs in the organs, it prepares them for receiving the power of sensation and movement and the acts of life—they [prior physicians] link [*yudīfūn*] to this the movements of fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghadab*] on account of what they find in them in terms of expansion and contraction of the vital spirit [*al-rūḥ*] related to this faculty.<sup>280</sup>

The vital spirit is initially posited to account for how a body comes to receive psychological faculties in animals (vegetative, sensitive and motive). In other words, it is posited to account for how animals become living. As will be shown, the vital spirit does not explain those very vegetative, sensitive and motive functions, but it explains a body's *receptivity* to the faculties responsible for those functions. In addition to this, it is also frequently appealed to as part of emotional experience, both as that which underlies occurrent emotions and as a key component of emotional dispositions and effects (both of which we will look at shortly). These discussions of dispositions and effects will make more sense if we already have in hand an understanding of the vital spirit on its own terms.

The first step towards understanding all this terminology is to see it in the context of Avicenna's division of faculties in his medical texts, which differs from that of his psychological texts. In the *Canon*, Avicenna groups the faculties of living organisms into three broad categories, and discusses them in the following order: the natural [*al-ṭabī'iyya*], the vital [*al-ḥayawāniyya*],<sup>281</sup> and the psychological [*al-nafsāniyya*]. The “natural faculties” of the *Canon* correspond to the “vegetative faculties” in the *Psychology*, which include faculties for nutrition, growth and generation. The *Canon*'s “psychological faculties” explicitly correspond to the sensitive and

<sup>280</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126.

<sup>281</sup> “Animal” would also be an appropriate way of translating this term, but “vital” more accurately reflects the faculty's role. The vital faculty has more to do with making something living [*ḥayy*] than making it of the genus animal. In other words, as we will see, the vital spirit underlies vegetative and sensitive faculties in animals, and is present in the relevant organs even when those faculties become damaged—thus making the organs alive (due to the vital spirit), but without their proper function.

motive faculties described in book 4 of the *Psychology*, with particular emphasis in the *Canon* on the sensitive faculties. To put this more schematically:

In the medical texts		In the psychological texts
Natural faculties (includes nutrition, growth, reproduction)	equivalent to	Vegetative faculties
Vital faculties		
Psychological faculties (includes sensation and motion)	equivalent to	Animal faculties

Avicenna never gives a reason for the difference in terminology, but presumably it has to do with medicine's focus on humans. In psychological texts, faculties are grouped according to the three varieties of living beings (plants, animals and humans). Medicine, on the other hand, does not need to be concerned with which faculties in a human are generically similar to animals and plants, and it does not deal with the rational faculties, making the vegetative-animal-rational division less relevant.

Avicenna typically uses the term “spiritual” to refer to a particular type of *physical* substance, and this is no different when it comes to the vital spirit. Most fundamentally, the vital spirit is a lightweight, fine physical substance produced by the heart.<sup>282</sup> It flows to not-yet-animate organs, giving them life, and enabling them to receive the further vegetative, sensitive or motive faculties that we typically associate with them. Avicenna relates the development of the vital spirit in an almost poetic section of *Cardiac Drugs*, describing how all of life derives from God. Vital spirit, Avicenna says, is “a physical substance, coming from the mixture of the elements, approaching a likeness to the heavenly bodies.”<sup>283</sup> The vital spirit is often described in physical terms, but it also has a functional description, which leads to Avicenna shifting between referring to it as a “spirit” or “faculty” unceremoniously, suggesting that neither label is meant to refer exclusively to its

<sup>282</sup> In positing something like this, Avicenna is depending chiefly on Galen, though the theory of vital spirit (Greek: *pneuma*) goes at least back to Aristotle. For a discussion of *pneuma* in Aristotle, see *Generation of Animals* (1943), Appendix B. For a discussion of *pneuma* in Galen, see *On the Natural Faculties* (1916), introduction, xxxiv-xxxv.

<sup>283</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

material aspect. Rather, either “vital spirit” or “vital faculty” refers to this fine substance, which can also be described in terms of its form, or function.

The vital spirit is initially posited to account for the beginning stages of the development of living organisms. In broad strokes, this process unfolds via elements being combined together, composing humours, which ultimately compose organs and substances, ranging from the crude and coarse, to the fine and harmonious. In *Cardiac Drugs* and the *Canon*, Avicenna explains how this process of organ and substance development works in the case of humans: the heart emerges prior to all other organs (except possibly the liver) as a “storehouse” for vital spirit (*khizānat al-rūh*), and proceeding from there the vital spirit gives life to the other organs.<sup>284</sup> Those organs, to which the vital spirit gives life, originate from the liver. Whereas the heart produces the fine spirit that gives life, the liver produces something much more coarse, which is suitable for shaping the matter of the other organs.<sup>285</sup> In other words, the liver produces the raw material to be shaped into organs, and the heart produces the physical, vital spirit which enlivens them. It is not apparent from these texts how the liver and the heart themselves first arise, or which one comes first, but presumably the important thing for the physician to know is the role the liver and the heart play once they in fact exist.

In the medical discussions of human life, “life” refers to the existence of the vital spirit in various organs.<sup>286</sup> Once these organs have the vital spirit, they by that fact have a vital faculty, which is

<sup>284</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 221.

<sup>285</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126.

<sup>286</sup> Most would, of course, say that plants are also alive, yet they do not have the vital spirit. Avicenna discusses the status of plants with respect to “life [*al-hayāh*]” towards the beginning of his *Healing: Book of Plants*. He argues that this is primarily a verbal dispute:

“One strays from truth if they argue that plants have sensation on account of the fact that [*li-*] they also have thought and understanding, like Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Democritus. Now if activity in the realm of nutrition were called life—so that a body, if it persists through nutrition, is [called] living, and then, if it is unable to maintain its individuality through nutrition, outside corruption has power over it so that its mixture changes, and its power dissipates, then it [is said to] die—then [if that is what we mean by life] it is appropriate to call a plant living. And if [calling a plant living] is on the condition that [life means] perception and non-voluntary movement, then it is not permitted to call plants living in any respect. And this dispute is mostly verbal (*laftī*). (Avicenna, *Healing: Book of Plants*, 3.)”

Because plants are capable of nutrition, growth and reproduction, some call them alive. If that is all we mean by “living,” Avicenna has no problem calling plants alive. But some, conflating the idea of life with thought, understanding, and sensation, assume that plants must have the latter faculties in some measure as well, if they are to be considered alive. This is a mistake, Avicenna thinks, because we know those later faculties are only given to living beings capable of voluntary motion and, as mentioned in the paragraph just prior to the above

essentially the ability to receive the vegetative or sensitive faculty we more typically associate with those organs.<sup>287</sup> In other words, taking the lungs as an example, there are three states we can distinguish: 1) the to-be-enlivened matter of the lungs, from the liver 2) the lungs, enlivened by the vital spirit, and technically “alive” in Avicenna’s medical terminology, and 3) the lungs, with the power for respiration, able to do the breathing we typically associate with them. So an organ like the lungs can be “living” even when not yet breathing or even *able* to breath.

Avicenna argues that this distinction between when an organ is living, versus when it is performing or capable of performing its function, is necessary to account for the fact that sometimes an organ is not “dead,” yet it seems to have lost its ability to perform the act which we uniquely associate with it. For example, as described in the *Canon*, an organ of sensation might have some obstruction, or be paralyzed, and so be unable to sense, lacking the power of sensation, but it would not thereby *also* be dead. On the contrary, precisely in virtue of having vital spirit, it is still alive—just lacking its particular power.<sup>288</sup> So in the *Canon* and *Cardiac Drugs*, the primary function of the vital spirit is to provide life, and thereby the ability (the vital *potentiality*) to acquire further abilities.

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quote, plants cannot act on the basis of information concerning harms and benefits. So it is appropriate to call plants living, provided we understand that there is life capable of voluntary motion (animals and humans), and life which is not (plants).

This exposition runs contrary to Tawara's recent article, “Avicenna’s Denial of Life of Plants.” In this article, Tawara argues that while Avicenna early on, in the *Compendium*, attributed life to plants (because they have souls), he later revised his view in the *Book of Plants*. The key text for Tawara's claim is the one just presented, where Avicenna says towards the end that “it is not permitted to call plants living in any respect (see Tawara (2014) 129).” But as we have seen, this statement is part of Avicenna’s permissive stance that we can either call plants alive or not alive, *depending on what we mean by life*. So Avicenna does not decisively deny life to plants in this text.

Tawara claims to find further support for his view in Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine*. There, according to Tawara, Avicenna says life is not present in plants, because plants lack the vital faculty. The vital faculty is “the faculty that makes the organs prepare for accepting the faculty of sensation and movement, and the functions of life (ibid., 135).” Based on this, it may seem Avicenna is denying life to plants in the *Canon*: life is associated with sensation and movement, and other functions of life, and if anything is certain, plants do not have these sorts of abilities.

But context suggests that Avicenna is, again, not going so far as to deny plants life. In the *Canon*, Avicenna is dealing primarily with humans from a medical point of view. The vital spirit is indeed a condition for a certain kind of life, namely, animal and human life. But just because plants lack the same conditions for life as humans, does not mean that we have to say that plants lack life. Again, in *Healing: Psychology* Avicenna insists that plants have a soul, and says that he is perfectly happy with calling something alive, if by alive we mean “has a soul (1.1, p. 15).” So viewed, Avicenna’s later statements concerning of life of plants are ambivalent and less dramatic.

<sup>287</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126-127.

<sup>288</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126-127.

While the *Canon* and *Cardiac Drugs* are substantially in agreement about the nature of the vital spirit, there are some surface differences worth clarifying. In brief, these texts use somewhat different language when discussing 1) whether there is one “spirit,” or three, and 2) whether the further vegetative, sensitive and appetitive powers exist in the vital spirit *before* mingling with the unique temperament of the to-be-enlivened organ, or after the vital spirit encounters the matter of the organ. To illustrate the first point, in *Cardiac Drugs*, Avicenna says that there are three things properly called spirits [*arwāh*]—vital, natural/vegetative, and psychological—with the vital spirit being the foundation for the others.<sup>289</sup> On the other hand, in the *Canon*, he firmly asserts that there is only one thing that should properly be called “spirit,” and that is the vital spirit,<sup>290</sup> with the vegetative and psychological simply being labeled faculties. As for the second point—whether the vital spirit bears the further faculties prior to mingling with the temperaments, or whether these come to be after the organs are enlivened—in *Cardiac Drugs* he mentions both views, without taking a side<sup>291</sup>. In the *Canon* he is again more decisive, saying that the further faculties do *not* appear until vital spirit mingles with the organs.<sup>292</sup>

The difference between the two texts is only on the surface, and can be explained for reasons historical and substantive. Though Avicenna lists three “spirits” in *Cardiac Drugs*, only one of them is the vital spirit, and only it has the function that has been described above. Further, even though Avicenna is not firmly settled on the temporal priority of the vital spirit in the *Cardiac Drugs*, he lists it as a legitimate option, and says nothing against it.

As for why there is the divergence, as a point of history, Avicenna’s disciple Juzjānī records that *Cardiac Drugs* was finished in 1015 and given to a patron,<sup>293</sup> with Avicenna never going back to modify it. The *Canon*, on the other hand, continued to be modified until 1024, being finished during Avicenna’s last stay in Isfahan.<sup>294</sup> So the time lapse provides space for development.

Substantively, there are two possibilities for why such a development might occur. On the one hand, since the vital spirit is that which enlivens and makes possible all the remaining faculties, it

<sup>289</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 222-223.

<sup>290</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

<sup>291</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 224.

<sup>292</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

<sup>293</sup> Gutas (2014), 514.

<sup>294</sup> Gutas (2014), 512.

plays a role in medicine akin to the soul. As Avicenna argues in the *Canon*, if we were to talk about three spirits—even if they are not all vital spirit—we would verge precariously close to affirming the view that there are three souls, as some prior physicians have done.<sup>295</sup> So Avicenna’s considered view on the vital spirit’s fundamental nature seems to be found in the *Canon*: there is only one “spirit,” not three, whose function is to give the organs (produced by the liver) potentiality for receiving further faculties, as opposed to these faculties already existing in the separate vital spirit. On the other hand, Alpina speculates that the *Cardiac Drugs*’ more complex schema of the vital spirit’s function may simply be due to its more philosophical orientation.<sup>296</sup> That is, in general, Avicenna tends to avoid philosophical nuances in the *Canon*, whereas the *Cardiac Drugs*, as discussed above,<sup>297</sup> appears to have been conceived by Avicenna as more of an extension of his philosophical project in *Healing: Psychology*.

The vital spirit is not only active at the beginning of life, but continues to play a role as life persists. That is, the vital spirit remains in the body, passing through the brain as it circulates, where the brain alters it as needed it, and then redistributes it in such a way as facilitates the other functions of and communication between different organs (vegetative, sensitive and motive).<sup>298</sup> That is, the matter underlying every faculty includes vital spirit of a particular variety, and it is the brain that tailors the vital spirit to serve those functions. Moreover, the specific varieties of vital spirit distributed throughout the body can fluctuate in minute ways, and these changes affect how exactly a particular act of that faculty occurs. For example, Avicenna explains some vagaries of vision via the disposition of the vital spirit in the eye.<sup>299</sup> So the vital spirit remains coursing through and between all the organs, similar enough in all of them to provide some unity and communication, but distinct enough in each locale to play a role in particular functions. In brief, the vital spirit enlivens organs, and then undergirds those organs’ functions and cooperation.

As a final point, Avicenna describes the vital spirit’s activity as resembling a middle-ground between the natural and animal faculties. The vital faculty is like the natural, in that its acts are

<sup>295</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

<sup>296</sup> Alpina (2017) 376-377.

<sup>297</sup> See section 4.1 above.

<sup>298</sup> On the role of the brain in redistributing vital spirit, see: Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 5.8, 263 ff.

<sup>299</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 3.8, 155.

not volitional. He makes this distinction, apparently, to help justify why it should be considered in its own category, rather than subsumed under natural or animal (see chart at the beginning of this section). According to Avicenna's distinction in *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 between volitional and non-volitional faculties (examined above, in chapter 3), this means that the vital spirits' primary role is not part of the belief-appetite system of faculties.<sup>300</sup> Yet the vital spirit is also like the animal, sensitive faculties, in that it exhibits contrary movements. Whereas the vegetative faculties just act according to one pattern (e.g., nutrition heats food), the vital spirit can expand and contract, can heat and cool. So its varied movement makes it similar to animal, sensitive faculties, but not quite the same since it lacks will.

With an understanding of the vital spirit in hand, we will now turn to Avicenna's discussions of the physiology underlying occurrent emotions, as well as emotional dispositions and effects, which incorporate the concept of vital spirit throughout. In addressing each, we will begin with the philosophical framework into which the physiological texts fit, and then discuss the physiology itself.

### 4.3 The physiology underlying occurrent emotions

Avicenna's brief remarks about what underlies occurrent emotions can serve as a foundation to his discussions of the physiology of emotional dispositions and effects. When we experience an emotion, triggered by some cognitive evaluation, what we experience most fundamentally is an *inclination/impulse* (that is how Avicenna likes to describe the initial act of the motive faculty, prior to the resolution to act). Physiologically, what underlies that inclination/impulse is the heart, and the vital spirit that is in the heart. This can be seen by putting together several texts. First, there is Avicenna's remark about the organ of the irascible faculty in 5.8 of his *Healing: Psychology*:

As for the faculty of anger and what is related to it, it does not need an organ other than "the principle" [*al-mabda'*], because its act is one and it is suited to the strong, hot temperament [therein], and it needs this.<sup>301</sup>

<sup>300</sup> See chapter 3, section 3.3.

<sup>301</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 5.8, 268.

As mentioned above, Avicenna affirms in 5.8 that the heart is the principal organ, with the brain and liver being principles in a subsidiary sense, in more specific domains. So when Avicenna says in the above text that the organ of the irascible faculty is “the principle,” without any kind of qualification, we should take him to be referring to the heart. The heart in the Aristotelian tradition is considered the source of the body’s vital heat, so identifying “the principle” with the heart is supported by Avicenna’s ensuing explanation that this organ is suited to the irascible faculty because of its “strong, hot temperament.” What Avicenna says about the underlying organ for the acts of the irascible faculty applies to other types of emotions, as well, as seen by the qualifier that what he says is meant for the faculty of anger and “what is related to it.” Nowhere else in 5.8 does Avicenna discuss an organ for concupiscible acts, or any other types of emotions, so it is best to take this as a way of saying that the seat of *any* emotion is the heart.

In the next two texts, we see that in addition to the heart, the vital spirit that is in the heart underlies an occurrent emotion. These texts are from different works, but complement one another to make a similar point:

For anger and fear and what is similar to them are passions[s] [*infī’ āl*] of this [vital]<sup>302</sup> faculty, even though their principle [*mabda’ uhā*] is sensation and estimation and the apprehensive faculties related to these faculties.<sup>303</sup>

It seems that the sages and their followers among the doctors have agreed that joy [*al-farah*] and depression [*al-ghamm*] and fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghaḍab*], [that] they are among the affections [*al-inf’ ālāt*] proper to [*al-khāṣṣa bi*] the vital spirit [*al-rūh*] that is in the heart.<sup>304</sup>

As seen in chapter one, the proximate cause of an emotion is an evaluative cognition. But the emotion itself is realized in the vital spirit that is in the heart, which is distinct from the brain and the vital spirit in the brain (where the sensory cognitive faculties are localized). The first text makes it fairly clear that Avicenna wants to localize occurrent emotions in the vital spirit, and the second text clarifies that this is the vital spirit “in the heart” in particular. This is an important clarification because, as was discussed above (4.2), the vital spirit taken generally underlies *all*

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<sup>302</sup> Though Avicenna does not name the vital spirit here, he does earlier, and it is clear that he is carving out a role for the vital spirit. In the prior paragraph he mentions the vital spirit as partially resembling the vegetative faculty in terms of its function, and partly resembling the animal, sensitive faculty. He then goes on to elaborate on this distinction, showing that certain functions are attributed to both the vegetative and the animal/sensitive faculties, but that other functions remain in need of a third drive/faculty to be assigned to—and this third drive is the vital faculty.

<sup>303</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 128.

<sup>304</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.



psychological faculties, so it wouldn't mean much to just say that the emotions are passions of the vital spirit, taken generally.

So the idea is that when an emotion is triggered, the impulse or inclination is realized in a unique activity in the heart, and the vital spirit in the heart. This is a fairly circumscribed view of what the matter or organ of an occurrent emotion is, but it fits with what we will see Avicenna say about the broader effects of emotions, which extend well beyond those confines.

## 4.4 Physiology of emotional dispositions

### 4.4.1 Observations in need of an explanation

In *Healing: Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna lays out some observations that he thinks give rise to several related questions: why do acts of the motive faculty occur at some times, and not others, and with greater or lesser degrees of intensity? For example, why might one person get sad as a result of hearing some piece of news, and another person not? Coming at the start of 4.4, as Avicenna transitions away from his discussion of the sensitive powers of the animal soul, the most direct impetus for these observations is to show that we need to posit some additional, distinct faculty, besides the apprehensive faculties (namely, the motive faculty):

For people agree in apprehending what they sense and imagine insofar as they sense or imagine, but they differ in what they have appetites for from among those things they sense or imagine. For one person's own state [*hāluhu*] might differ in regard to this. For he imagines food and has an appetite for it at the time of hunger, and does not have an appetite for it at the time of satiety, and also the person with good morals [*al-hasn al-akhlāq*], if he imagines despicable pleasures, he does not have an appetite for them, while another person does. And these two states don't only belong to humans, rather, they also belong to animals.<sup>305</sup>

Avicenna's point is obvious once stated: it is possible to have an apprehension, but no emotion. Sometimes when we notice food, we want it, and sometimes we don't. Since the same cognition sometimes does and sometimes does not lead to acts of the motive faculty, the two are thereby distinct, not essentially connected. This both shows us that acts of the motive faculty are distinct from apprehensions, and gives us some information about how emotions function.

Though Avicenna is not explicit in the above text, it seems best to assume that the sort of apprehensions or cognitions he has in mind are *evaluative* apprehensive acts, because if that were

<sup>305</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 194.

not the case, Avicenna's point would be trivial. No one expects a non-evaluative judgment, like grasping a definition, or noticing the material properties of a piece of food, to result in an emotion. But when we judge something to be good, pleasant or useful, there is some expectation that these judgments have relevance to feeling and behavior. We thus need an explanation for why sometimes the motive faculty is triggered by those judgments, and at other times it is not.

Avicenna indicates in the above text that the explanation for why certain evaluations trigger emotions comes down to someone's "state" upon having the judgment. As his examples show, one's "state" can include cognitive as well as physiological dispositions. Someone who is satiated from food will not respond to a judgment of something as delicious or nutritious in the same way as a hungry person, nor will a person of good morals respond to something judged as pleasant, but immoral, in the same way as a vicious person. So physiology is an important part of the explanation for why judgments sometimes result in emotions, and other times not.

Our responsiveness to evaluative judgments not only varies along the lines of *whether* we will have certain emotions, or not—there is also a difference in *intensity*. Immediately following the above text, Avicenna observes that:

Appetite may vary. For among [different kinds of appetite] there is that which remains weak, and there is that which strengthens to the point where it causes the resolution [to act]—though the resolution is not the same as appetite.<sup>306</sup>

Avicenna is making two points here: first, that appetite grows strong and diminishes, and that sometimes it grows strong enough to the point where the resolution to act occurs. As we have seen in chapter three, part of what accounts for the transition to the resolution to act is the move from mere evaluative judgment to practical judgment (e.g., the evaluation "that apple is pleasant" can cause an inclined will, while "I should eat that apple" can cause a resolved will). But even prior to the resolution to act, the motive faculty can incline with varying strengths. You see something, judge it as delicious, and the inclination grows from mild to all-consuming, without any change in the evaluative judgment. So there needs to be some other explanation for why one and the same value judgment can result in different degrees of intensity for emotions.

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<sup>306</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 195.

Avicenna does not provide a complete answer in *Psychology* 4.4 for these issues, but two points within the chapter suggest that he is particularly interested in the role of physiological dispositions. Firstly, about halfway through 4.4, as a conclusion to his overview of the motive faculty, Avicenna states that emotions “do not occur without the participation of the body” because,

[...] the bodily temperaments [*amzija*] change with [these emotions], and also, these [emotions] come about with the occurrence of [various] bodily temperaments. For from some temperaments a disposition towards anger follows, and from some temperaments, a disposition towards concupiscible desire. And cowardice and fear follow upon certain temperaments. Some people have angry dispositions, such that they are quick to anger, and some are fearful, that is, cowards, quick to fear.<sup>307</sup>

As becomes evident in what follows, Avicenna is claiming that an emotional episode *causes* changes in the body’s temperaments—that is, the state of the elemental properties and humours in the body—and also that an emotional episode is, at least in part, *caused* by changes in the body’s temperaments. By paraphrasing Avicenna as saying that emotions are caused by the temperaments, I mean something like dispositional cause, where the temperaments provide suitable conditions for an emotion, or a particular strength of an emotion. But, of course, the preceding cognitions more directly determine specifically what type of emotion (e.g., anger vs. envy) may arise.

Moreover, at the end of the chapter he points us in the direction of his more full response, in a text we looked at earlier. Concluding 4.4, he says:

And we have discussed in our books of medicine, to a degree of detail and accuracy not found in any predecessors, the reason for the dispositions [*isti’ dādāt*] of different people—on account of their natural temperament [*jibilla*] and their different states [*aḥwāl*]<sup>308</sup>—to joy, depression, anger, gentleness, rancor, calmness, and suchlike. So let someone read [about such things] there.

The terms he uses here, *jibilla* and *ḥāl*, do not on their own clarify that we are talking about physiological dispositions, but *jibilla* is certainly suggestive of that, being used often in that context. In any case, taken alongside the reference to his medical texts, we can infer that he wants to explain our dispositions (*isti’ dādāt*) in terms of physiological states—and that is in fact what Avicenna does in his medical texts, *Cardiac Drugs* in particular. Thus, Avicenna begins 4.4 with his observations about how people are disposed in different ways towards emotions, and he

<sup>307</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

<sup>308</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 201.

concludes 4.4 by pointing us in the direction of what he thinks to be a key (though not total) part of the explanation, which is an appeal to the state of the body and its temperaments.

#### 4.4.2 Physiological dispositions in the context of Avicenna's predecessors

In tying both these sorts of dispositions (whether an emotion occurs, and its intensity) to the body and its temperaments, Avicenna is building on several key discussions found in his predecessors. First, there is a set of issues Aristotle raises in *De Anima* 1.1, 403a19-24. Here Aristotle begins to probe the issue of which psychological states depend on the soul and body together. Though this section of *De Anima* is not intended as an account of emotion per se, Aristotle's use of emotions as examples gives us insight into his views on their nature, and proved foundational for future theories of emotion among his followers. He cites emotions as prime examples of states that *do* involve soul and body, because we so readily associate certain physical acts with certain emotions (e.g., shame is partially constituted by the face going red). But Aristotle says that even more solid evidence of the hylomorphic nature of emotions is the fact that peoples' temperamental dispositions affect whether and how they have certain emotions. For example, some people are physically constituted so that they will become fearful at the least provocation, while others are so disposed that they will not evince any sign of fear, even when something fearsome is right in front of them.

Avicenna's discussion of physiological dispositions for emotions is clearly reminiscent of this passage in Aristotle, but the two have different aims in bringing up these observations. Aristotle is providing preliminary evidence that most acts of the soul must be embodied, contrary to what is true of states of the rational soul—a notion with which Avicenna concurs and deals with elsewhere. So when Avicenna brings up similar observations about the ways that the motive faculty depends on temperamental dispositions, it is to illustrate something about *how* the motive faculty operates, not about what *sort* of state motive states are (e.g., hylomorphic or not). Nonetheless, this *De Anima* text is clearly foundational to the Aristotelian tradition's tendency to discuss physiological dispositions for emotions. For example, Themistius and John Philoponus discuss physiological dispositions for emotions when commenting on this portion of *De Anima*, extending the points Aristotle makes, but they ultimately subordinate it to the point that these

states are hylomorphic.<sup>309</sup> Avicenna's contribution lies not in the fact that he notes the dependence of emotions on temperaments, but in the fact that he discusses this relationship in its own right, and in greater depth.

Avicenna's analysis of emotional dispositions also bears on a debate in the Stoic tradition, available to Avicenna in the Arabic version of Galen's *Harmony of Plato and Hippocrates*.<sup>310</sup> In *Harmony*, Galen reports that two early figures in the history of Stoic theorizing about emotions, Zeno and Chrysippus, associated emotions with judgments, but in different ways.<sup>311</sup> For Zeno, the emotion itself is a kind of non-cognitive movement of the soul that in some way accompanies or supervenes on a judgment. Chrysippus thought emotions themselves are, in fact, types of judgments—linguistic, but non-rational. Since emotions are linguistic, according to Chrysippus, animals and infants are not able to experience them. As Galen recounts, Posidonius later adds to this debate, objecting to both of Zeno and Chrysippus, criticizing the notion that emotions are tied in any essential way to judgments. Posidonius's first concern, more directed at Chrysippus, is that it seems obvious animals and infants *do* experience what we call emotions, especially fear and anger. Secondly, and more relevant to our conversation here, is that it is possible to have one and the same judgment, but to fail to have the associated emotion. If emotions were types of judgments (of whatever kind), or necessarily supervened on judgments, they would track our affirming or denying particular propositions. But he notes that in the case of grief, the relevant judgment (e.g., that someone you love has died) does not change, while nonetheless grief may lessen over time.<sup>312</sup>

Though he does not mention this debate explicitly, Avicenna would have been well aware of it, and his presentation strikes a middle ground. Judgments are necessary causes of emotions, but they are not sufficient, either for the occurrence of an emotion, or for determining the strength of a

<sup>309</sup> See John Philoponus (2005), 67-72 and Themistius (1996), 21, 6.34.

<sup>310</sup> Avicenna never cites this text, but it is a prominent enough debate within the ancient tradition that it is reasonable to think he would be aware of it as a central concern with which to be dealt.

<sup>311</sup> The debate is recounted in *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* books 4-7. The following key text (5.1.4–6) is cited at Knuutila (2004), 53: “In the first book of his *On Emotions* Chrysippus tries to prove that emotions are certain judgements of reason while Zeno did not regard them as the judgements themselves but contractions, expansions, elations and dejections of the soul which supervene on judgements. Posidonius, disagreeing with both, praises and accepts Plato's view. He disputes the view of the followers of Chrysippus arguing that emotions are neither judgements nor supervenient upon them, but certain movements of other irrational powers, which Plato called appetitive and spirited.” The exchange is also discussed at King (2012) 1-11.

<sup>312</sup> Nussbaum (2001) discusses grief on page 79.

particular occurrence. This is particularly relevant to Posidonius's formulation, since Avicenna's view provides a multi-faceted explanation for why emotional occurrences and strengths can vary in the face of one and the same judgment. Even if we still value someone and cognitively acknowledge their loss as tragic, one's physiological disposition and background beliefs will partially affect just how strongly grief follows from that judgment, if at all.

In sum, through his analysis of dispositions for emotions, Avicenna moves the *De Anima* conversation forward by honing in on physiological dispositions as a matter of analysis in its own right, and he moves the concerns expressed in the Stoic tradition forward by offering an account of how emotions relate to judgments.

#### 4.4.3 Dispositions for emotions in Avicenna's medical texts

Avicenna fills in the picture of how the body's states amount to dispositions for emotions in his medical texts, specifying that the relevant dispositional states are states of the vital spirit. In the *Cardiac Drugs*, after Avicenna's overview of the the vital spirit's origin and dual purposes (described above in section 4.2), he immediately makes the following remark:

It seems that the sages and their followers among the doctors have agreed that joy [*al-farah*] and depression [*al-ghamm*] and fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghadab*] are among the affections [*al-infi' alār*] particularly associated with [*al-khāṣṣa bi*] the vital spirit [*al-rūh*] that is in the heart. Moreover [*thumma inna*], every affection [*infi' āl*] which grows strong or weak, [does so] not because of the agent cause [*fā'il*], but rather it accords in its intensification or weakening with the intensification or weakening of the passive substance [*al-jawhar al-munfa'il*].<sup>313</sup>

The first part of this text is making the general point, discussed above in section 4.3, that the matter underlying occurrent emotions is the vital spirit in the heart (and the heart itself). The second part of the text is making the point that intensity or weakness of a particular emotion is due in a significant way to the state of the vital spirit. He does this by invoking the standard Aristotelian point that when some phenomenon is subject to intensification or weakening, it is typically due to the "passive substance." For example, a weak fire is caused by wet wood, not impotent flames. It becomes clear in the sections that follow that the passive substance relevant to emotions is the state of the vital spirit. That is, he proceeds from here to talk about what sort of emotions arise from people with vital spirits of characteristic varieties. For example,

<sup>313</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

people with a less harmonious, murky vital spirit (like the sick, the tired, or the elderly) tend towards more marked sadness, while those whose vital spirit remains harmonious and light tend towards joy.<sup>314</sup> Of course, as we saw in the section on the nature of the vital spirit, the vital spirit undergirds the functioning of all psychological activities, so emotions are not unique in being affected by the state of the vital spirit. We will return to that point below.

Emotional dispositions in the vital spirit are distinguished from the “agent cause [*fā‘il*]” of some emotion in the above text. Avicenna does not return to this precise language to unpack what he means, but he seems to flesh things out in a following section when he enumerates various “strong [*qawīyya*]” and “obvious [*zāhira*]” causes of joy and sadness, as distinct from those that are disposing, and less obvious. The strong and obvious causes of joy include things like good conversation, being surprised by something pleasant, acting freely according to one's wishes, and so on.<sup>315</sup>

It is not entirely clear whether in discussing these agent causes Avicenna is referring to the thing itself (“a good conversation”), or the thing as evaluated in some way (“a conversation evaluated as good”). In this portion of the *Cardiac Drugs* Avicenna mentions his “*Book of Rhetoric* [*Kitāb Rītūrīqa*]” as a place where more such “strong and obvious causes” are discussed. And indeed, in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric* (*Kitāb al-Khaṭāba*), he likewise often switches between these ways of talking when discussing proximate causes for emotions. For example, he says that an insult can lead to anger, but also that this is because the insult is understood to be offensive.<sup>316</sup> As we have seen in prior chapters, when Avicenna is being precise, he argues that the proximate cause for emotions is an evaluative judgment. So it seems it would be fair to assume that these “agent causes” are in fact agent causes only insofar as they are cognized as, e.g., pleasant or painful. But given that the overall point being made is more about the vital spirit as an explanation for why an emotion grows strong or weak, we do not need to settle the issue conclusively.

Later in the *Cardiac Drugs*, Avicenna also describes how the vital spirit similarly constitutes dispositions for whether emotions *happen or not*, plain and simple. Avicenna makes this point in

<sup>314</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

<sup>315</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 232.

<sup>316</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 131.

the following two texts, which bookend a discussion of the effects of wine, and the “clear and obvious” causes of joy we just looked at:

[For] that which is prepared for something, the weakest of its causes suffices for it, like sulphur for conflagration, for it is set aflame with the slightest spark, while wood is not set aflame with twice as much. So when the soul possesses a vital spirit prepared for passions from joy-causing things, it rejoices at the slightest cause<sup>317</sup>.

[R]egarding preparation: the one who leans towards one side is *uninfluenced* by causes from the other side, unless they are strong, and they *are* influenced by the causes [of the side he leans towards], even though they are weak<sup>318</sup>.

In the first text, Avicenna’s point is that when someone is disposed in one emotional direction, very little is needed to trigger that emotion. In fact, he says, when people drink wine, it seems that they sometimes experience emotions for no reason whatsoever. But of course this is not possible, since every effect needs to have an active cause. Wine simply makes the vital spirit more abundant and active, which makes it more likely for some judgment to result in an emotion. In the second text, Avicenna asserts that one’s vital spirit can be so far in one direction that some active cause rarely if ever leads to the emotion it normally would in most people. For example, while it is possible to be disposed towards grumpiness such that a positive evaluation will only make you a little pleased, it is also possible to be so strongly disposed towards grumpiness that a positive evaluation won’t trigger any emotion whatsoever. So we see that the state of the vital spirit affects whether some agent cause will result in an emotion and, if so, the strength of the emotion.

These two points—whether an emotion occurs and its strength—are obviously related along a kind of spectrum. If your vital spirit is only disposed partially towards grumpiness you will experience weak positive emotions, but if your vital spirit goes too far in that direction, you will experience no relevant emotion. Presumably Avicenna emphasizes them as distinct points, because they account for phenomena that we typically classify as different. Just because the answer to two questions (i.e., “Why did that emotion occur?” “Why did it occur in that strength?”) make reference to the same sort of solution, does not make them the same question.

<sup>317</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 230.

<sup>318</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 233, emphasis mine.



Returning to a point made earlier, it is important to note that the link Avicenna is drawing between emotions and vital spirits in terms of dispositions accords with the relationship other psychological phenomena have to the vital spirit. Insofar as the vital spirit facilitates the functioning and communication of various faculties, those faculties will all have dispositions and effects in the vital spirit, to some degree or other.<sup>319</sup> For example, Avicenna explains some vagaries of eyesight by an appeal to the vital spirit.<sup>320</sup> Elsewhere Avicenna says that what parents imagine during intercourse can have an effect on the color [*lawn*] of child conceived, for example, thinking about red can add a tinge of red.<sup>321</sup> He admits that this latter point may sound far-fetched, but he says it follows from his fundamental principles that cognitions work by way of the vital spirit.

Further, in the *Canon*, Avicenna makes reference to the vital spirit in explaining treatment for other sorts of mental disorders, beyond the emotional. In book three (of five), Avicenna has a discussion of mental illness (*amrāḍ al-ra's*) which includes emotional disorders, such as melancholy and lovesickness, but also non-emotional mental disorders, such as sleep disorders, defects of the imagination or memory, and general mania.<sup>322</sup> For some of these cases, Avicenna recommends altering one's mode of thinking, but there are also many references to changing one's diet, and procedures like cupping, in order to affect one's temperament, and ultimately the vital spirit. So the vital spirit underlies the functioning and dispositions of other faculties, but Avicenna is most interested in the relation between the vital spirit and the heart, and the *Cardiac Drugs* is naturally where we get most of that discussion.

#### 4.4.4 Physiological emotional dispositions in relation to moral formation

Avicenna makes the connection between the physiological side of how we are disposed to emotions, and the broader topic of moral formation. He does not say much on this topic, but it is worth briefly exploring the significance of what he does say. In *Cardiac Drugs* he makes the following comment in the midst of his discussion of different types of preparatory causes for emotions:

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<sup>319</sup> See end of section 4.2.

<sup>320</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 3.8 155.

<sup>321</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.2.1.14, 160.

<sup>322</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1987), vol. 2, 877-901.

[W]hen acts and emotions [*infi' ālāt*] recur, a strong disposition [*malaka qawīyya*] is formed, and character traits [*al-akhlāq*] are acquired in this way. And it is possible that the cause for this is that every emotion leads to an actualization suitable to it, and what is suitable to something is unsuitable to its opposite. And that which is unsuitable for the opposite, if it is repeated many times, diminishes preparation for the contrary, and increases preparation for [that which is repeated] [...]. If that is the case, then repetition of joy disposes to joy, and repetition of depression disposes to depression.<sup>323</sup>

The term translated here as “character traits” (*al-akhlāq*) is a flexible Arabic term, but it clearly has moral overtones to it, most obviously because the Arabic translation of *Nicomachean Ethics* was titled *Kitāb al-Akhlāq*.<sup>324</sup> In this vein, al-Farabi says in his *Directing Attention to the Way of Happiness* that “all ethical traits [*al-akhlāq kulluhā*], from the virtuous to the vicious [*al-jamīl wal-qabīh*], are acquired [traits].”<sup>325</sup> Character traits are formed through habituation, and that habituation is partly realized as the vital spirits take on a particular predisposition. If the vital spirits are heated up during moments of anger over and over, their resting state will eventually be hotter, which makes it much easier to experience anger yet again.<sup>326</sup> The converse is true as well: practicing being happy will lead one to have a more calm vital spirit, which will in turn make it easier to maintain happiness in difficult situation. There couldn't be a person with a perfected disposition towards courage whose physiology looked just the same as a coward, because physiology affects how we respond to situations. So our moral character—our characteristic way of responding to situations from an ethical point of view—is to some extent realized in our physiology.

There is a different sense in which physiology is relevant to moral formation, and that relates to what we do with the physiological dispositions that are given to us as a result of our birth or our situation in life. Sometimes, just because of our genetics, or our age, we may have a leg up when it comes to virtue, or have an internal obstacle that that needs to be overcome. For example, someone from a family prone to anger for genetic reasons would have a harder time developing patience. This sense in which we can be disposed to emotions should be distinguished from *cultivating* moral dispositions, true virtue or vice, as described above, which is akin to cultivating true virtue or vice. Physiology also plays a more preparatory role. We will discuss this more

<sup>323</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 235.

<sup>324</sup> Aristotle, *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics* (2005).

<sup>325</sup> Al-Farabi (1992) 235.

<sup>326</sup> Avicenna describes the relationship between emotions and their corresponding dispositions in *Healing: Categories*, discussed in Appendix 2.

preparatory aspect of physiology in relation to emotions and character traits in the next chapter, when we look at Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*.

## 4.5 Physiology of emotional effects

### 4.5.1 Temperamental effects considered to be primarily of the body

In *Psychology* 4.4, in addition to discussing the nature of emotions, and the importance of physiology to our dispositions for emotions, Avicenna eventually comes to discuss the nature of emotional effects. What we see in the following passage is a distinction made between emotions, and the sort of physiological changes that we often associate with emotions. Avicenna wants to consider the latter effects, rather than a part of the emotion itself:

And [as for] fear and anger and depression, the passion [*infī' āl*] whereby they occur happens primarily on account of the soul. Anger or depression, insofar as they are anger or depression, are *not passions among those passions afflicting the body*, even though they are followed by passions which afflict the body, like the rising or abating of heat, and suchlike. *For those things are not anger or depression itself* [*laysa nafs al-ghadab wal-ghamm*], but rather things that follow [*yatba'*] anger or depression.<sup>327</sup>

Emotions exist “primarily on account of the soul,” and they need to be distinguished, according to Avicenna, from the temperamental effects that follow them, which “afflict the body.” In order to understand what Avicenna means by these specifications, referring some things more to the soul, some to the body, we need to understand the section leading up to it, in which Avicenna discusses a variety of states that “belong to the soul with the participation of the body.”<sup>328</sup>

In *Psychology* 4.4, after the initial discussion about the motive faculties, but before the above text concerning emotional effects, Avicenna makes some distinctions about different types of psychological states: imagination, emotions, hunger, physical pain, health, and so on. Some such states are “primarily” psychological, while others are “primarily” physical. To be clear, the issue is not about whether any of these states are psychological, or even hylomorphic, in general. Rather, Avicenna is making distinctions between different types of states, all which involve the soul to some degree, and *all* of which “do not occur without the participation of the body.” In essence, he is trying to schematize all psychological states, save those that belong only to the intellect. His distinctions are as follows:

<sup>327</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

<sup>328</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

[...] states [*ahwāl*] that belong to the soul with the participation of [*bi-mushāarakat*] the body come in different types. One of them is [1] what belongs to the body primarily but because it has a soul, and another is [2] what belongs to the soul primarily but because it is in a body, and [3] what is between the bodily and soul equally.<sup>329</sup>

Avicenna goes on to provide examples of these three categories. His references to [1] and [2] are clearly laid out. That which is [1] “primarily body” includes includes sleep, waking, health, sickness. That which is [2] “primarily of the soul” includes imagination, memory, irascible and concupiscible appetite, depression, pity and sadness. If he provides any examples of [3], it is somewhat less clear, but the following seems meant to be an explication of states that belong to body and soul equally:

As for pain from a strike, or from the transformation of [one’s] bodily temperament, the event therein is *something that exists in the body* because of a fracturing of the connection and the temperament, on account of the *states of the body insofar as it is a body*. And it is also *something existing in the senses* which sense it insofar as it is sensed—but [the event that is sensed occurs] because of the body. And it seems that hunger and appetite [*shahwa*]<sup>330</sup> are of this sort.<sup>331</sup>

Physical pain and hunger here are discussed as states that are due to states of the body, insofar as it is body, but they are *also* something that exists in the senses. This is markedly different from they way he talks states that are “primarily of the soul,” about which he says “there is *nothing* in [such states] which is an occurrence of the body insofar as it is a body.”<sup>332</sup> States like imagination and emotions are primarily psychological, and though embodied, are not caused by anything in the body insofar as it is body. States like physical pain and physical hunger, however, are both sensed, *and* owed to the body insofar as it is body.

With these distinctions, Avicenna appears to unpacking something similar to the distinction at the beginning of Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia*. It is not surprising to find Avicenna incorporating discussions stemming from the *Parva Naturalia* in *Psychology* 4.4 since, as Hansberger has shown, much of Book 4 as a whole picks up on themes found in *Parva Naturalia*, in addition to *De Anima*.<sup>333</sup> The distinction in Aristotle’s text is somewhat different from that which Avicenna

<sup>329</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

<sup>330</sup> Despite this being the same term as “concupiscible appetite,” which is classified as a state that is primarily of the soul, it seems to be a way of referring to very basic animal urges, of which hunger would be a prime example, as opposed to emotions based on cognitive evaluations. Avicenna also uses *shahwa* as a genus that includes hunger in *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.3, 67: “hunger is [simply] the appetite [*shahwa*] [for] the hot and dry, and thirst is the appetite [*shahwa*] for the cold and moist.”

<sup>331</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

<sup>332</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

<sup>333</sup> Hansberger (2010) 158.

makes, which is likely due to the transmission history of this Aristotelian text. As shown by Hansberger, the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia*, which went by the name of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, is less of a translation and more of an adaptation.<sup>334</sup> But in this case we need to start with the original *Parva Naturalia* as a frame of reference, since the first part of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is not extant<sup>335</sup>

In the beginning of Aristotle's original *De Sensu*—the first book of *Parva Naturalia*—he distinguishes between several ways of approaching the discussion of the soul. On the one hand, he says that he has already (in *De Anima*) talked about (1) features of the soul that are *common* to many species, and which are understood with reference to the soul taken “by itself.” This includes sensation, memory, passion, desire, and appetite generally, and in addition to these pleasure and pain.<sup>336</sup> Thus, he says, there remains two further categories to discuss. There are (2) features of the soul that are *common* to many species, but which are *not* understood with respect to the soul “by itself” (rather, the body's involvement is more prominent). This second category includes “waking and sleep, youth and old age, inhalation and exhalation, life and death.”<sup>337</sup> Finally, there are (3) states that are particular to certain species. The last of these—faculties particular to species—are discussed in Aristotle's biological works on plants and animals. And since, as mentioned, Aristotle says that type (1) states were already dealt with in *De Anima*, the *Parva Naturalia* is ostensibly most concerned with type (2) states. But many of the activities given as examples of type (1) nonetheless show up in the discussion of *Parva Naturalia* (e.g., *De Sensu* and *De Memoria* discuss sensation and memory, respectively). This suggests that the distinction being made between (1) and (2) is not primarily between groupings

<sup>334</sup> For clarity: the title “*Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*” was used to refer to the whole text that paraphrases/adapts the whole collection of *Parva Naturalia*. This, despite the fact that “*Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*” is actually a translation of the name for the first book of the *Parva Naturalia*, i.e., *De Sensu*. So the title *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* refers to the whole of the *Parva Naturalia*, despite taking its name from the first book of the Greek collection.

<sup>335</sup> Hansberger (2010) 144.

<sup>336</sup> See Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensible Objects* (1986), 463a. These sort of functions the essence of the soul which, as Avicenna explains at the beginning of the *Psychology*, is that which accounts for behavior that is “not according to a single pattern, or which does not lack will. (Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.1, 4). In other words, all psychological behavior exhibits some sort of goal-directed behavior. Plant life is “not according to a single pattern,” which can be seen by way of contrast with, say, rocks, that remain constant in terms of their capacities and tendencies. Plants grow in complex ways, changing over time, and adapting to their environment. Animal and human behavior is more clearly psychological, since it is voluntary, meaning that its actions are based off of appetites or choices in response to cognition. None of the sorts of states in category [1] (waking and sleep, etc.) are manifestations of goal-directed behavior.

<sup>337</sup> Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensible Objects* (1986), 463a.

of faculties, but between ways of approaching a discussion of psychological faculties. In other words, you could talk about sensation solely with respect to the soul, giving it a more abstract, formal account. Or you could integrate issues of physiology into your account about sensation, as done in the *Parva Naturalia*. So much for the distinctions Aristotle makes towards the beginning of the original *Parva Naturalia*.

It is the distinction between (1) and (2) that Avicenna (and perhaps the adaptor in *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*) appears to be trying to capture with the language of “primarily soul” and “primarily body.” These are both, of course, discussions of faculties that must be embodied in order to exist. But it is one thing to discuss common psychological faculties in the abstract, on a purely functional level. It is another thing to discuss how those common functions play out, when realized in bodies, and affected by particular material changes. As Avicenna explains, “Sleep, waking, health and sickness are states that belong to the body and its principles, so they belong to [the body] primarily, but nevertheless they only belong to the body because it has a soul.”<sup>338</sup> Non-living things do not experience sleep, waking, health and sickness. Sleep would not occur if there were no such thing as sensation. Health would not occur were the body not to have an ideal, soul-given function in the first place (in other words, only living bodies can be healthy). But what causes a living being to need sleep, or to fail in health, is not anything to do with the soul’s function, considered more generally. Rather, it has to do with the needs and failings of the body’s matter. We sleep not because sensation needs rest, but because sensation, as an embodied function, taxes physical resources, and those physical resources need time to recover.

So Avicenna’s distinction between “primarily of the soul” and “primarily of the body” can be summarized as follows: for a state to be “primarily of the soul” is for it to be a psychological state, talked about strictly from the point of view of a living being’s soul-given, goal-oriented functions. For a state to be “primarily of the body,” is for it to be a psychological state that would not arise, were it not for the nature and demands of the particular body in which the soul is embodied.

Avicenna’s distinction is thus different than Aristotle’s in the following way: Aristotle is trying to distinguish ways of talking about faculties, and some faculties can be discussed in both ways

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<sup>338</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197

(e.g., sensation in the abstract, or the particulars of sensation ). Avicenna, on the other hand, is trying to distinguish categorically different types of psychological states: [1] those that are psychological, but whose root cause lies with the particular body the soul in instantiated in, and [2] those pertaining to the essence of the embodied soul and its goal-oriented functions.

Whether the development comes from Avicenna himself, or the adaptor of the text (and Avicenna is just mirroring it) is impossible to tell, since, as mentioned above, the first part of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is not extant. One bit of evidence that the development stems from the adaptor is that in Averroes relates the same categories as Avicenna's [1] and [2] in his *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia*, suggesting a common source for those distinctions in the Arabic *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.<sup>339</sup> Averroes explains that “primarily body” states, like sleep, are in some sense more necessary, and are related to the “primarily soul” functions as a genus is related to species. That is, sleep is a state wherein all the senses are “at rest.”<sup>340</sup> What this sort of talk captures, that Avicenna would agree with, is that “primarily body” states are in a sense conditions without which the more essential functions would not exist. But of course, were there no essence of the soul, there would be no “primarily body” psychological states either, so this merely is a matter of emphasis. Nothing in Averroes’s analysis clashes with Avicenna’s analysis that what sets “primarily body” states apart is that they are most directly explained by material changes.

#### 4.5.2 The distinction between emotions and their temperamental effects

With Avicenna’s distinction between states that are “primarily of the soul” and “primarily of the body” in hand, we can return to his remarks about emotions and their effects. If we keep in mind that this text comes just after the texts we have been unpacking regarding the three categories of psychological states, it is clear that he is appealing to those distinctions:

And [as for] fear and anger and depression, the passion [*infī' āl*] whereby they occur happens primarily on account of the soul. Anger or depression, insofar as they are anger or depression, are *not passions among*

<sup>339</sup> These faculties are of two kinds: first, those that are attributed to the body of an animal by virtue of the existence of the soul in it, as for instance, sense-perception and motion; second, those that are attributed to the soul by virtue of the body [in which it exists]. The faculties of the second kind constitute genera, such as sleep and waking, youth and old age, death and life, inhalation and exhalation, health and disease, and length and shortness of life. See Averroes, *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia* (1961), 3. Averroes has a similar discussion, expanded to four distinctions, in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima* (2009), section 3.

<sup>340</sup> Averroes, *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia* (1961), 3-4.

*those passions afflicting the body*, even though they are followed by passions which afflict the body, like the rising or abating of heat, and suchlike. *For those things are not anger or depression itself [laysa nafs al-ghadab wal-ghamm]*, but rather things that follow [*yatba'*] anger or depression.<sup>341</sup>

When Avicenna says that emotions are not passions that “afflict the body,” contrasting this with passions that do, like “the rising or abating of heat,”<sup>342</sup> we should understand this to reflect the division between states that are primarily of the soul, versus those that are primarily of the body. These are both psychological states that happen with the participation of the body—just of different kinds.

Given that this distinction between emotions, and states that follow emotions, comes directly after Avicenna has outlined the three types of psychological states, we can use those earlier distinctions to further understand what is going on in the above text. When an emotion occurs, it is some kind of inclination or impulse, realized in some sort of matter. As we have seen, emotions are localized in the heart, and the vital spirit that is in the heart. But in most cases, an emotion would then have *effects* throughout the rest of the body, due to the way that the vital spirit proceeds to course through the various organs and arteries, and how it effects the pulse (for more evidence of this, see the next section, 4.5.3). But what shape these effects take precisely would be due to the material conditions of the body. Emotional effects are far more variable than the essence of an emotion. Anger is anger, from one person to another. But the physical effects of anger in a particular person will be largely determined “on account of the states of the body insofar as it is a body.” Of course, given that humans have roughly the same physiology, certain emotions have characteristic effects: anger mostly makes us feel hot all over. But this physical effect could be otherwise, and anger would nonetheless still be anger. Two people might both feel the same sort of shame, but one person might be far more prone to turning red. It is presumably for these reasons that Avicenna distinguishes between the physiology of occurrent emotions (discussed in section 4.3 of this chapter), and the physiology of emotional effects (discussed in this section).

<sup>341</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

<sup>342</sup> This phrasing recalls Aristotle’s suggestion at the beginning of *De Anima* that things like rising or abating of heat count as the “material causes” of emotions, with what Avicenna calls their “essence” constituting their “formal cause (403a30).” Avicenna might not necessarily disagree with Aristotle on this point, since as we have seen, the emotion itself is localized in the heart and the vital spirit that is in the heart, which could itself get hot in certain emotions. But Avicenna is here concerned with something beyond the “material cause” of emotions.



One might argue that Avicenna is not describing two different events in the above text, but two different aspects of the same event (i.e., the rising and abating of the heat is not an emotional effect, but is rather that which underlies an occurrent emotion). Yet Avicenna makes a sharp distinction in this text between that which is, precisely speaking, the emotion (*nafs al-ghaḍab wal-ghamm*), and that which follows (*yatba'*) the very emotion. This language of characteristic effects “following” emotions is also found in the *Cardiac Drugs*, so we know that his usage here is intentional<sup>343</sup>. For something to “follow” something else implies a close relationship, but also distinction. It would be possible to translate “follows” as “entails” in this case, as well. So Avicenna realizes that these characteristic effects are vital to how emotions fulfill their role in animals and humans. But we wouldn't want the closeness of the two phenomena to obscure the fact that Avicenna thinks it important to draw attention to their distinction, presumably due to the variability of the effects, which are more dependent on the state of the body.

#### 4.5.3 Further examples of emotional effects

The place where Avicenna most schematically spells out the “primarily body” effects which follow emotions is in a later section of the *Canon*, titled “the pulse of psychological emotions [*nabḍ al-‘awāriḍ al-naḥsāniyya*].”<sup>344</sup> The pulse, Avicenna holds, is an act of the heart and the arteries that move and modify the vital spirit.<sup>345</sup> Avicenna describes different pulse states caused by five key emotions, and the analyses are not surprising: anger [*ghaḍab*] causes an increased pulse, and an agitated vital spirit throughout the body. Pleasure [*ladhdha*] and gladness [*surūr*] lead to a calm pulse, and a calm vital spirit. Depression [*ghamm*] slows things down too much, with a sluggish pulse. Fear [*khawf*] makes the pulse erratic. Since the pulse is felt throughout the whole body, the vital spirit is affected in these ways throughout the whole body, which in turn affects the functioning of various organs.

That is, it is important to note that the changes in the vital spirit are just the beginning of the “primarily bodily” effect that emotions have. When Avicenna talks about emotional effects, he

<sup>343</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 235-236. Sometimes this term is used to describe the way that emotions follow dispositions, sometimes to describe the way temperamental effects follow emotions.

<sup>344</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.3.1.1.1, 200. See discussion of the technical term *al-‘awāriḍ* at footnote 98. While this term technically means occurrences/accidents, Avicenna is clearly meaning to single out a particular subset of occurrences, i.e., emotions, in what follows.

<sup>345</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.3.1.18, 215.

more often talks about “temperamental changes,” as opposed to changes in the vital spirit, and this is because every part of the body has a temperament that can be changed by the character of the vital spirit that runs through it. For example, in the following text (which we already looked at in the context of human emotions)<sup>346</sup>, Avicenna discusses how emotional pain can eventually lead to a break-down of the temperaments in the vegetative faculties, using some of the same distinctions between “primarily of the body or soul” that we have just seen in 4.4:

The emotion [*infi‘āl*] of joy [*surūr*] or pain [*ghamm*], [...] is one of the psychological apprehensions, and does not occur to the body insofar as it is body. [Joy or pain] affects the growing, nutritive power such that there occurs in it, on account of the occurrence that first occurs to the soul—let that be rational joy<sup>347</sup> [*al-farah al-nuṭqī*]—a strength and effectiveness in its act, and on account of the contrary occurrence—let that be rational pain [*al-ghamm al-nuṭqī*], in which there is no physical pain—a weakness and an impotence that corrupts its effectiveness. And perhaps the temperamental disposition [*al-mizāj*] will be broken down through that [weakness and impotence].<sup>348</sup>

The familiar experience Avicenna seems to be describing here is how negative emotions can effect digestion, and make us physically unwell in a variety of ways. Those temperamental changes are contrasted in this text with the emotional states, which “do not occur to the body insofar as it is body.” To supply another example (not Avicenna’s), when someone’s face turns red because they are embarrassed, this has to do with changes in the blood vessels in the skin. The vital spirit would only be a remote cause for such a change. Again, anxiety might cause someone to sweat, which is something beyond an initial change in the vital spirit. Such physical changes go beyond mere changes in the vital spirit, though there is no doubt a connection.

How exactly an emotion plays out, in terms of its “primarily bodily,” temperamental effects, depends on the physical state of the emoter, which is why Avicenna’s approach of distinguishing these effects from the essence of the emotion makes sense. Some emotions frequently lead to sexual arousal,<sup>349</sup> others increase or mitigate disease symptoms.<sup>350</sup> But despite certain temperamental changes being commonly associated with each emotion, things could be otherwise from species to species, or for individuals within species, without changing the core of what it is to experience a given emotion. Were Avicenna to build particular physical effects into

<sup>346</sup> See chapter 2, section 2.4.

<sup>347</sup> For discussion of the significance of this passage in relation to human emotions, see chapter 2, section 2.4.

<sup>348</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.3, 31-32.

<sup>349</sup> Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 229.

<sup>350</sup> Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.2.1.14, 160.

the essence of a given emotion, it would compromise our ability to provide any kind of unified definitions of emotion-types.

#### 4.5.4 Emotions and the necessity of some sort of physical effect

Although emotions are essentially something distinct from their particular physical effects, it is essential that emotions have *some* physical effect. This is a point Avicenna makes in a separate text, his *Marginal Glosses on Aristotle's De Anima*, but it helps balance out the conclusions of the preceding sections. The relevant discussion occurs in Avicenna's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* 1.1, where Aristotle mentions "common affections" that involve both body and soul. In this text, Aristotle cites the following as examples of common affections: sensation, emotions like courage, pity and joy, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites more generically. As seen in section 4.5.1, Avicenna understands there to be a variety of ways that states can be said to "involve both body and soul." Aristotle's discussion of common affections provides Avicenna fertile grounds to make some similar distinctions, this time under Aristotle's heading of states that "only exist with the body." What emerges from Avicenna's analysis of Aristotle is that he thinks emotions (and the internal senses as well) are states that, while "primarily of the soul," *necessarily* have effects in the body. Up to this point we have been emphasizing the distinction between emotions and their effects, but *Marginal Glosses* shows that we should not take from this distinction that we could have emotions without any physical effect whatsoever.

In order to understand what Aristotle means when he says that emotions and appetites cannot exist without the body, Avicenna distinguishes three senses in which something can be said to "not exist without a body." Avicenna summarizes the three senses upfront as follows:

I know that "the thing which does not exist except with the body" is understood in three senses: [1] One of them is that that thing is a bodily form; [2] the second is that its cause is a state of the body; [3] the third is that there is together with it a bodily passion, necessarily.<sup>351</sup>

This list is different from the schema of psychological states we saw earlier from *Psychology* 4.4, because these are not all necessary states of an ensouled organism: Avicenna is just describing different states that could be referred to as requiring a body, in some way or another. The first

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<sup>351</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.16-18.

and most straightforward sense refers to corporeal forms, Avicenna's example being the smoothness of some body.<sup>352</sup> By definition, smoothness is an accidental form which cannot be predicated of anything that is not material. The second and third states that cannot exist without a body are both states—as Avicenna later makes clear—that exist because of the *participation* between body and soul, rather than just being straightforwardly corporeal forms.<sup>353</sup> Before discussing them further, we can outline them as follows:

- States that “do not exist except with a body”:
  - States that are *not* due to the the participation between body and soul:
    - 1) Corporeal forms (e.g., smoothness)
  - States that *are* due to the the participation between body and soul:
    - 2) State of the soul *caused by* a body
    - 3) State of the soul that necessarily *causes something in* a body

Turning to (2), this sort of state involves the body and soul, but in such a way that the body is the cause.<sup>354</sup> Avicenna's immediate example of this sort of state is a hypothetical scenario, reached by reversing the normal situation between celestial intellects and spheres. To start with the normal scenario, Avicenna first recalls celestial intellects' ability to influence the spheres that they are associated with. Intellects influence those spheres, but they do not inhere in the spheres as forms in matter. Having reminded us of this, Avicenna then constructs a hypothetical situation where the causality is reversed, such that we get an illustration of this second category of “only existing with a body”: if the celestial spheres were able to influence their associated intellects to be in some state, that state would only exist *because* of a body (the sphere), even though the intellect (a non-body) would not be “joined” to the body which is doing the causing. As mentioned, Avicenna presents this as a hypothetical scenario, since celestial spheres do not in fact causally influence their intellects. But in his discussion of (3), we see that there are also more mundane examples of the way that body can influence soul.

<sup>352</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.20.

<sup>353</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.21, 25.

<sup>354</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.21.

Avicenna distinguishes states of type (3) as those which “do not exist except with a body” in the sense of entailing that something is necessarily caused *in* a body, by a soul, as opposed to entailing (as in the second type) that something is caused *by* a body, in a soul. Avicenna chooses to explain this third type by using appetites/emotions as an example, although he later makes clear that the rest of the acts of the animal faculties fall under this heading as well. And it is immediately apparent that appetites are actually examples of both the second *and* third way in which something “only exists with a body,” because the second way is pointed out in the explanation of appetites even before the third. In other words, in his illustration of the third distinction Avicenna actually incorporates both (2) and (3), as follows:

[77.25] And likewise the cooperation [of the body and soul is sometimes] such that, given a passion in one of them, there follows from that fact [78.1] a passion in the other. He [Aristotle] brings up an example of this: concupiscible and irascible appetite. It cannot be shown that [lit: it does not suffice for proving that] concupiscible and irascible appetite are purely corporeal simply on the basis of the fact that the body, according to its states, is affected in an angry or desiderative way [by concupiscible and irascible appetite]. For [Type (2)] it is not unthinkable [i.e., it is reasonable to think] that when the body enters into [such] a state, there occurs to the soul, [which is] essentially separate from the body [but] connected to the body through a certain relation whose occurrence in it the soul is prepared for—a passion particular to the soul due to bodily causes.<sup>355</sup> [And it is reasonable to think that] [Type (3)] when the soul enters a state which is particular to it, there follows from that [78.5] a state in the body in terms of the boiling of the blood or the spreading of the organ. And we know that the soul is not joined to the very blood dispersed in the body, [but nevertheless] there could happen to [the blood] passions following passions of the soul or [following passions] of the organ [i.e., the heart] by which there is the first connection to the soul.<sup>356</sup>

At the beginning of this text, Avicenna is cautioning that just because emotions are partially caused by bodily states, this “does not suffice to prove” that they are merely physical. The view Avicenna seems to be cautioning against here is the Galenic idea the animal and vegetative soul’s capacities just are equivalent to the mixture of the body, and that their activities are just constituted by changes in the body. This confirmed when Avicenna later mentions Galen in the same section, referencing the work wherein Galen affirms such a view, i.e., *The Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body*.<sup>357</sup>

It is perfectly plausible, according to Avicenna, that acts of the animal and vegetative soul are indeed acts primarily of the soul, despite having with various relations to the body. Referring back to type (2) states, Avicenna reaffirms that emotions could have causes that can be construed

<sup>355</sup> The Arabic of the parenthetical in this sentence is difficult, but the rest seems clear.

<sup>356</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.25-78.7.

<sup>357</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 78.19. Galen’s work, *The Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body*, was translated into Arabic and available. See Gutas (2010) 807. Such a view is affirmed in the text at Galen, *Capacities* (2013), 386.

as bodily, despite the emotion itself being something primarily psychological. Presumably the non-psychological bodily causes in mind here are dispositional physical causes, as seen in section 4.4 of this chapter. More to the point, Avicenna adds that, once caused, emotions themselves necessarily cause something in the body, despite being something of the soul (i.e., something “primarily psychological,” in the language of *Psychology* 4.4). The effects described at the end of text above text are more explicitly of the temperaments, exemplified in involuntary rising blood pressure and sexual arousal. So this is what it means to “not exist except with a body” according to sense (3): to be something primarily psychological, which nonetheless necessarily has an effect in the body.

To put this in other words: emotions are the sort of phenomena they are because of the faculties of the soul (they are inclinations, caused by cognitions). But, of course, those faculties are embodied, and thus emotions can have bodily dispositional causes and effects. Those dispositional causes and effects get their character primarily from the non-psychological aspects of the body (its temperaments, its humours, its aches and pains). Of course, none of these states are *only* psychological or *only* bodily: we are talking about necessarily embodied psychological faculties, and bodily states that only occur in living, ensouled bodies. But there is a difference in the degree to which different acts of a living organism depend on one side of the spectrum or the other, and this is what Avicenna is trying to get across in the above texts.

Continuing from shortly after where the above text from *Marginal Glosses* leaves off, we have additional evidence that the “first principle” of emotions is the soul:

And evidence that anger and desire have some sort of separate account [*lahumā infirādu hukmin bi-wajhin*], is that the intellect prevents [*yamna'*] anger and desire, but it is not able to prevent sensible pain or pleasure. So it is understood that the first principle of these [anger and desire] is the soul. [...] For it is reasonable to think that anger and desire are something in the soul from which something bodily follows, without their being understood [merely] as an intention in the body or subsisting in it.<sup>358</sup>

The idea here seems to be that emotions, unlike sensible pleasure and pain, are able to be guided by reason.<sup>359</sup> In other words, we are able to change things about occurrent emotions with our

<sup>358</sup> Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 78.14-18.

<sup>359</sup> To use contemporary terminology, we would say that emotions are “cognitively penetrable.” Though since cognition is not the same thing as reason for Avicenna, this terminology would not be the best fit for Avicenna. The general idea, however, is the same. For a discussion of this concept in Aquinas’s theory of emotions, see King (2012), 216.

thoughts in ways that we cannot change sensible pleasure and pain. When you stub your toe, you cannot will or think the pain away. But when you experience emotional sadness, you can probe the beliefs underlying that emotion, and possibly make it go away.

So, we have seen in this section that Avicenna thinks acts of the animal and vegetative soul—using emotions as the most obvious example—are acts of the soul, despite the fact that they are “necessarily” followed by some sort of bodily passion. It is the word “necessarily” from the first text cited above that provides much of the payoff for the sake of our discussion.<sup>360</sup> In previous sections we saw Avicenna take pains to distinguish emotions (“primarily of the soul”) from their temperamental effects (“primarily of the body”). What we see here adds to that picture by showing that emotions are part of a class of acts where the effects that are “primarily of the body” are to some extent necessary. Insofar as emotions are acts of the animal soul, they must be followed by changes in the body. We saw in the prior section that the precise physical changes that follow are variable, but now we see that—despite this variability—there must be *some* physical change, or we are no longer talking about the same sort of state.<sup>361</sup>

#### 4.5.5 Further effects: action-readiness and cognitive influence

Though Avicenna does not draw the connections explicitly, there seems to be some explanatory payoff to his emphasis on emotions’ temperamental effects. The first and most obvious is that it helps make sense of how emotions play the role they do in animals and humans, in terms of putting us into states of inclination (or, in contemporary terminology, states of “action-readiness”). As we saw in chapter three, emotions are the stage of the motive faculty prior to a practical judgment, which practical judgment leads to concrete action. Emotions merely *incline* towards some object or goal. That inclination, we have seen here, is essentially born out in terms

<sup>360</sup> See above at footnote 350.

<sup>361</sup> Though Avicenna does not draw this point explicitly, an implication of the fact that emotions necessarily cause things in a body is that states analogous to particular emotions, but in subjects without a body, are not properly called emotions. Or at the very least, we would need to be aware of the significant difference between emotions that are necessarily followed by a bodily passion, and “emotions” that are not, if we wanted to stretch the terminology that far. Delight of the animal soul and intellectual joy, experienced in this life, with a body, are clearly emotions. But intellectual joy experienced once the rational soul is separated from the body, or the joy experienced by the Necessary Existent, while they could still be called a type of joy, would only be an emotion in a much looser sense. One of the things that seems essential to an emotion (and all other acts of the animal soul, for that matter), is that it has *some* effect on the body. This is presumably why Avicenna, whenever discussing outlier “emotion” states, never uses the standard generic terminology that we see around his discussions of emotions, such as *infi’ ālāt*. See the introduction of the thesis for an overview of such terminology.

of a state that is “primarily of the soul.” But as a matter of fact, emotions in animals and humans have temperamental effects throughout the body that put the organism, as a whole, into a state of inclination. Though Avicenna is writing far before the distinction between the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, his descriptions of what emotions do parallel their functions: the sympathetic system pumps blood rapidly to divert resources to muscles and action-oriented organs (as in anger), while once a goal is achieved, the parasympathetic system restores balance (as in joy).<sup>362</sup> Neither of these states actually cause us to take any action; rather, they incline us towards different sorts of actions.

A second payoff, albeit more tenuous, concerns the effect of emotions on cognition. The effect of emotions on cognitions is stated most bluntly in Avicenna’s definition of emotion at the start of his *Healing: Rhetoric*:

The emotions [*al-infi’ ālāt*] [...] are states [*aḥwāl*] through which one’s judgment differs [*yakhtalif*], through a difference [brought about by] the transformation [*takayyuf*] of the judger [when they are in that emotional state].<sup>363</sup>

This definition occurs at the beginning of a discussion designed to help the rhetorician bring about emotions in the judge, emotions that are suited to garnering sympathy for their defendant, or stoking animosity towards the accused. That this change in judgment is the result of undergoing an emotion helps explain why Avicenna earlier in the same section describes the rhetorician’s task as a kind of “persuasion/swaying”: to get someone convicted of a crime merely because the jury is angry with them leaves plenty of room for error, since anger can be stirred up by causes that have nothing to do with their guilt, and then misplaced on the accused. If you become envious towards someone, you might be more likely to inflict the harm of a harsh sentence on them, however unjustified that might be.

However, the mechanism by which emotions “transform” the emoter is not discussed in detail. We know that the “transformation” is not simply a reference to the evaluative perception that triggered the emotion, since that evaluation is prior to the emotion, and we are here talking about an effect of the emotion itself. As the text quote above states, the change in judgment being

<sup>362</sup> See discussion in Johnston and Olson (2015), chapter 1.

<sup>363</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 130. This of course parallels Aristotle’s own definition of emotions in the Arabic version of his *Rhetoric*: “The passions [*al-’ ālām*] are those things which, when the one judging is changed [*yataghayyar*] by them, their judgments differ [*yakhtalif*], and pleasure [*al-ladhdha*] and pain [*al-adhā*] are necessarily involved in their occurrence [*yalzamuhā*].” See: Aristotle, *Ars rhetorica* (1982), 83.



discussed is brought about by an emotion, so change in judgment would necessarily be distinct from the judgment that preceded and caused the emotion. What seems more likely is that the general physiological changes which emotions cause, which can affect the body as a whole, cause our ensuing judgments to change. For example, cognitive function is affected by the temperament of the brain, and since the body is a connected system, emotions can affect that temperament.<sup>364</sup> As an example of how this might work, recall that emotions don't always have the same targets as the causes which trigger them: you might be mad about your performance at work one day (an emotion caused by some prior judgment about work), and then take this out on your spouse, who had nothing to do with work. This negative judgment about your spouse would be distinct from the judgment about work that caused the emotion, and it would have been brought about by the physiological state into which the emotion put the emoter. As mentioned, Avicenna does not make this point explicitly, but he seems to have the resources to do so. Of course, emotions do not always affect cognition, nor do they do so in predictable ways, which is perhaps another reason why Avicenna keeps these whole-body temperamental changes distinct from the essence of an emotion.

## 4.6 Conclusion

Avicenna's discussions of the physiological side of affective psychology show a striking level of detail—as he himself points out to us in the text from the end of *Psychology* 4.4—and they help him explain a variety of philosophical issues related to emotions. By separating out temperamental dispositions and effects from that which underlies an occurrent emotion, he isolates the core of an emotion itself. His discussions ground preliminary aspects of moral formation, and help fill out the picture of how emotions prepare us for action. Moreover, physiology helps explain why emotions occur in the face of the same object at some times, while at other times they do not, and why their strength varies when the object stays the same.

To conclude, we should pause to reflect on the significance of Avicenna's assertions in his medical writings that there is a strong link between emotions and the vital spirit. For example, in texts cited in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter, emotions are “linked” to the vital spirit, in

<sup>364</sup> Aquinas later says that this is how emotions affect changes in cognition. Discussed at Pickavé (2008), 193.

that they are “passions” of the vital spirit, and they are “proper to” the “vital spirit that is in the heart.” At first glance these descriptors might have been taken to mean that the vital spirit is in some way an organ solely dedicated to emotional functions. Yet, as we have seen, most of what Avicenna has to say about the vital spirit and its relation to emotions could be said of other psychological faculties, and indeed *is* said of other faculties, though not in as much detail. Emotions are localized in the heart, and the vital spirit *in the heart*. But insofar as the vital spirit throughout the rest of the body facilitates the functioning and communication of various faculties, all the soul’s faculties will all have dispositions and effects in the vital spirit, to some degree or other.

Finally, what Avicenna in fact says about the dispositions for emotions and effects of emotions in the vital spirit is significant, but it is not the whole story for either emotional dispositions or effects. We are disposed to emotions for cognitive reasons as well as physiological reasons, and while the vital spirit might be the most immediate effect of an emotion, characteristic effects of emotions involve other aspects of the body as well, as discussed in section 4.5.3 above. Thus, Avicenna manages to unpack the physiology of emotions to the high level of detail that he does, all while keeping these details in their proper place in an overall theory of motivation and action.

## Chapter 5 Emotions in Avicenna's *Rhetoric*: Analysis

Appendix 1 of this dissertation consists of a translation of the section from *Healing: Rhetoric* where Avicenna discusses particular emotions in detail (3.1-5). I have incorporated this text and others from *Healing: Rhetoric* at numerous points throughout the preceding chapters.<sup>365</sup> But I will here provide some context and analysis of the translated text as a whole, more directly.

### 5.1 Avicenna's *Rhetoric* in its broader context

The broader context for Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric* is best understood alongside his *Healing: Poetics*. Both of these texts follow Aristotle's project of trying to articulate 1) the goals of poetic and rhetorical modes of speech, and 2) how to achieve those goals. As has been shown in Black (1990), the Classical Arabic philosophers were presented with translations of Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* grouped with the other texts of the Aristotelian logical corpus (the *Organon*). Thus, a large part of their work on these topics sought to make sense of how poetical and rhetorical speech related to the broader goals of logic.<sup>366</sup>

Avicenna's way of making sense of how poetic and rhetorical arts fit in with the standard branches of logic depends primarily on holding that all branches of logic seek something under the genus of acquiescence [*idh 'ān*]. Standard logical modes, like deduction, lead to a type of acquiescence called assent [*taṣḍīq*]. Poetical speech, on the other hand, leads to a kind of acquiescence better called “imaginative” acquiescence.<sup>367</sup> This idea in *Poetics* is relevant to a study on the nature of emotions because, as was discussed in chapter two,<sup>368</sup> imaginative acquiescence is a type of emotional reaction, wherein one is moved emotionally by the speech, positively or negatively, as the speech dictates. For example, a poem about a landscape could be said to have the goal of convincing you that the landscape is beautiful. To the extent that you feel the sorts of things about the landscape as a result of the poem that you would normally feel

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<sup>365</sup> The main points at which *Healing: Rhetoric* was discussed in the prior chapters of this dissertation are as follows: Chapter 1.3.1, on the distinction between different types of pleasures; 1.2.3, on the nature of fear; 1.2.5, on different types of goods; 3.4.2, on the rational and non-rational cognitive bases for emotions; 4.4.4, on the *Rhetoric's* approach to character traits; 4.5.5, on the effect of emotions on judgment.

<sup>366</sup> Black (1990) 34.

<sup>367</sup> Discussed in chapter 2, 2.3.1, but also see Black (1990) 182.

<sup>368</sup> See chapter 2, section 2.3.1.

towards a beautiful landscape (e.g., peace, wonder, joy), the poem has succeeded in “convincing” you.

As for the discipline of rhetoric, Avicenna says that the goal of rhetoric is a type of acquiescence called “persuasion [*iqnā*].”<sup>369</sup> Persuasion, in turn, is not an emotion, but rather an opinion [*ẓann*], wherein one believes something is true, but simultaneously is consciously aware that their view could be false.<sup>370</sup> For example, a great rhetorician might stir you up so that you cheer for their political agenda at a rally, while you temporarily ignore the nagging thought that you have not actually thought through all their ideas, or fully considered the other side. Emotions enter into the discussion of rhetoric because one of the tools a rhetorician has to move someone towards persuasion is emotional manipulation. So a difference between poetics and rhetoric is that the acquiescence involved in poetics *is itself* a kind of emotional response, whereas in rhetoric emotions are a *tool* to move the audience to rhetoric's particular type of acquiescence.

## 5.2 The structure of Avicenna's discussion of emotions in the *Healing: Rhetoric*

The *Healing: Rhetoric* is composed of four books that treat roughly the same topics as Aristotle does in the three books of his *Rhetoric*. Whereas Avicenna is obviously innovative in the structure of his psychological and medical texts, book 3 of his *Healing: Rhetoric* follows the model of Aristotle's book 2 quite closely in terms of its goals, and the emotions he chooses to focus on. This is not to say Avicenna simply regurgitates Aristotle. There are many new examples, elaborations, and brief philosophical analyses that make it clear Avicenna is reflectively assimilating Aristotle's text.<sup>371</sup> Avicenna's creativity in the *Rhetoric* is especially

<sup>369</sup> This explanation of rhetoric taken from Avicenna's early *Compilation: Rhetoric* (2013), 139.

<sup>370</sup> *Compilation: Rhetoric* (2013), 139. Discussed at Black (1990) 108-111.

<sup>371</sup> In the translation in Appendix 1, these sections have been noted in the footnotes with the phrase “No parallel in Aristotle's text,” along with a brief description of the difference.

Some of these differences seem to provide a rare glimpse into Avicenna as a social commentator. For example, when giving examples of the causes of anger, he says the public doesn't understand the concerns of scholars, so they consider them to be worthless and floundering in their work, which in turn makes the scholars angry (132.5).

Again, when discussing those who have come into recent, unexpected material success, he says that they are prone to love God and trust in providence. With apparent tongue in cheek, he says that their outlook makes sense, since they have been lucky without hard work (163.10). The criticism seems to be directed at those who claim to trust in providence, when in reality they would want nothing to do with religion if they had not been so lucky in their lives.

clear when put alongside his earlier, shorter, less innovative *Character Traits and Affections of the Soul* [*Al-akhlāq wa-al-infi'ālāt al-nafsāniyya*]. That text, which appears to originally have been part of the larger *Compilation*, is essentially just a concise summary of book 2 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.<sup>372</sup>

The stated goal of discussing individual emotions in Avicenna's *Rhetoric* is, as in Aristotle's text, to equip the rhetorician to be able to persuade the audience effectively. This is clear from the opening line of book 3, when Avicenna says that he will now “discuss the types of rhetorical speech by which one sways [*yastadrij bi-hā*] judges and listeners.”<sup>373</sup> The judges and listeners in this context are most directly legal judges (this can be seen in the ensuing introductory paragraphs, which contain descriptions of how judges who are well-disposed towards a defendant might decide on a lighter sentence for the defendant, while being ill-disposed toward a defendant will have the opposite effect). In 3.5, Avicenna follows the discussion of individual emotions with a description of character types—young, old, rich, wealthy—and the emotions each type is disposed to experience. In Aristotle's text, the relation between these two sections is not explicit, but Avicenna concludes his discussion of both by tying them together, saying, “it is necessary that the rhetorician knows about the types that correspond to [certain] emotions [*al-infi'ālāt*] and character traits [*al-akhlāq*].”<sup>374</sup> By knowing what certain emotions dispose people towards (3.1-4), and what emotions different types of people are *already* disposed towards (3.5), the rhetorician can skillfully manage the audience. Yet despite the practical framing of these sections, Avicenna rarely draws our attention back to these stated goals in the body of the text, which is simply focused on analyzing of the nature of particular emotions and character types.

As for the emotions themselves discussed in *Healing: Rhetoric* 3.1-4, Avicenna (like Aristotle) mostly groups emotions in clusters of contraries (e.g., shame and shamelessness). The following table captures the emotions dealt with, in order. I include the terms used for an emotion's valence in the right hand column, which I will discuss below. An “x” in the left-hand column shows that these emotions are presented as a cluster of contraries. Sometimes the pair includes more than one emotion on one side of the contrary:

<sup>372</sup> *Character Traits* is presented in Avicenna (1954), along with a French translation.

<sup>373</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 129.

<sup>374</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 164.

Contraries/ groupings	English Term	Arabic Term	Location in Arabic Text	Valence
x	Anger	<i>al-ghaḍab</i>	130	<i>adhā</i> [pain], <i>ladhdha</i> <sup>375</sup> [pleasure]
	Calmness	<i>futūr al-ghaḍab</i> <sup>376</sup>	133	
x	Friendliness	<i>ṣadāqa</i>	135	<i>irtiyāḥ</i> [elation]
	Enmity	<i>ʿadāwa</i>	137	
	Hatred	<i>baḡḍa</i>	137	
x	Fear	<i>khawf</i>	138	<i>ikhtilāṭ</i> [agitation], <i>ḥuzn</i> [sadness]
	Courage/Boldness	<i>shajāʿa</i>	139	
x	Embarrassment	<i>istiḥyāʿ</i>	139	<i>ikhtilāṭ</i> [agitation], <i>ḥuzn</i> [sadness]
	Shame	<i>khajal</i>	142	<i>ikhtilāṭ</i> [agitation], <i>ḥuzn</i> [sadness]
	Shamelessness	<i>al-waqāḥa</i>	145	
x	Gratefulness of kindness	<i>shukr al-minna</i>	145	n/a, focus on the deed of kindness
	Lack-of-gratefulness	No specific name given	146	
x	Pity/empathy	<i>hamm/ihtimām</i>	147	<i>adhā</i> [pain]
	Indignation	<i>jazaʿ</i>	150	<i>ḥuzn</i> [sadness]
	Envy	<i>ḥasad</i>	150	<i>adhā</i> [pain], <i>ḥuzn</i> [sadness], <i>ghamm</i> [depression]
x <sup>377</sup>	Joy [at different kinds of successes and failures]	<i>farah</i>	151	
	Vengeance	<i>naqma</i>	151	
	Zeal/desire to emulate	<i>hamiyya</i>	154	<i>adhā</i> [pain]
	Zeal	<i>ghayra</i>	155	

The bulk of Avicenna's analysis of each emotion on this list is taken up with a discussion of three aspects of the emotion: 1) the sort of states that dispose a person to that emotion, 2) the triggering cause for that emotion, and 3) the object of that emotion. This programme is never explicitly laid out by Avicenna, but it is plain to see that he is following in Aristotle's footsteps, who does lay things out explicitly:

<sup>375</sup> The mention of anger involving a kind of pleasure technically occurs a bit earlier in the *Rhetoric*, at Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 130.

<sup>376</sup> In the earlier *Natural Dispositions and Affections of the Soul* Avicenna refers to calmness as *sukūn al-naḥs*. See Avicenna, *Natural Dispositions* (1954) 24.1.

<sup>377</sup> The structure of the grouping at the end, beginning with joy, is presented not as a cluster of contraries, but merely as a group of closely related emotions, with subtle differences

It is necessary that we proceed and examine each [emotion] in the threefold manner. As for how this will be done, I say that it will follow the pattern of what we'll do concerning anger, showing [1] the state—which one and what it is like [*kayfa wa-bi-ayya hāl*]—such that someone in that state is disposed towards anger, and [2] that on account of which [*mimmā*] it is typical for [a particular occurrence of] anger to arise, and [3] towards whom/what [*alā man*] [anger is directed].<sup>378</sup>

We can illustrate these points with anger: [2] a triggering cause of anger is an insult, a slight, or an offense; [1] one is more likely to be angered by such a triggering cause if they feel entitled to respect, or perhaps if they live a generally luxurious life; [3] their anger, once it arises, will be directed at the person who they perceive to have insulted them.<sup>379</sup> This is not a comprehensive analysis of anger, of course, and Avicenna's text includes many more examples. One thing worth noting is the need to distinguish a triggering cause from an object. In typical cases, we might think that the cause of anger would be the same as its object (e.g., so-and-so caused me to be angry, and I'm angry at so-and-so). But although neither Avicenna nor Aristotle dwell on the point, it does seem worth making this distinction, because sometimes these two aspects could be construed as much less related. For example, you could be angry because of something that happened at work (the trigger), and then unfairly take this out on a friend (who becomes the object of your anger). Despite Aristotle's good intentions with the above schema, in practice neither Avicenna nor Aristotle unpack all of the three aspects in a clearly identifiable way for every emotion. This is perhaps why Avicenna does not even make a point of repeating that he is going address every emotion in this threefold way. This is also why it is not feasible here to undertake an analysis of each emotion under those three headings: despite the careful overall organization presented in the chart above, the individual discussions of emotions are too full of unsystematically presented specifics and examples to be amenable to much general analysis.

### 5.3 Insights about the nature of emotion from the *Healing: Rhetoric*

While we cannot get into a discussion of each individual emotion, there are three main insights we can draw about the nature of emotions from *Healing: Rhetoric* 3.1-5 as a whole.

- Emotions have an effect on cognition.
- Emotions have a positive or negative hedonic quality.
- Specific emotions are distinguished from one another primarily by their cognitive causes.

<sup>378</sup> 83.13-17 in the Arabic, see Aristotle, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica* (1982). cf. 1378a in the Greek.

<sup>379</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 130-131.

The first two points should not be surprising to readers of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which early on in the Arabic text defines emotions as follows:

The passions [*al-ālām*<sup>380</sup>] are those things which, when the one judging is changed [*yataghayyar*] by them, their judgments differ [*yakhtalif*], and pleasure [*al-ladhdha*] and pain [*al-adhā*] are necessarily involved in their occurrence [*yalzamuḥā*].<sup>381</sup>

In this definition, pleasure and pain are closely linked to core emotional experience, whereas changes in judgment come about *as a result* of having an emotion. The verb used to describe the place of valence in emotions is somewhat ambiguous (*yalzamuḥā*), such that it could be taken to mean either that emotions are defined as pains and pleasures, or that emotions have pains and pleasures as effects. But the issue seems settled in the actual definitions of emotions which follow in Aristotle's text, since emotions are consistently defined as pleasures or pains, plus some judgment, in fairly straightforward identity statements (e.g., "anger is a pain"). So the impression Aristotle's text gives is fairly clear, and Avicenna generally follows suit, as we will see.

Like Aristotle, Avicenna provides a general definition of what an emotion is towards the start of 3.1. This definition includes mention of the effect of emotions on cognition, but leaves off any mention of pleasure and pain:

The emotions [*al-infi'ālāt*] [...] are states [*aḥwāl*] through which one's judgment differs [*yakhtalif*], through a difference [brought about by] the transformation [*takayyuf*] of the judge [when they are in that emotional state].<sup>382</sup>

The Arabic in this definition is compact to the point of being enigmatic, but it seems best to interpret it as approximating Aristotle's definition, given its context. That is, the definition occurs at the beginning of a discussion designed to help the rhetorician bring about emotions in the judge suited to garner sympathy for their defendant, or stoke animosity towards the accused. That this change in judgment is the result of undergoing an emotion helps explain why Avicenna described this as a kind of "swaying/subtle manipulation":<sup>383</sup> to convict someone of a crime merely because you are angry at them leaves plenty of room for error, since your anger can be stirred up by causes that have nothing to do with their guilt. If you become envious towards

<sup>380</sup> Interestingly, Avicenna never uses the term *al-'ālām* to refer to emotions.

<sup>381</sup> Aristotle, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica* (1982) 83.

<sup>382</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 130.

<sup>383</sup> See above, footnote 372.



someone, you might be more likely to inflict the harm of a harsh sentence on them, however unjustified that might be. The mechanics of this transformation which brings about a change in judgment are not discussed in detail, but earlier, in chapter 4, section 4.4.5, I discussed how this seems likely to referring to some sort of physical change, which has cognitive implications.

As mentioned, Avicenna's general definition of emotions leaves off any mention of pleasure and pain. Nonetheless, pleasure and pain are just as central throughout his particular discussions of emotions as they are for Aristotle. Avicenna describes some emotions with terms that connote positive-valence, such as pleasure [*ladhdhah*], joy [*farah*], and elation [*irtiyāh*], while others are described in terms of negative-valence, such as pain [*adhā*], agitation [*ikhtilāf*], or sadness [*ghamm/huzn*] (see chart above). These feelings are sometimes stated without qualification, but other times they are qualified, as in a "psychological pain" or a "pain of the soul," which is just meant to distinguish this sort of pleasure or pain from physical pain and pleasure. As examples of how valence is worked into the definitions of particular emotions, we can take anger, fear and embarrassment/shame:

As for anger, it is a psychological pain [*adhā nafsāniyya*] owing to [*li*] a desire [*shawq*] on the part of the person for bringing about a punishment that they see as appropriate because of the thought of a slight or scorn to him, from the one toward whom he is angry. [...]<sup>384</sup>

And as for fear, it is a pain [*huzn*] and agitation [*ikhtilāf*] of the soul, on account of [*li*] imagining an expected, debilitating evil either reaching [the level of] corruption, or not approaching it. [...]<sup>385</sup>

Embarrassment and shame are a pain [*huzn*] and an agitation [*ikhtilāf*] because of some evil deed by which the person becomes blameworthy, whether its occurrence preceded, or is present, or is expected.<sup>386</sup>

Rather than seeming extraneous or tacked on to emotional experience, these definitions make the positive or negative feeling central to the emotion, with the cognitive and (sometimes) appetitive components filling out the picture. Given the prominent role cognition and appetite have in emotional experience in *Psychology*, it seems unlikely that valence is meant to be taken in any sense as *more* central, so it is best to see *Rhetoric* and *Psychology* as emphasizing different essential elements of emotional experience.

<sup>384</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 130.

<sup>385</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 138.

<sup>386</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 142.

These different aspects of emotional experience are never explicitly fused together by Avicenna, but it is possible to see how they might be. On the one hand, as was discussed in chapter 1, section 1.5.2, some emotions are positive completion states, and obviously such emotions (like joy, or sociability) include some positive hedonic quality. On the other hand, there is a tradition, going back to Plato, of thinking about appetite as painful.<sup>387</sup> Normally hunger is an example of a painful appetite, but the point seems to generalize to higher level emotions as well. We desire something because we lack it, and awareness of a lack typically involves some kind of discomfort. One place this is mirrored in Avicenna's other writings is in *Psychology* 4.4, when Avicenna says that certain appetites are caused when we "suffer the loss" of a pleasure.<sup>388</sup> So on a general level—if we are not being as precise as Avicenna is in *Psychology* 4.4—emotions could be seen as complex psychological phenomena, involving appetite, a cognition,<sup>389</sup> and some sort of pleasure or pain, or both.<sup>390</sup>

As for the third point, that emotions are distinguished from one another primarily by their cognitive causes, this is apparent from how Avicenna approaches each particular definition. As mentioned earlier, emotions are most fundamentally acts of the motive faculty. But the motive faculty is non-cognitive, and by that very fact it is difficult to describe states solely from the point of view of the motive faculty. We can see the importance of the associated cognition for distinguishing emotions by looking at the following example, in which Avicenna distinguishes envy from vengeance and wrath:

And there are two kinds of sadness [*huzn*]: a sadness which occurs on account of the good state of one who deserves it, for the sake of the goodness of the state, and this is envy. And there is a sadness that occurs on account of the good state of one who does not deserve it, because he does not deserve it, and this is vengeance or wrath. And these two are contraries.<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> See Wolfsdorf (2015).

<sup>388</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195.

<sup>389</sup> One might object to the conclusion that emotions all have some sort of valence by pointing out that not every emotion in the *Rhetoric* has pleasure or pain as part of its definition (see chart above in this section). To this I would say that Aristotle also does not include valence in all of his particular definitions, despite having explicitly built it into the generic definition at the outset. It seems that both Avicenna and Aristotle, in their respective works on the rhetoric, focus on the issues they take to be most important or illuminating about each emotion, not worrying about being utterly systematic and comprehensive. So just because Avicenna does not explicitly define some emotion as having a valence component does not mean there is none: Aristotle sets a precedent for valence being an essential component to what an emotion is, and Avicenna never contradicts this, instead following suit in almost every particular case.

<sup>390</sup> Avicenna says that anger can be pleasurable, since it involves the idea of overcoming. See Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 101.

<sup>391</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 151.

Here, as is typical in the *Rhetoric*, appetite is not even mentioned. Moreover, one is not able to tell, just by inspecting the valence component, what sort of emotion is occurring. Envy and vengeance/wrath are both kinds of sadness, distinguishable only by the sort of evaluation to which they are a response: envy sees someone else's good state simply as good, while the wrathful or indignant person sees it as good and recognizes that the person in the good state does not deserve it. Avicenna makes a similar point shortly before this, distinguishing envy, which he calls a kind of sadness [*ghamm*] over the fact that *someone else* has a good, from the sadness [*ghamm*] that *you* do not have a good. The latter, he says, is not envy, but something "very close to being necessary," since it is perfectly natural to be sad that you do not have something which someone else easily acquires.<sup>392</sup> The distinction seems to be between being sad simply that someone else has a good, which is envy, and being sad that you lack a good, which is natural. As was seen in our discussion of *Healing: Psychology* in chapter 1, emotions are fundamentally motive states, but to talk about and define particular emotions, we need to reference their associated cognitions.<sup>393</sup>

#### 5.4 Character traits in the *Healing: Rhetoric*

Turning to *Healing: Rhetoric* 3.5, Avicenna shifts from talking about individual emotions, to the sorts of emotions towards which particular types of people are disposed. At the beginning of 3.5, Avicenna says that he will discuss:

[...] the states that incline [*al-ahwāl al-muḥarrikah*], by way of [discussing] each disposition [*khulq khulq*] with respect to occurrences [*al-'awāriḍ*] [of the just discussed emotions] and concerns, according to ages, according to classes [*hudūd*]<sup>394</sup>, and according to souls.<sup>395</sup>

The notion of "states that incline" comprises many types of differences between people, as the text goes on to enumerate. In keeping with the purpose of this portion of the *Rhetoric*, these are being discussed primarily to get a sense of what sort of emotions (here *a 'rāḍ*) different types of people are disposed towards. The ensuing discussion is primarily organized according to the following groups, in order: the young, the old, those in the prime of their life, those of noble

<sup>392</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 151.

<sup>393</sup> See chapter 1, section 1.4.

<sup>394</sup> This translation seems appropriate, especially given that he later goes on to use a related term, "sharp [*ḥadīd*] (160.10)," to describe the anger of the old.

<sup>395</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 156.

lineage, and the wealthy. So “ages” and “classes” organize the discussion, while different types of “souls” are elaborated on within those particular categories. For example, it is said of the old that “their anger is sharp [*ḥadīd*] [yet] weak,”<sup>396</sup> and that they are disposed towards hopelessness not only because of the coldness of their temperaments,<sup>397</sup> but also because they have experienced so many difficulties and setbacks in life (a cognitive disposition).<sup>398</sup> On the other hand, it is said of the young that they are optimistic and prone to believing others because of their hot temperament, and lack of bad experiences.<sup>399</sup> In general he is focused on the psychological attributes of the different categories he discusses, occasionally grounding these in physiological differences.

It is worth comparing the discussion of emotions and character traits here, in the *Rhetoric*, with what we saw about character traits in chapter 4, when we were focused on physiology. That is, in chapter 4, Avicenna's brief remarks suggested that true virtue or vice are partially realized in (not necessarily reducible to) states of the vital spirit. But context from elsewhere suggests that when Avicenna is discussing character traits here in the *Rhetoric*, he is discussing something more preliminary and morally neutral.

Amongst Avicenna's predecessors, we can notice a distinction between dispositions that are given to us as a result of our birth or our situation in life, and the dispositions we acquire as a result of habituating ourselves towards virtue or vice. Most importantly, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle distinguishes between two types of excellence: excellence of thought, and excellence of character. Excellence of character is achieved when the non-rational part of the soul is well-disposed, having been guided and habituated by the practical intellect.<sup>400</sup> Similarly, in Galen's *On Character Traits* (*Kitāb al-akhlāq*), he distinguishes between character traits that are a

<sup>396</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 160.10.

<sup>397</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 159.

<sup>398</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 160.

<sup>399</sup> “And their natures are prone to believing quickly whatever falls at their feet on account of what is in them of optimism, and a lack of suspicion, and wideness of hope. And all of that follows on account of their hot temperament, which resembles the intoxicated, [and this temperament] strengthens the soul very much (Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 157).”

<sup>400</sup> On the two types of excellence, see *Nicomachean Ethics* (1994) 1103a. For the need to add practical wisdom on top of character traits in order for them to be complete, see 1144a-b.

result of nature, and those that are acquired by habit. The latter category is the domain of virtue and vice.<sup>401</sup>

There is no reason to think Avicenna would not be fully on board with this notion that virtue is something that requires rational control, given what we saw in section 2.2 about the practical intellect's role in habituating appetites.<sup>402</sup> The upshot of this is that, while being virtuous does involve dispositions (specifically, dispositions to act appropriately, cultivated by the practical intellect) these dispositions are of a different sort than those discussed in the *Rhetoric*. A disposition, even a disposition to act appropriately, is *not* virtue, *if* it is just the result of age, the circumstances of one's birth, good genetics, and so on.

Although Avicenna does not make the link explicit, there is one further connection between *Rhetoric's* discussion of character traits, and what we have discussed in prior chapters. That is, there is potential overlap between preparatory dispositions for emotions, and what we discussed about mental illness in chapter 4, 4.4.3. As we saw, it is possible for doctors to get rid of certain conditions that would make it all but impossible for someone to exert rational control (e.g., when someone is in the grip of extreme depression or madness). But a medical doctor could not (of course) positively inculcate virtue by improving physiology. So the role of physiology in moral formation, like the inborn/given dispositions just discussed, is something more preliminary. Treating a patient's melancholy with chemicals could give the patient a better position from which to develop a positive, virtuous, cheerful disposition, but that is all that it could do.

Stepping back, we can see how differently emotions are treated in *Healing: Rhetoric*, as compared to the texts on philosophical psychology. Avicenna does not contradict his fundamental point that emotions are primarily acts of the motive faculty, but his focus is

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<sup>401</sup> On the distinction between the two types of character traits, see Galen, *Character Traits* (2013), pp. 141-143 and 167.

<sup>402</sup> Avicenna does not have any canonical, explicitly ethical works to bring into this discussion. However, we can briefly mention *On Governance*, a text attributed to Avicenna, but of questionable authenticity. Its history is discussed at Gutas (2014), pp. 500-501. In it, the author exhorts his readers to virtue by telling them to “take count of their character traits and temperaments,” and then use reason to cultivate what is good, and rein in what is bad.” So the practical intellect is used to take whatever dispositions are given, and cultivate them into virtue. See Avicenna, *On Governance* (2007), 229-230. Original Arabic in *Risāla fī al-Siyāsa* (1911), ed. Cheikho, et. al.

elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*: on emotions as pleasures or pains, and on the dispositional states, triggering causes, and objects of particular emotions. It seems most likely that this shift in focus is because he is following the programme of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which in turn is attempting to provide concrete advice to the rhetorician.

## Conclusion

Avicenna's theory of emotion is detailed and well-integrated with other aspects of his psychology and physiology. Emotions are states of the animal motive faculty that incline us towards objects and actions, but do not actually directly cause us to act (they are *inclinations*, translating *nizā'āt/inbi'āthāt*). When we become aware of an object and evaluate it in a behaviorally relevant way, we typically have some sort of emotion with respect to that object. That emotion inclines us to some sort of action, and we can choose to act on that inclination, or not. For example, if a sheep sees a wolf, it will most likely become afraid, and thereby inclined to escape. If there are no impediments to doing so, it will then resolve to actually run away. Or if a human realizes they have publicly violated a social taboo, they may feel the emotion of shame, which could incline them to withdraw and hide. Some might resolve to act on this emotion, and in fact hide, while others might override the inclination to hide, and choose to make amends.

One of the distinctive features of Avicenna's work on emotions is the complexity of emotion of which he thinks animals are capable, and the detail with which he describes human emotions. Of course, the basic account of animal emotion begins with concupiscible and irascible appetites, but Avicenna also articulates how animals experience emotions more dependent on the imagination, related to things like freedom, companionship, and aesthetic experience. Human emotions are likewise analyzed in detail, from the higher pleasures of the intellect, to emotions that seem to have no parallel in animals, such as wonder, anxiety, shame, and future-oriented fear and desire.

Despite their different ranges of emotional experience, animal emotions and human emotions are both fundamentally actualizations of the same biological and psychological systems. Animal emotions are acts of the shared animal motive faculty, and are localized in the heart and vital spirits, the organs most responsible for action-readiness. Uniquely human emotions involve actualizations of this same hardware, but they are “uniquely” human in that their cognitive causes are significantly more complex.

As a medical doctor, Avicenna's theory of emotions also benefits from his ability to illuminate questions around emotions with his knowledge of physiology. For example, we might wonder

why the same evaluative judgment sometimes causes an emotion, sometimes not, and, when it does, why the emotion varies in strength. For example, two people evaluate an object as pleasurable, yet one person craves it, and the other ignores it. According to Avicenna, the explanation for this difference most likely lies with their temperamental dispositions.

Avicenna recognized the importance of emotions to our quality of life, and to our general outlook (including what we believe), as seen in his writings related to the arts of rhetoric and poetics. Equipped with an understanding of the nature of emotion, the rhetorician can delight or disgust the audience, and can in turn guide them to become convinced or incredulous of various propositions. Emotions are an important and powerful aspect of our everyday lives, and it is perhaps a recognition of this fact that drove Avicenna to analyze them in such detail.



## Appendix 1

Translation of the sections on emotions in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*From Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*, Book 3

## 3.1 On persuasive rhetorical speeches

[129]<sup>403</sup> Let us now discuss the types of rhetorical speech by which judges and listeners are persuaded [*yustadraj bi-hā*].

The [the type of rhetoric used] might differ according to the level of those judging, according to their minds and the sophistication of their beliefs, or the lack thereof, and that is especially the case in deliberations [*mashwariyyāt*]. As for lawsuits [*khuṣūmāt*], it seems that in them there is more of a dependence on preserved laws than on specific traits [of the judge].

So if the rhetorician is acquainted [129.5] with the state of the judge, and the state of the opposing party [*khaṣm*], he benefits from that. For those judging are not all the same in their disposition towards those they like, and those they dislike; nor is their judgment [the same] about one towards whom they bear ill, or with whom they are seeking a peaceful resolution. Likewise, a speech on the unsoundness of the case might persuade the judge towards thinking he should hate the defendant, and love the speaker and have compassion towards him; or something else might cause [the judge] to incline towards [the speaker] and harden him against the defendant. Or if [the judge] has a good opinion about the rhetorician, trusting him [129.10] on account of his perceived virtue and refinement (which he may not in fact have), then it is probable that the judge would do well by him, and deal harshly with abstruse speaker casting doubt [on that speech]. For how easily led people are by the mildness of a mild person or the querulousness of a querulous person.

As for the speaker, one might believe him on account of confidence in his practical wisdom, [130] or [confidence] in his virtue, or [confidence] in his good will and friendship. And one might disbelieve him on account of the opposite of these. Similarly, telling a falsehood could

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<sup>403</sup> Page and line numbers in brackets accord with Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954).

happen in the deliberations among deliberators, either because of: their ignorance, their wickedness and their love of doing evil to people, or because of they do not care about what is being discussed, so they do not sincerely look into the matter, and they give counsel according to a hastily formed opinion.

As for scrutinizing a person and getting to know a person [130.5] in terms of the strength of their practical wisdom and the integrity of their nature, grasping this is only facilitated through a consideration of the types [of people] given within the topic of praise and dispraise.<sup>404</sup>

As for the state of good-will and friendship, and their consideration, we will deal with their types in such a way as will get rid of the cause for the need to know about them [any further] when we mention the emotions [*infī' ālāt*]. And [emotions] are states wherein which one's judgment differ, through a difference [consisting of] the transformation of the judger [when they are in that emotional state].<sup>405</sup>

So let's begin discussing these states with anger [*ghadāb*], and the one who is angry, and the one toward whom anger is directed. As for [130.10] anger, it is a psychological pain [*adhā nafsānī*] owing to [*li*] a desire [*shawq*] on the part of the person for bringing about a punishment that they see as appropriate because of the thought of a slight or scorn to him, from the one toward whom he is angry. On account of this, anger does not deal with universal matters, for scorn does not issue from universal matters, nor is revenge directed at [universal matters], but rather the

<sup>404</sup> See section 2.4 of this same text, corresponding to 1.9 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

<sup>405</sup> Avicenna's most schematic definition of emotions in this text differs from that offered by Aristotle. Aristotle says: "Emotions [*al-ālam*] are things that, when the one judging is changed because of them, their judgments differ; and they may be accompanied by pleasure and pain (83.10-11 in the Arabic version, cf. 1378a in the Greek)."

Aristotle follows this by mentioning the he will deal with individual emotions, and their opposites, and he provides a description of how he will treat each emotion: "It is necessary that we proceed and examine each [emotion] in the threefold manner. As for how this will be done, I say that it will follow the pattern of what we do concerning anger, when we show [1] the state--which one and what it is like [*kayfa wa-bi-ayy ḥāl*]—such that, if someone [is in it] they are disposed towards anger, and [2] on account of what [*mimmā*] it is typical for [a particular occurrence of anger] anger to occur, and [3] towards whom/what [*'alā man*] [anger is directed] (83.13-17 in the Arabic, cf. 1378a in the Greek)."

Avicenna does not include the references to pleasure and pain, or opposites, or the three aspects of emotions, in this initial overview. His analysis of individual emotions that follows, however, does proceed along these same lines.

object<sup>406</sup> of anger is an individual person or a group of people. And you have learned about the pleasure<sup>407</sup> [*al-ladhdhah*] that accompanies anger, encouraging the anger to increase.<sup>408</sup>

And as for scorn/disregard [*istihqār*], it is that which rears its head [130.15] on account of something said or done [indicating] to someone that someone else does not consider them deserving of concern, or have regard for their honor, or worry about their meeting some evil, or hope that they meet some good.

And scorn/disregard can be divided into three divisions: disdain [*istihāna*], [131] abuse [*ʿanat*], and insult [*shatīma*].

Disdain is the doing of that which indicates the worthlessness of the one disdained.

Abuse is dealing with someone in such a way that [the abuser] tries, by intentionally doing or not doing something, to get in the way of the other person for no other reason than the fact that they take pleasure in the other's discontent and helplessness. And [abuse] is not done except to someone who is considered not worth one's concern or respect, or who is not revered or feared.

[131.5] And as for the manner of being harmed by insult, and the fact that it comes about through disregard, these are two clear phenomena which do not require elucidation. And insulting is also something which gives pleasure to the one insulting, on account of the dominance he imagines when he insults, and [on account of] conceiving in himself that he is superior to the one insulted, in terms of virtue, on account of his being free of that disgrace which he hurls at the other. The young and the rich are excessive insulters for this reason.

And mockery is a combination of abuse and belittlement, or abuse and insult, understood as will be explained in their proper place.

[131.10] And the person who is least able to bear<sup>409</sup> difficulties [*muḥarrijāt/muḥrijāt*] annoyances or the sting of anger-inducing things, is the one who considers himself better

<sup>406</sup> This would correspond to the “towards whom” aspect of an emotion mentioned above, in footnote 404.

<sup>407</sup> It is worth noting that anger involves both pleasure and pain.

<sup>408</sup> Unclear to what prior section this is a reference, but it is illustrated in later in 131.15, where it is said that someone may get is angered when a pleasure gets taken away from them.

<sup>409</sup> This is a discussion of the sort of “states” that dispose someone towards anger.

intrinsically, or due to his power, or some virtue in himself, or [his] authority, as well as those who live in luxury, and those who expect to be honored or given favors and are then disappointed in this, or [the one who has trouble bearing such things is he who] encounters intentional belittlement and disregard towards himself or his kinfolk, from the one from whom he expects [honor].

And the one focused on a pain in his body, or suffering harm from someone else, or being afflicted by some disaster or mishap that burdens him, [such a one] is disposed towards anger on account of the least annoyance. So, one who suffers some trial, or fails to reach one of their desired goals, [if] he does not detach himself from the appetite and the [missed] pleasure [131.15], he is struck by an occurrence of anger. Anger comes quickly to the the one who [132] is made light of with regard to some physical or psychological harm, or with regard to some [bad] news, or the occurrence of a death, or [due to some person] paying little mind to his duty in terms of friendship. Similarly, when one fails to achieve that which they hope for, their burning anger falls upon that which denied him his hope, and even on other things.

And in the [same] genus as insult [*shatīma*] and scorn [*istihāna*] is disdain [*taḥqīr*] for that which is declared by those who make official judgements about religious obligations and virtue, or [for the] teaching [132.5] and learning of some wisdom by those who make official judgments. And [disdain also applies to] that which they opine.<sup>410</sup>

For indeed the general population frequently mocks these [jurists] on account of the failure of their imaginations to realize the use in what [the jurists] are working on. So they suppose that [the jurists] are floundering in useless things, and in that which has no benefit. And if the judge or the scholar becomes aware of what the masses are doing, he becomes angry and grieved.

[Nonetheless], at the end of the day, the general population is compelled by their condition to accomodate the trustworthy and virtuous [jurists], because they count on their skill at managing trusts, and their good ability to mediate in conflicts, [and] because of what [132.10] the general population understands of [the jurists'] devotion to charity and the need for [the jurists'] valid testimony as required for civil and commercial transactions. So they endear themselves to and

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<sup>410</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this discussion of religious judgments.

seek the sympathy of [the noble jurists] hearts, and if they get the cold-shoulder from [a noble jurist], they see this as a forfeiture and a loss.

And those things which make a person angry include: the breaking of the custom of generosity, and refraining from repaying a favor with favor. Indeed, how would you react if repayment is done poorly, or a great amount of kindness [is met with] with evil or ungratefulness, [132.15] or if the charitable offering is trivialized and considered less than what is deserved. And one of these ways of being [a bad repayer] is vile, namely, the breaking of custom, and one is even more vile, and that is failing to repay, and for [yet another] one there is no way to speak of its repugnance, and this is repaying [good] with bad.<sup>411</sup>

And someone might get angry at his friend <sup>412</sup>[133] if [the friend] considers it fine to pass over in silence the lovely gift, and especially if he is struck by some misfortune and it is trivialized by [the friend], and [the friend] does not get frustrated about it, and does not do good by sharing with him in [the misfortune]. Or if need afflicts him, and he is in the midst of its trial, and [the friend] does not say a word to him [then he would get angry]. And similarly [he would get angry] if he is one of his dependents, and someone whose affairs concern him. And [anger is caused by all these things]because all of this signifies disdain.

[133.5] And the types of disdain [*istihāna*] leading to anger include: disdain for a person himself, distain for someone that he respects, disdain for someone that someone marvels at,<sup>413</sup> and distain for that which brings humiliation on a friend. Examples [of distain] include: a father who gets angry at his children, and a woman who domineers over her husband.

And injustice towards a deserving [person] is a type of disdain, as is responding to something serious with a joke, along with [arbitrarily] singling-out someone for deprivation from among many others. And being neglectful of a friend to the point where his name or [133.10] tale is blotted out of memory [is a type of disdain]. Thus has the explanation of that which is related to anger been laid out fully.

<sup>411</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this focus on repayment of gifts and debts.

<sup>412</sup> cf. 1379b in Greek Aristotle (at various points where there is a clear parallel in language or focus between Avicenna and Aristotle's text, this will be noted).

<sup>413</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for these specific examples of objects of disdain.

So let us move onto explaining the nature of [anger's] opposite,<sup>414</sup> and that is the slackening of anger [*futūr al-ghaḍab*]. For example, anger slackens towards one who did not intend to disdain an act of kindness, but [who was simply] absent-minded or made an error; and towards one who goes beyond doing something that provokes anger to torturing, such that the pain diverts from anger;<sup>415</sup> and [anger slackens] towards the one who is treated as he treats the other; and towards the one who acknowledges [their wrong] and seeks forgiveness via repentance. On the other hand, someone who persists in denying and disavowing insolence or disregard brings about more [133.15] anger in addition to what was already directed towards him.

And [anger slackens] towards someone who is submissive, humble, yielding, and quiet, [134] who does not take recourse to obstinance or argument. An ashamed acknowledgment [from the other of their wrongdoing] solidifies the abating of anger. And [for example] you might find vicious dogs<sup>416</sup> who are on the verge of attacking some [people]. If some of [the people] sit down, and some of them hasten as if to fight the dogs, [the dogs] refrain from the ones who sit down submissively, and they attack the ones who are making to fight.<sup>417</sup>

And anger slackens a lot towards someone who is very cheerful. For the magnanimity that is perceived in someone on account of their joyousness, [134.5] it moves the soul towards something similar toward them, as if cheerfulness were a gift that requires repayment.<sup>418</sup>

And similarly [anger slackens towards] the poor, who are in distress, and ones dressed as ascetics seeking forgiveness [from God]. And those who are well known for refraining from harm, and avoiding the extreme, and holding their tongues, their fits of passion and their eccentricities are tolerated. And similarly the revered and the ones who make you feel bashful [do not make you angry], for anger does not join to reverence or embarrassment.<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> cf. 1380a in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>415</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this example of how being tortured by someone can cause anger to abate, because you are distracted by the pain of being tortured.

<sup>416</sup> cf. 1380a in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>417</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the in depth explanation of the example of quarrelsome dogs. The dogs are Aristotelian example, but Avicenna seems to take more interest in unpacking it.

<sup>418</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this example of how perceiving a positive trait in someone else (joyousness, in this case) can shift your emotional state positively towards them.

<sup>419</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this explanation that certain emotions are incompatible with one another.

And disdain, if it comes from a revered person, it is thought to be a result of their just displeasure [*sukht*], which is not [134.10] considered not to be pure disdain, but rather it is thought to be [an attempt to] educate or instill culture, and [the revered one's] assessment that [the other] deserves his anger is considered the opposite of scorn.

As for one who has reached a high degree of depravity, reprimand does not even reach down to their level, and one does not feel grief on account of him, and there is no pain felt with the awareness of [your being an object of] his disdain.<sup>420</sup>

And likewise [one does not get angry over] the apparent disdain in the case of making fun of someone, for it signifies that the one who is doing the disdaining [via jokes] takes pleasure in the one who is disdained and in mingling with him. And this is on account of [the joker's thinking that the other person has] strength of character, not on account of his scorn.

The one who is made fun of might not get angry if they are hoping for some good from the one who slights them.<sup>421</sup> [134.15] For example, someone might do something that [would normally] cause anger, [but] mixed with meeting a need or providing an obvious service [in which case it would not cause anger].

And time elapses after the thing that caused anger, its impact abates, so that one is no longer angry, or anger lessens.<sup>422</sup>

[135] And those things which lessen anger include: triumph, taking revenge, and the pouring out of agonies—as if from heaven—on the person who is the cause of anger. And the person who acknowledges a mistake and crime, who admits that they deserve shame, and does not take recourse to denial in the midst of their chastisement, and especially when there are first verbal punishments—for they agree to the badness of their [135.5] deed, and are chastised about it. And [the only kind of person who] gets angry in this sort of case in one who is exceedingly malevolent.

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<sup>420</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the idea that being disdained by someone might not cause any pain if we think little of the one by whom we are disdained.

<sup>421</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the idea that someone could do something that would normally cause anger, but because you are hoping for some good from them, you don't become angry.

<sup>422</sup> cf. 1380b in Greek Aristotle.

And that which lessens the feeling of anger at the wrong-doer is the wrong-doer's being ignorant of their offense, and their not being aware of the difference between good and evil.<sup>423</sup> And the death of the one who causes anger, and their reaching the final house [that lessens anger also], indeed that is among the things which removes resentment from the heart, to say nothing of anger.

### 3.2 [135.10] On the types of friendship, and hope and fear, and courage and cowardice

Friendliness [*al-ṣadāqa*] is the state [*hāla*] of a person insofar as they wish the good for another person, for the sake of that other person, and not for their own sake. For he has some disposition [*malaka*] motivating him to do the good for that other. The friend is one who both loves and is loved, and who shares in happiness and adversity, for the sake of his friend [136], not for his own sake.

The true sign of friendship is apparent when there is elation [*al-irtiyāh*] at what makes the friend happy, and sadness [*al-ighitimām*] and what is bad for him [*yasū'uhu*]. For the enemy [does] the opposite of that. Those people who love you are those who do good either to you, or to one of yours, for some reason, and especially when they do some big thing in terms out of charity, without hesitation, without finding it burdensome. And similarly those to whom one looks for something similar [i.e., you think they will be friendly toward you]. [136.5] Similarly, the beloved of the beloved [is one that you feel friendship towards], and [one feels friendship for] the enemy of [your enemy] who hates [your] enemy, or who [your] enemy [likewise] hates.

Those who covet are different from those who do not covet, like the generous and the courageous and the upright. And those who are content with that which they gain by their own work of themselves [are different from those] who strip away the objects of greed from others, like those who live off the plunder of their enemies. Likewise those with sincere hearts are loved on account of the fact that they curb others' pains and protect others from harms. And similarly people of virtue [are loved], who do without [136.10] others, and with whom no one initiates the giving of a gift without permission [i.e., because it is an honor to give a gift to a respectable

<sup>423</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph of the sort of things which can reduce anger.



person]. [With respect to these people, the gift-giver] is conscious of [the recipients'] bestowing on them them a great kindness when they agree to accept [the gift].<sup>424</sup>

And similarly [we feel friendship towards] those who are pleasant to be around, and those who are delightful to have as companions one account of the fact that they can be counted on to be forbearing and helpful, and to help repair disorderly states of affairs, and to not scold when there is a failure,<sup>425</sup> [or] it is believed by the friend that their scolding is light. And the opposite of this is those who are quarrelsome, hostile, and critical. And [this is true] even if each [of the above-mentioned unpleasant tendencies] is not on account of being bad-tempered, but on account of pity. And among them [who we feel friendship toward] are the hardy, those who bear well [136.15] under various types of punishment, and those who suffer with fortitude, for they only do that [i.e., suffer well] on account of the hardness of their character.

[137] Among those who are loved [as friends] are those who praise and flatter, and those who are well adorned, who have beautiful clothes, and those who are not reproachful, and not critical, and those who do not nurture anger in their hearts, and those who try hard not to be an obstinate nuisance. And when word is spread about someone's whose manner is like this, everyone hopes for someone similar to that [sort of friend] for themselves.

And similarly those who have control over their tongues,<sup>426</sup> for they do not talk nonsense nor do they abound in mentioning evil. In this way [137.5] the knot of anger loosed, that is, when [anger] is met with with tranquility and subservience. And the one who is a partner in trade and in what you do with your time [is one who is loved].<sup>427</sup>

And one who thinks a person to be virtuous or admirable, and who is friendly to him, he is loved by the one he is thinking about. Similarly the one giving respect and honor [is lovable].

And similarly someone's jealousy of you [can cause you to feel friendly towards them], so long as they do not reach the point of lying in wait to betray you. Were you not prepared for [their jealousy], you would not like their jealousy towards you. But the one who is prepared, if he is

<sup>424</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph. The focus on hospitality in the second part is especially noteworthy.

<sup>425</sup> cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>426</sup> cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>427</sup> Still cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

safe from evil befalling him, he is open to loving [the one who is jealous]. Similarly [you love someone when] you love that they love you.<sup>428</sup>

And among those who you love [as friends] [137.10] also is one who offers his resources to those near and far without flattering or affectation. And [those who are loved as friends] include one who is trusted because he is well able keep quiet about bad traits discovered in [some other] person. Therefore the shameless love the chaste/modest because they feels safe around them.

And there are three kinds of friendship: the first is companionship, and it is a state that takes root between two people on account of the length of time they spend seeing one another; the second is sociability/intimacy, and it is when meeting [the other person] brings delight at meeting, and the third is a bond or [137.15] partnership, either in kinship, as in a relationship by marriage, or in benefaction, as in the exchanging of gifts.

And as for enmity [*al-ʿadāwa*], its states [*aḥwālihā*] are known from the states [*aḥwāl*] of friendship, insofar as they are contraries. And one of the causes of enmity and hatred is anger.<sup>429</sup> But anger is only for a individual, [138] and hatred might be for a species/group, or what is like to a species, like your hatred for a thief in an unrestricted sense. And from these types it is possible that we would distinguish someone as friend, and someone else an enemy, and in this way we could place enmity and hatred for an adversary in the mind of the judge or the hearer, or love for the speaker and an inclination towards him. This is the manner in which [rhetorical] persuasion [*istidrāj*] proceeds.

[138.5] And as for fear [*al-khawf*], it is a pain [*ḥuzn*] and agitation [*ikhtilāf*] of the soul, on account of [li] imagining an expected, debilitating evil, either [an evil] that reaches [the level of] full-on corruption, or not. Now, not every evil is feared. For envy or a person's being licentious are among the sort of things that are not feared [despite their being evil]. Among evil things, that which is feared is that which will harm that one to whom it occurs with [either] corruption or pain, and it [the object of fear] must be something in the future. For fear dissipates with respect to that which has passed, or that which has occurred. And the object of fear—despite its being in the future—is expected, that is, close to happening. For that which is far off is not feared.

<sup>428</sup> Still cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>429</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

[138.10] For that reason not everyone fears death, but rather one only fears it if he is on the brink of it. So objects of fear, then, are those things which have the ability to inflict this sort of harm. [As an aside], to venture some dangerous thing is an action which either gets rid of the proximity of the harm, or intensifies its closeness.

And among the things that cause fear,<sup>430</sup> there is when one takes heed from something else, and that is when one witnesses some sort of harm, happening to someone else. And someone from whom came something feared [is thereafter a cause of fear], and one who has frequently carried out harm is also feared. [And someone will be feared] when they are so powerful they could only be defended against via prayer, [138.15] even if they have not taken any step toward doing any harm. This is especially so when they are also [known to be] unjust.

And that which suddenly comes out of nowhere causes fear, [139] unlike those things which are anticipated [beforehand], [and] they feared on account of their being surprising. The sudden thing, if it was not previously anticipated, is feared by the person who is startled.<sup>431</sup>

And the one who is a powerful opponent in the sphere of those things that cannot be shared, such as the king, he is also feared. And the high of hand are feared, especially if one is aware of some sort of [malicious] purpose/intent from them.

And among those whom one fears is the one who is better, for he is feared by the inferior. And the friends of the unjustly treated, and enemies, [139.5] and those who are quick to cause harm to you [are feared]. And those who think carefully, the sly ones, for they are more harmful than those who are quick to anger. They are those whose intentions are not known very quickly, and who do not weary of a long struggle in carrying out their enmity.<sup>432</sup>

And things which are feared include those which it is not easy to prevent, or to exchange with its opposite, and that for which there is no hero to defend against.

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<sup>430</sup> cf. 1382a in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>431</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this whole paragraph about unanticipated things causing fear.

<sup>432</sup> cf. 1382b in Greek Aristotle.

And as for the one who is disposed to fear,<sup>433</sup> he is the one in whom there is one of these states [aḥwāl], for he is expecting a looming evil, with no one to triumph over it, and no way of changing it.

And those who do not fear [139.10] are the rich, those who have mastery over many, and [those who have] powerful supporters. Therefore you see them being habitual vilifiers and hecklers, putting people down, and lording themselves over others; especially in the age of youth, and [in the] health of the body and its strength. And those who have a lot of followers and a big group of friends [have no fear].

Taking refuge in counsel is something that signifies fear.

[A rhetorician] who wants to deepen fear, or fix it in [someone else's] soul or the imagination, let him consider each thing we have said, and let him make use of it in the [proper] place.

[139.15] As for courage [*al-shajā'a*]: it is a state [*malaka*] by which a person is good at hoping for deliverance,<sup>434</sup> and seeks to ward off the occurrence of that which is hateful. In the view of the courageous person, it is as if the hateful thing does not exist, or is far off.

And every [courageous person] [140] has courage because of his belief that the causes of his deliverance are near; and because they are optimistic about being able to overcome the expected evil, and their strong awareness of their ability to unravel the difficulty with the competition.

A great amount of supporters [makes someone courageous], and their cumulative strength, [or] also freedom from injustice along with a paucity of suffering [i.e., if one hasn't gone through too much suffering to be discouraged]. If these things occur together, they make the person courageous. For insofar as one has not been wronged he is optimistic, and insofar as [140.5] one has not suffered injustice he is daring in competition. For he would not be able to undertake struggle, and that by which there is suffering of body or soul, [were he not courageous].

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<sup>433</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy that (among other things) belief-states can constitute dispositions for emotions.

<sup>434</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, courage is framed as a virtue, a disposition towards an emotion.

And whenever there is [one who has] strength, and another person has become to him a friend, and [the weaker] is free from facing harm from [the powerful], and indeed, on the contrary, [the weaker] continues to be favored by the [strong] person, either in actively or passively—actively, insofar as they might help him with money, or passively, like undergoing trials in which some benefit redounds to the [weaker]—this [weaker] person is [140.10] very courageous towards one who harms him on account of his friends, whose relation to him is as we have described.

Then the one who is supported by means of nobility in rank, or excellence in reputation, or the two of them together, [he is] daring [and] bold, on account of the fact that he scorns those [he views as] beneath him.

And the things towards which one is courageous are things that do not reach the point of causing death, and for which one expects some sort of remedy. And [as for] when there is repeated suffering for the sake of deliverance, the one experienced in fearful matters that cause suffering might venture [such repeated suffering] for the sake of his people, and sometimes might avoid them for the sake of his people. [140.15] And that which has not been experienced is something about which one can be courageous, when its end/result is not conceived of.

And the experienced person is courageous towards that which is feared, if he happens to have some sort of support that supports him sufficiently, like one who is courageous about sailing the sea, [141] having confidence in the wise captain.

And one might be courageous towards a fearful thing on account of their knowing that some other group that had been suffering from it was delivered, though the person did not wade through the experience himself.

And when a ruler [of lesser authority] is under the rule of another [who has wider domain], thinking that he is better and higher in age and standing than the other, he is courageous towards him. And likewise [even] if he sees himself as a peer to him.

And as for when the more elevated one is more virtuous and greater in the abundance of money, or [in] the strength of his brutality, [141.5] or [in] the density of his supporters and the dense throng of his country and the greatness of its numbers, or in something potent of this sort, then he

is at that point a feared, awe-inspiring person.<sup>435</sup> And when the person who is ruled is of good conduct, someone who has himself well in order in terms of that which is between him and God, he also is little concerned about the one dominating him. Similarly, if those who are considered wise, and the jurists, and the orators present good opinions about him, and give a good account about him, then [the weaker] does not worry about [the one dominating].

Among the things that give courage is the burning of anger; for [141.10] when one is heated, it emboldens the cowardly, strengthens the weak, and such a person is moved towards bravery.<sup>436</sup> And among the things that bring about this sort of anger is injustice happening to the innocent, for [the one burning with such anger] is optimistic about God's giving him victory.<sup>437</sup>

Likewise [the sort of things that make one courageous include] the trust wherein one feels safe from the [possibility of] calamity or the [need to] go on the offensive, or [trust that] the benefit [of some hardship] will outweigh the harm, or [trust that] the harm is susceptible to remedy.

### 3.3 [142] On the types of shame [*al-istiḥyā*'], and its opposite, and kindness [*al-minna*]

Let us discuss embarrassment [*al-khajal*] and disgrace [*al-iftiḍāḥ*] and their causes.

Embarrassment and shame are a pain [*ḥuzn*]<sup>438</sup> and an agitation [*ikhtilāf*] because of some evil deed by which the person becomes blameworthy, whether [142.5] its occurrence preceded, or is present, or is expected. And shamelessness is a trait [*khulq*] by which a person doesn't care about a loss of honor, and makes light of the spreading of disrepute [about themselves].

Things which cause disgrace are evil things like the following: running away from the an army, taking out your weapon in cowardice, interfering with a deposit by breaking a contract, committing injustice, mingling with of an adulterer, frequenting places of suspicion, a greedy desire for shameful things, the pursuing of lowly things (as in plundering the down and out and exhuming [142.10] the shrouds of the dead), irrational frugality despite having wealth, asking the

<sup>435</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in the first part of this paragraph.

<sup>436</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the explanation of how anger leads to courage via a physiological mechanism.

<sup>437</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the way that Avicenna brings God into the explanation in the second half of this sentence.

<sup>438</sup> Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

poor [for money], borrowing when it is unacceptable, refusing someone who asks and entreats for a favor, responding to a supplicant with a demand for debt (as in making a claim when asked for a gift), and asking for a gift when one has been paid.

And [disgraceful things] include: extolling greediness, criticizing the unsuccessful, [when] one is a flatterer who is excessive in spreading word about the virtues of a person beyond beyond what is necessary, and [when] one is a pretender by being sad for what saddens another over and above that which is hidden in [the pretender's] soul.

And [again] disgraceful things include: anxiety/regret about trivial [143] pains or a harms, [as we see in] the anxiety of the old, or the lazy, or foul mouthed people, or the weak. And [disgraceful things include] reproaching those who do well for their actions or feelings, for that is bad and [a signifier of trying to act with] excess, for these things are a sign of smallness of soul.

And likewise [disgraceful things include] falsely praising oneself boasting, and claiming the good traits which someone else displays, for that is among the signs of vainglory.

And those who are considered disgraceful include are those who follow the course of [i.e., hang out with] those [disgraceful ones], even if they don't do the [exact same] deeds. "Those who follow their course" include one who are satisfied with [disgraceful peoples'] approval [143.5], and who enter into their advice, and incline to their companionship.

And shameful things include: emotions of submissiveness that a person has in his soul and inner self, a person's being okay with being ridiculed by imitation for foul things, someone's exposing his limbs to sinful acts, and someone's enduring evil happening to him (willingly or unwillingly) on account of his keenness and greediness and his expecting something good in return for it. And a lot of endurance is cowardice [143.10], not courage, such as failing to retaliate, and suchlike. So, disgrace or shame, in general, can be conceived of as happening when honor passes away, blame descends, tongues are loosened about [the disgraced person], and there is blame in the the eyes of someone who [the disgraced person] cares about.

As for when honor is lost in the eyes of jokers and boys, that is something that one does not feel shame about. For one feels shame before those that they admire, or before those by whom one is

admired, and or before those who they prefer [143.15] to be respected or revered by. For one counts on what they get from [such people] in terms of praise praise, because [144] they prefer their praise, or they need it, or they glory in it, or [such people] are peers. Or maybe one aspires [to look good] to the peer as long as he does not strive [to impress] another [more distinguished person]. And one is embarrassed someone known as having sound judgment, known for the strength of their belief, or an older person, or an educated person.<sup>439</sup>

And dishonor seen before [another's] eyes is more severe than dishonor that was been reported, and dishonor made public is more severe than dishonor kept secret. And dishonor in front of those who are relatives [144.5] and friends is greater than dishonor before those who are far away and left behind.

And dishonor before those who do not hold the place of evaluator and educator for him [who is dishonored] is greater than dishonor before those standing in the position of the evaluator and educator. For people tend to open up to those who do not hold the place of educator/evaluator, and [people up to those] with whom one can act chummy; and people tend to shrink from one who holds the place [of educator/evaluator], and do not disclose to them the core aspects of their mind, or the hidden things of his inner self, and he hates when [the one holding the place of educator/evaluator] is aware of his mistakes, whether [the educator/evaluator] is honest or not, [144.10] whether he is right or wrong, after there is some judgment. [However] not everyone who has knowledge [i.e., not all the non-evaluators to whom one opens up] are chummy [back] towards him, for many who [seem] lovingly aware are waiting for mistakes, monitoring, and [are ones] charged with investigating the wrongdoers [even though they are not technically evaluators]. And dishonor before those sorts of people is the greatest kind of dishonor. And as for those sorts, one is not shamed before them because they themselves are the community [wherein one most feels] shame, but rather [one is ashamed of] their broadcasting that which one is ashamed of, so that it reaches those before whom one is ashamed. And they are those who mock friendships [144.15] and who are quarrelsome with acquaintances.

And one might be embarrassed before one who by whom one remains honored [despite the shameful deed], and who has not despised him with scorn, just as like how one is embarrassed

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<sup>439</sup> cf. 1384a in Greek Aristotle.



before the one who is infatuated with the person [who did the shameful thing], and before the one with whom the renewal of friendship is desired, and the continuance of friendly exchange, and before the one with whom one will eventually meet, and before old acquaintances who [145] did not exposed the person in prior [shameful] things.

And one is not merely embarrassed by a shameful deed and the corrupt profit, but also from the evidence of it and its signs, and when it is heard about.

As for one who one is not ashamed in front of, that is the sincere friend, and the riffraff one looks down on, i.e., those who act like beasts and children, and strangers who have no education. Shame [145.5] before those who know you is true shame, while before foreigners it is like mere opinion.<sup>440</sup>

And it is not necessary to reiterate that about which one feels intense shame.

And since we have spoken about proper shame and shamelessness, let us discuss being thankful for kindness, [*shukr al-minna*] and ungrateful for it [*kufrānihā*], for this is connected with [shame].

Kindness is something by which someone is called kind.<sup>441</sup> And it is something beneficial which, if one person does it to another, it necessitates that other person be thankful towards him, or compliant [to him], or even more thankful, or even more obedient of spirit.

And the types of kindness [are as follows]: either a service, [145.10] that is, any bodily, beneficial deed; or a boon, like the giving of a jewel from which one can benefit; in both of these cases, were the thing not given, the benefit [thereby acquired] would not possibly be grasped [by the beneficiary].

And this sort of service or boon is only kindness if one does not want with it anything other than the the very person to whom it is being given. And great kindness is that which meets a severe need, or [comes] at a time in which the aid is difficult to replicate, [145.15] or when the giver is singled out by his giving it, [i.e.] no one else took action, or [the giver] is the first one who

<sup>440</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this last line, which is interesting in that it suggests that are more or less justified versions of emotions.

<sup>441</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, kindness is discussed neither as a virtue nor an emotion, but an action.

bestowed [a kindness], [and] then he spurred others to action, so that [the initial giver] is [considered] even more giving.

And need, it is either constituted by an object of desire which one longs to obtain, or an object of desire whose loss one is sad about, like a lover. Especially what is longed for in misery [is felt to be a need], either because it [would] dispel misery, or because the desire is for the thing in such a way that the depression and sadness of the misery do not diminish the desire.

And the impact [146] of kindness among poor recipients, and among those driven to poverty, is greater. And similarly [the impact is greater] among the afflicted, and the forgotten, and those hiding from enemies and adversaries, and those who are in similar positions, and among those who are in a worse state. And the most kind person is one who does not seek acknowledgement through giving, nor do they intend in their concealing the good deed [that the recipient] spread [it], for the hidden good deed is [in fact their] reward, just as broadcasting it is loathsome to them.

And these things [146.5] are what can be used in rhetorical arguments to emphasize kindness.

And that which one can put forth in order to argue that someone is not actually kind, and to diminish their status as kind, is to say: you intended by your good deed merely a display from which you benefited, and or you didn't see the act of kindness through to completion, or you failed in some duty incumbent upon you in something similar,<sup>442</sup> or since you did not meet the superior need, or you compelled acceptance [of the kindness] in view of an acquisition [of something else], or you did not do the thing intentionally, but rather by coincidence or necessity, or on account of a desire for repayment, or without knowing [146.10] or without will. For all of that is the sort of thing that together weakens [the sense in which someone is] kind. And if [some deed] were on account of necessity, kindness is thereby lessened. And [a good deed] could be voluntary [but also] by necessity, as when the will is compelled, and that is like when someone seeks recourse [from some harm] by choosing to do some kindness. And a kind deed could be without any will, and that is when someone is compelled, and has their money taken from them,

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<sup>442</sup> cf. 1385b in Greek Aristotle.

and the other person squanders it, and likewise that can happen with knowledge [of what is being done], or without knowledge.<sup>443</sup>

[146.15] And these characterizations of types are beneficial for mounting a legal complaint or defense. And the things known to indicate that there is in fact good will of kindness,<sup>444</sup> or [known to] strengthen [the fact that it is a kindness], is when the coming forth of [the kindness/benefit] is on account of will and love, and that there is no slighting in it, and nothing similar has been given to the enemies of the one being benefited. For if two enemies share in a kindness [147], it indicates that necessity caused that kindness. And similarly if the [supposedly] kind person does a similar [kindness] to his own enemy [this would have been on account of necessity]. And likewise [it will appear to be by necessity] if he did not give to someone a similarly or more deserving; for [when it is not given to someone more deserving] that suggests that the kindness did not come forth on account of generosity. For were one's charity a charity intended for the sake of kindness and as a sacrifice [pleasing to God], then [the giver] would not take their enemy into consideration, nor would [the giver] fail in to be kind towards someone similarly deserving.

And likewise if the kindness is tarnished with evil, [147.5] that diminishes it. For in that case the kindness does not seek to meet some corresponding need. That is because, for something to be considered kindness, there must be something that can be considered a need [to be met], and evil is not considered to be a need to be met.

### 3.4 On having concern [*al-ih̄timām*] and pity [*al-shafaqa*] for others, and on envy, revenge, [147.10] jealousy, zeal and scorn

Let us mention concern for others, which is close in meaning to pity, or heartfelt concern involving care, and [let us mention] the one who is cared about.

Pity is a pain<sup>445</sup> [*adhā*] that strikes a person on account of [*li*] something [148] corrupting or saddening that happened to another person without the other person deserving it, and without it being expected. The person feeling concern is the one who has this pain on account of what happened to the other person, or some fallout of that occurrence.

<sup>443</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the discussion of will, compulsion and intention in this paragraph.

<sup>444</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for these indicators of kindness.

<sup>445</sup> Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

As for those who are passing away [i.e., dying], one does not have concern/pity for what happens to them, because it is not reasonable to say that what happens to them is unexpected.

Likewise those who are very lucky, one does not have concern/pity for them, because one does not associate anything bad with them, [nor does one expect them to] encounter of evil.

And those who do not have concern/pity, or who do not care [about things], they are those who are accustomed to enduring evils on account of age, [148.5] or on account of a plethora of experience. And those abiding in good fortune, and whose souls are good, they do not feel distress in any situation.

And [others who do not feel pity include]: those famous for [their] ascension to office and advancement; the well-mannered who are of good repute; those upon whose beloved ancestors befell evils; those moved by courage, like the angry and the hard-hearted. And those who despise and those who revile do not [148.10] have concern/pity, nor fo their counterparts, namely, fearful slaves and miserable, downtrodden folks, for they have concerns that divert them from caring for/pitying others. On the other hand, the moderate person between [very high and very low states] is the one who feels concern/pity.

And one is not concerned for the unknown [and] despised, for they [merely exist] in the mass of the unknown. And the powerful ones/tyrants do not care about individuals, because they do not consider one to be different from any other.

As for the reasons why one has concern/pity, one may infer them from the definition of concern/pity. And these [148.15] causes of pity include someone's perishing from torture, and starvation, and strenuous effort, and old age, and illness, and destitution, and bad luck, and lack of supporters, and especially when evil strikes someone expecting good instead of that evil,<sup>446</sup> [149] and when the evil [being experienced] is completely unmixed with any good, or if the time wherein there was some good mixed in [with the evil] has passed away.

And one has concern for those who are acquaintances, partners, and fellow-workers.

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<sup>446</sup> Expectation, and thwarted expectation, is a key part of the cognition behind some of these emotions, which shows how they are tied up with belief.

And as for someone who is of one's very self, such as a child, it is not said that the person "has concern" for a pain that afflicts them, just as it is not said that one "has concern" for what happens to oneself. For it is not said that a person pities oneself,<sup>447</sup> or is preoccupied with himself, but rather great fear [is what one has for one's self], not "care" or "pity." It is on account of this that there is the story of the one whose eye did not shed a tear [149.5] at his son being on the brink of destruction, whereas when he saw a friend shamed by poverty, he cried for him. The intensity [of the fear] rids the mind of pity, and causes one to forget about care for the other.<sup>448</sup>

And among the ones that one has concern for [there are those] who are like [oneself] in age, including peers, and those who are like oneself in terms of character traits, and interests and ranks, and in the choosing of the good.

And every sort of thing that might occur that is feared by a person, if it befalls his brothers, it is a cause for concern.

Therefore one does not have concern for those living in opulence or old age.

And among those whom one has concern for are those who are unjustly treated, and those who are tormented, those who are sorely tried [149.10] and tested, even when one does not directly witness what afflicts them [inwardly] nor fully ascertain their [inward] trial. For the [outer] appearance represents the [inner state], and seeing the [external] appearance is like seeing the [inner] state.

Also, signs of the harms can cause concern/pity, if they indicate the occurrence of harm, even if it has not happened yet. For this reason a trial/tribulation that it not deserved can cause concern. And it seems like this pain [that we call pity] is the analog or counterpart in some way to the sort of pain [*huzn*] that [149.15] strikes [a person] on account of [someone else's] undeserved success, and this is what is called in this book indignation [*jaza* ʔ], even though [150] it is not a true contrary. For the source of each one [pity and indignation] is an honorable disposition

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<sup>447</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the way that pity is distinguished from fear in that you cannot have the pity towards yourself, while you can have fear towards yourself.

<sup>448</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

[*khulq karīm*].<sup>449</sup> And the general idea that captures both of them [is that] something of good or evil comes in each case to one to one not deserving it.

And the occurrence of what one does not deserve causes sadness [*yaghamm*]<sup>450</sup> justifiably. However if, if there is no known cause for the [thing that befalls], but rather it happens along the lines of of providence and divine decree, then the sadness [*huzn*] towards it is less intense. For someone might reasonably say, [150.5] “that sudden good that came to him would not be decreed for him unless he deserved it, and the sudden evil which is decreed for him likewise would only occur if he were deserving.” The sadness [*huzn*] thereby diminishes, even if [the evil] does not go away quickly or completely. However, [this way of thinking is dubious because] decree and fate are not limited only to what is deserving, although they are imagined as such, but it is well known that the matter of decree and fate is a murky matter entrusted to God.<sup>451</sup>

And it is stated in the primary teaching:<sup>452</sup> “as for those who arrive at that without inevitability or providence.” [150.10] It seems that the expression “without” is extraneous, owing to negligence on the part of the translators or others, or that its meaning is “without inevitability from the ones acquiring [it], and without a determination on their part,” so it is as if it said: “without expectation and determination on the part of people.”

And that which is opposite of concern [i.e., pity] and indignation, which have been mentioned, is envy [*al-ḥasad*]. For concern is a pain [*adhā*]<sup>453</sup> that strikes a person on account of an evil that befalls [some other] person, and [the pain] strikes because the [other] person is undeserving [of the pain], and is focused on [150.15] that person. Envy is a pain [*adhā*]<sup>454</sup> that strikes one on account of a good befalling someone who deserves it, and on account of the fact that it befell him. And as for indignation which has been mentioned, it is like a mean between the two, [though] indignation is closer to concern/pity, and since it is closer to concern it is like a contrary to jealousy.<sup>455</sup>

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<sup>449</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions are true contraries if they stem from opposite dispositions.

<sup>450</sup> Unclear why Avicenna switches to a more generic verb for sadness here.

<sup>451</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the discussion of providence and decree in this paragraph.

<sup>452</sup> Reference unclear. Not obviously a reference to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

<sup>453</sup> Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

<sup>454</sup> Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

<sup>455</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the technical language of “means” and “contraries” in this context.

And it is not necessary [151] to get into a [further] discussion also about contraries, seeking to elucidate those truths, not [just] opinions. For what has been said about this already is sufficient for this section.

Envy is only envy, when the sadness [*ghamm*] about something is because of a good that befell another. And if the sadness [*ghamm*] is not because [of someone else having a good], but rather you are sad that you yourself lack a similar [good], this is not jealousy. [Rather] this is something very close to being necessary [151.5], [for different] dispositions cannot escape feeling it. For each person is sad [*yaghtamm*] for the gifts and blessings that pass him by which are wont to exist for another.

Similarly, [it is not envy] if the sadness is because of a fear that strikes a person on account of the success of an enemy. For one understands that that success makes the enemy even more powerful, and gives the enemy more ability to perpetrate acts of hostility.

And along these lines, there is a joy<sup>456</sup> that arises when evil happens to those who deserve it, like to those who kill people and obliterate monuments and live in some land attempting to corrupt it. And another type of joy is at the failure [151.10] of one who deserves [it] and evil [happening] to one who does well; and these two are contraries: one comes from a virtuous state, the other from vice.

And here are two kinds of sadness [*huzn*]: a sadness which occurs on account of the good state of one who deserves it, with respect to the goodness of the state, and this is called envy. And there is a sadness that occurs on account of the good state of one who does not deserve it, because he does not deserve it, and this is vengeance or wrath. And these two are contraries. One of the stems from vice, the other from virtue.

And these [emotions] different compositions [*tarkībāt*] of sadness [*huzn*] and joy [*farah*], and good and bad, and merit and non-merit.<sup>457</sup>

[151.15] And the envious person [can be] envious toward any good thing, even charity and beauty and suchlike. As for the wrathful [*nāqim*] one, he cannot be envious about virtues,

<sup>456</sup> cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>457</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text that emotions are compositions of these different sort of psychological ingredients.

because there is no meaning to the idea of “one’s awareness of the existence of undeserved virtue.” [152] For it is not as though the non-virtuous person is simply gifted virtue<sup>458</sup> [undeservedly]. Rather, wrath can be directed towards external goods [received without deserving]. For the non-virtuous person does not deserve [external goods], and yet is granted them, while only the best sort of people truly do deserve them.

Likewise vengefulness is not directed at good things occurring by nature such as loveliness or beauty, nor about inherited goods that are not acquired recently, for these things are seen as a fixed right. And similarly when the one does acquire something recently, [152.5] [but] he is an authority or [the authority’s] follower. For even though [such a] one might not deserve such good things on account of [his] virtue, it is as though they were merited to him from of old, and it seems this way on account of power and status. And some [people who recently acquire undeserved things] do not inspire vengeful feelings because they are the sort of people who possess things from of old, although this particular thing is acquired recently, and some of them because [they possess something] that is not acquired recently, but rather belongs to the person as by right.

And the amount of merit in every person is not the same,<sup>459</sup> and each person is not deserving of every good, but rather each person is suited to a particular good, and he is wrathful if it flits away. For an ascetic is not deserving [152.10]—according to common opinion—of loveliness or goodness in terms of the ornaments of clothing or armament. Likewise, overdoing it in one’s furnishings and the like is not fitting to the one who is newly rich. For the newly rich, it is appropriate to him to seem still like the poor until he is accustomed to his wealth.

Likewise those who are base do not deserve victory over the highborn, especially if they are both involved in the same mode of life.<sup>460</sup> For this reason there are examples of these states which are reckoned among the effects of divine decree, and [there are also examples] that are not [reckoned] among the effects of divine decree. And were that not the case [i.e., that divine decree

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<sup>458</sup> i.e., it would be unjust were the non-virtuous person simply gifted virtue, but since that could never occur, there is not way for someone to feel wrathful on account of undeserved virtue. Wrath is directed at that which is undeserved, but true virtue cannot be undeserved.

<sup>459</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this whole discussion of merit.

<sup>460</sup> i.e., it is excusable if for some reason someone in another field outdoes you in your own field in an unexpected, unlikely happening, but it is more shameful if your inferior in your field does so.



acts in various ways] the impotent would not rule over [152.15] the powerful, and the rich would not despise the poor. And the issues discussed in this section related [153] to divine decree are two:<sup>461</sup> one of them is when one who does not deserve victory obtains victory over a great danger, and the second is when a deserving, virtuous person fails in the thing he deserves.<sup>462</sup>

And the wrath of the wrathful one intensifies towards examples of both cases if he himself is a lover of honor. For the lover of honor is more attentive to merit, or lack thereof.

For this reason the one content with vileness, and relying on deception, on which he bases his life, [153.5] who does not pay attention to blame, he is not [properly called] “wrathful,” because such people do not pay attention to what someone deserves. Rather, the objects of their jealousy are those on whom befall some good, and it is due to that that [those content with vileness] are in [the same] category as the people who are jealous.

As for someone who is of an altogether different sort of status, they are not [able to be] an object of jealousy; and likewise with those who are different in terms of property, or age, or profession, or rank, or wealth. If the distinction between statuses is very great, envy abates. For it is when they are not equal, but are comparable, that there will be envy.

[153.10] And the jealous person is the one who fails in a goal, even though he got close to it.

Therefore jealousy proliferates among those who are competent.<sup>463</sup> For one who has knowledge is more jealous towards a fellow knower than will be one who has no knowledge.<sup>464</sup> And one who does great things is more jealous toward the one who surpasses him will be one who does not even try. For in such cases [noticing] likeness or comparison is inescapable. And the most jealous one is the lover of respect, and, in short, the one who loves honor, on account of what we have said, and likewise those who dress up with finery and riches. For dressing up is a feature of those who put on airs about their respectability.

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<sup>461</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this talk about divine decree and its relation to our emotions.

<sup>462</sup> Avicenna’s point seems to be that we can see that divine decree acts in unusual ways, and this impacts our emotions.

<sup>463</sup> cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>464</sup> Avicenna develops this idea that competent people more easily experience jealousy more thoroughly than what we see in Aristotle’s text.

And likewise for everything [153.15] deemed good [there will be] an observer who is jealous, especially if the good thing is among those things that the jealous person seeks.

And you can tell from this what the objects of envy are; there is no need to repeat mention of it, on account of what has been said.

[154] As for those whom people do not envy, they include: those who are dying an early death, those who are perishing in a miserable way, those who are in a far away place from whom one is cut off from, like those living at the Pillars of Heracles (for no one from these [i.e., Eastern] countries envies them). And the severely punished [are not envied], nor the insignificant, nor those with whom there is no comparison. But rather one envies someone who it is appropriate to consider a rival,<sup>465</sup> and about whom it could be said that they have some shared love or [154.5] desire.

And the envied good is something which the jealous person expects, or that he had at one time. For this reason the older of two youths envies the younger of them if [the younger] prospers, since [the old thinks] he was entitled to that prosperity. Likewise one who squandered something envies the one who does things properly, and the one who only obtains the good with effort envies the one for whom obtaining the good was easy. And in general [there will be envy] if one sees himself worthy of something which has come sooner to someone else. However when [people] are in different stations, then there is not jealousy.

[154.10] So with these characterizations, the rhetorician is able to arouse vengeance, jealousy, sadness, concern/pity, entertainment, and suchlike.

And there is something related to vengeance, and that is zeal [*hamīya*]. [Zeal] is also from the set of good [emotions]. And zeal is a pain [*idhā*]<sup>466</sup> that strikes [a person] when someone loses goods that they deserve, while others attain them, and there is in an attainment of the others an indication of the possibility of attaining it. For the possibility of attaining it is in the manner of deserving.<sup>467</sup>

<sup>465</sup> cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>466</sup> Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

<sup>467</sup> i.e., someone feels like they deserve something if it is possible for them to deserve it.

[154.15] This kind of zeal only strikes one who loves the good, and is grieved at its passing, and sees that [the good] is something honored, [155] and [zeal] does not occur except to the great of soul, and to those who are concerned with higher matters.

The most zealous are those whose predecessors, or companions, or peers, had an easy time with such a good, especially when the good is among those things which is respected, and by which honor is obtained—like money or beauty (though not like health, for health does not always expose a person to honor). One is zealous<sup>468</sup> of things like courage, and wisdom, [155.5] and leadership; for these are things which make possible the virtues, like generosity and the acquisition of various praiseworthy things.

So zeal<sup>469</sup> then only is directed towards those who have these virtues and similar things, and towards all whose friendship is desired on account of virtue, and towards the ones impressed by [the virtuous], and towards the one praising [the virtuous].<sup>470</sup>

And the ones who are scorned [by a zealous person] are those who are not as good as the ones they are zealous towards, and who are opposed to [the ones they are zealous towards] and who fight against them. For scorn is opposed to zeal.

So zeal [*ḥamīya*] comes from zeal [*ghayra*] [towards the one to-be-emulated],<sup>471</sup> and scorn comes from a lack of zeal [towards the underwhelming person]. And if scorn is opposed [155.10] to zeal [*ḥamīya*], then the contrary movement stirs it up and [the contrary] pain increases it. [For example,] the one scorning the possessor of zeal stirs up zeal in the [possessor of zeal] on account of [the other's] scorning the zealous one.

As for the one whom zeal strikes, he is the one who lacks the good that he is zealous towards. As for the one who is scorned<sup>472</sup> and whom one does not feel zealous towards, he is the one to whom good luck gives something without deserving it, and without its coming about on account of

<sup>468</sup> *yaghāru*: Avicenna appears to use this verb interchangeably with *ḥamīya* and its derivatives in this section.

<sup>469</sup> *ghayrah*: Avicenna appears to use this noun interchangeably with *ḥamīya* and its derivatives in this section.

<sup>470</sup> cf. 1388b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>471</sup> *ḥamīya* and *ghayrah* seem to have been used interchangeably in the preceding paragraphs, so it is unclear what the difference here is supposed to be.

<sup>472</sup> cf. 1388b in Greek Aristotle.

firmness [of character] and stern effort. Such a person is scorned, and one can trust in the imminent collapse of the foundation of his affair.

### 3.5 [156] On the roots of the differences of people with respect to character traits

It is appropriate now to discuss the states that incline [*al-ahwāl al-muḥarrika*], by way of [discussing] each disposition [*khulq khulq*] with respect to occurrences [*al-‘arād*] [of the just discussed emotions] and concerns, according to ages, according to classes [*ḥudūd*], and according to souls.

As for occurrences [of emotion], [156.5] these are like anger and desire. As for concerns, this is like the preference of a soul for one kind among many things, such as ruling, or politics, or asceticism; and religions and the practical arts enter into this [concept]. As for ages there is adolescence, youth, and the graybeard. As for classes there is the noble, the easygoing, and the long-suffering. As for the types of souls there is the Arabic and the foreign, and the great and the small.

Let us begin with ages. The movement of concupiscible appetite is more prevalent among the young [*al-ghilmān*], and it is stronger among them. Their appetite is limited to matters encompassing the body, and related to beauty, such as women and clothes and perfume. And they are quick to transform and change, [for] boredom has power over them, and they desire immoderately and [then] they grow bored quickly, on account of the keenness of their passions and [their passions’] restlessness and their lack of firm beliefs. [157] And their beliefs are like a deceptive thirst that is satisfied by a cold wind.

And anger comes upon [the young] quickly, and it is strong in them, especially on account of their love for honor [*al-karāma*],<sup>473</sup> such that they do not bear injury well. And their love for honor is immoderate in them, and their love for dominance inclines them towards renown and status. And their love for [dominance] is stronger than their love for money. Indeed their desire

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<sup>473</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this explicit mention of something like the object for anger. This is probably due to Avicenna’s generally more specific discussion of the irascible faculty in general.

for money is fairly moderate, for they have not [yet] suffered from need, nor have they [had to] endure [157.5] poverty.

And their natures are prone to believing quickly whatever falls at their feet on account of their optimism [*husn al-zann*], and their lack of suspicion, and their abundance of hope. And all of that follows on account of their hot temperament,<sup>474</sup> which resembles the intoxicated, [and their temperament] strengthens the soul very much.<sup>475</sup>

Therefore they do not go far astray, and they are not beaten down, and they seek the best in life on account of hope. For the future is in their power, while the past is in the power of the old. For since there is not much of the past belonging to them, their experience is small, and on account of their optimism, tricking them is easy.

[157.10] The bold [*shuj'ān*] are like this, too. Therefore both of these types [the young and the bold] have quickness towards anger in common. So they are optimistic, and quick to anger. Optimism does away with anxiety. And intense anger emboldens natural disposition, so that a lack of fear follows;<sup>476</sup> [so this happens] not only on account of optimism, but also because of strength of heart. So fear and anger do not coexist. And it seems that optimism is a part of [what causes] courage.

And shame is pervasive among the young, for they have not yet plunged into shameful obscenities, and they remain according to nature.<sup>477</sup> And they are hard on [157.15] themselves due to their lack of experience and knowledge.

And their magnanimity is a consequence of their optimism. They do not think that they will be deprived, since they have not yet experienced harms. Therefore their concerns are turned [158] towards great things, and beliefs abound in their souls.

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<sup>474</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions partially depend on physiological dispositions.

<sup>475</sup> cf. 1389a in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>476</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

<sup>477</sup> i.e., they are not hardened against shame.

And their desire towards the beneficial [*al-nāfi*] thing that they know is stronger than their desire toward the good [*al-jamīl*] with which they are not yet acquainted.<sup>478</sup> And indeed their thought and the ideas in their souls and held fixedly on the most beneficial thing. For in the category of “good,” they only know the beneficial that is before them on account of their age, that is, pleasure and what goes along with it, and [their] thought [is] based upon nature [*fiṭrah*]. And this thought [158.5] is attracted to the beneficial, which is [beneficial] in relation to the thinker and present to him. As for that which pulls towards the noble good, it is virtue, and not nature.<sup>479</sup>

It is in this way that this type of character needs to be understood.

As for youth [*al-ahdāth*],<sup>480</sup> [again], they have a strong love for their family and brothers and relatives, because they are spirited, and they love gaiety. And gaiety only occurs when there is health and friendship together.

And their goal in what they choose is not true benefit, but rather benefit leading to pleasure. [158.10] Therefore they make friendships for pleasure, not for a benefit in intellectual interests.<sup>481</sup> So they love friends, in order that they might make merry with them.

And in seeking to reach some benefit—and in everything for that matter—they make more mistakes than the old, because they are excessive and they are not moderate. For excess causes error.<sup>482</sup> And due to the severity of their immoderation, they think of themselves as comprehending all things..

And due to their natures they will commit injustice in public, even though they are given shameful disgrace in return [for such acts], because they tend by nature towards bad actions, on account of their being by nature [158.15] very angry, and low on fear.

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<sup>478</sup> cf. 1389a-b in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>479</sup> This is one of the clearest statements in Avicenna that pleasure/benefit is that towards which nature tends, whereas the good is only pursued by virtue.

<sup>480</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this secondary discussion of the young.

<sup>481</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the use of the term “benefit” as a genus that includes pleasurable benefit and intellectual benefit [true benefit].

<sup>482</sup> No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the discussion of how excess causes error, and the preference for moderation. Seems that Avicenna may be channeling the spirit of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he otherwise does not write about.

Nevertheless pity abounds in them, on account of their believing the one known to be wronged to be good. And they are hostile to evil deception, on account of their own lack of sins and deceptive tendencies.

And they are lovers of jest and joking, on account of [their] love of joy and gaiety, and on account of the weakness of their deliberative faculty. The care [of their deliberative faculty], if it were strong, [would rather] fall upon serious matters.

[159] As for the old, most of their dispositions [*akhlāq*] are opposite of [the young]. Their dispositions are passionless and grumpy, and they do not give into any [trickery] on account of all that they have experienced, and all that has happened to them in terms of deception and error, and all the evils they have fallen into, and [even] those they have intended [to commit]—thus they are on high alert for such things.

It is on account of their dispositions that they don't ever speak about anything with decisive speech. And if they judge, they judge [159.5] on the basis of what they have experienced. Everything in their view is [judged] according to a prior judgement, or they don't make any judgment about it. And it is as if, owing to the abundance of their experience, they never try anything [new], because they are skeptical about anything that has no precedent in their eyes, and in that which they are like the unlearned. And they are little concerned about praise and blame. And when they talk about something in the future, they speak about it with misgivings, attaching the expressions, "possibly," and "perhaps."

And their dispositions are bad,<sup>483</sup> on account of their pessimism [*sū' zunnihim*]. And it is not typical of them to go very far in the way of good will or hatred, except [159.10] about things in which there is compulsion. And you can observe them in their love to be like those who hate, and in their hate to be like those who love.

And they are not magnanimous] and they belittle [others]. They don't act in the manner of those who are resolute and determined, [but they act] as though they have already despaired.

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<sup>483</sup> cf. 1389b in Greek Aristotle.

Therefore their appetite for things is weak, except for what is connected with their livelihood, for they are intent on that, fearing the perception of death. And on account of that [fear] their souls do not rise up to generosity and chivalry, because they are stingy with respect to worldly goods. And experience has made them conscious of the difficulty of acquiring [goods], and the bad that comes from losing them or having them [159.15] destroyed.

And cowardice rules over them. And they are good at cautioning about what could happen, on account of all the experiences they have benefited from. And they are opposite of youth in terms of how they are motivated [*fī-al-ma ʿānī al-muḥarrīka*], indeed they incline towards rest on account of the coldness of their temperament.<sup>484</sup> Therefore they are cowardly and fearful.

And because of cowardice and fear their greed is stronger. And also [they are greedy] because they cling excessively to their love of life, realizing that it is close to vanishing.

And their desire has ceased [160] for women and spectacles, on account of the fact that they no longer need them. And [this occurs] despite the fact that they do indeed [continue to] desire [other things], especially food.

And they incline towards justice, and they love just imams, and this is on account of their cowardice and weakness. For the inclination towards justice is on account of love of peace. And love of peace is either on account of excellence, or smallness of soul. For virtue encourages it, and smallness [160.5] of soul also brings about [love of peace]<sup>485</sup>. When someone is impelled toward [love of peace], if it isn't virtue impelling him, then it must be smallness of soul.

[The old] prefer the beneficial good, and they do not prefer the <sup>486</sup>noble good, because of their love of themselves. For love of self inclines one towards the beneficial, rather than the noble. For the beneficial has to do with the person himself, while the noble has to do with others. And they are shameless, not being embarrassed, for they do not have any inclination towards the noble, rather their disposition focuses on the beneficial. Therefore they little esteem the noble.

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<sup>484</sup> Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions partially depend on physiological dispositions.

<sup>485</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph.

<sup>486</sup> Although Aristotle does discuss the *kalon* in comparison with other types of goods elsewhere in the *Rhetoric* (e.g., 1.3, 1.9), there is no parallel in Aristotle's text for the distinction between the beneficial and the noble good at this juncture.



[160.10] And on account of their dispositions [they have] a paucity of hope, since they have found failure in the world more often than success. And [what we call] experience is that which happens most often, and their beliefs accord with experience<sup>487</sup>.

And rather than taking pleasure in hoping, they take pleasure in remembering. And on account of the paucity of their hope, their cowardice grows.

And their anger is sharp [*hadīd*] [yet] weak.<sup>488</sup> The sharpness is due to quickness of feeling, as if they are sick, and as for the weakness [of the anger], it is due to the weakness of their natural disposition.<sup>489</sup>

Their appetitive power is dwindling, or abating, and their appetite is towards the beneficial, not the [160.15] pleasurable, therefore they are thought to be self-controlled. Yet they are self-controlled by necessity, not one account of virtue. And their desire for seeking the virtuous and the beneficial is in decline, on account of the fact that their time of life is waning.

And they associate [161] with people who are adherents to what they prefer, on account of their [having] settled dispositions for the sake of which they do what they do.<sup>490</sup> They do not [associate with people] insofar as [the others] are adherents to thoughts that are in accord with what is beneficial.<sup>491</sup>

Their wont is to feign the dispositions of the pure of heart, even though what they do is for certain ends and contrivances. For when they feign as pure of heart, they seek some benefit, but they do not acknowledge it. They are dead set on acquiring benefits, [161.5] but by means of skill and deceit and cunning, not by means of things done out in the open, which one might be embarrassed by. [In this they are] contrary to the tendency of the young.

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<sup>487</sup> Noteworthy that some dispositions are beliefs, or habits of mind, caused by repeated experiences.

<sup>488</sup> cf. 1390a in Greek Aristotle.

<sup>489</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this explication of why their anger is sharp yet weak. Aristotle asserts the same thing, but does not explain.

<sup>490</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text at this juncture for the specific notion that dispositions [*akhlāq*] settle as you get older.

<sup>491</sup> i.e., even though old people only seek the beneficial, they do not seek to associate with people who might push them towards new types of benefits. Rather, in their relations they just look for people like themselves.

And they may have compassion [but for reasons] contrary to [the reasons behind] the compassion of the young. For the young are compassionate on account of their love for people, or the fact that they believe [the other's] complaints. [The old] are compassionate on account of their own weakness, and on account of the fact that they imagine the evil complained about or witnessed as if it were happening to them.

Along with all that they are patient in the face of harms, not worried. And they are not jokers, for [161.10] joking is incompatible with seriousness, and different than patience.

As for those in the prime of life, they are those who have reached their strongest, and have not passed over [it]. Their dispositions are a mean between the two previously mentioned dispositions: between destructive courage and cowardice, and between believing everything and considering everything to be false.

Rather, they are courageous insofar as it is appropriate, and they believe things insofar as it is appropriate. And their concerns are a mixture of [being concerned with] the beneficial and the noble, and of seriousness and jesting. For they are [161.15] self-controlled as well as courageous. As for the young, they have courage along with voraciousness. Likewise, the old have cowardice along with continence.

The beginning of these years is from thirty to thirty five, and their completion is at fifty.<sup>492</sup>

[162] As for those people of noble descent who possess a [good] lineage, they greatly desire honor, striving to resemble their ancestors. And it is thought [by them] that everyone who is older is more illustrious and greater, and therefore they desire rank and honor. Therefore they tend towards pride and presumptuousness and self-control.

Nevertheless, their honor compels them towards justice, and that is the case at least as long as honor still remains in them, and the passage of time has not dispelled [162.5] the habits they have inherited from their predecessors. Eventually [their inherited habits] break down with the passage of time, on account of their lack of humility for [submitting to] education, their lack of humility for [submitting] to education, and their being too proud to pursue such trifling matters

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<sup>492</sup> Aristotle distinguishes between the prime of the body and the prime of the mind. Avicenna does not.

as a profession or a craft or any lowly means of making a livelihood. And when time encroaches upon them, [their inherited habits] continue breaking down, and skills and competencies fall away from them, and they go on to be helpless and lazy.

As for the dispositions of the rich: [they are characterized by] domineering, scorning people, engaging audaciously in [162.10] insults, and puffed-up thoughts about themselves, as if they are victorious in all good things, and they never take note of [those in] slavery or servitude. For they are luxuriously equipped with the good life, swaggering about in a good state. And they love praise and purchase encomia, owing to the amount of both [praise and encomia] that they are accustomed to. And their wont is to be suspect envy of everyone, as if everyone were envious of them for their lot.

Therefore some attribute to them the virtues of wisdom, since [the wise] need the wealthy, suffering poverty, such that [they consider the rich] to be wise, aware of all things,<sup>493</sup> [162.15] not thinking badly about people, not doing badly through domineering judgement. [But this is backwards, because] the bad deeds of the wealthy increases in them weakness of judgement, for they belittle the need for it.

And the qualities [of the rich] resemble the qualities of women.

However, the one who has a history of wealth is more high minded than one who has newly acquired it, who may have suffered ignominy prior to his wealth, and in whom smallness of soul may have become deeply rooted.

[163] And the wealthy resemble the young in [their] committing manifest acts of injustice without a care, as if money protects them from blemish.

And in [the rich] there are strong dispositions that incline [them] towards power, such as [a disposition] which is more base, uses the benefits of power to gain more acquisitions, and [a disposition] which is more noble, such as love of seeking excellence. For he who is [163.5] concerned with higher things uses his power for excellence. And these are the ones who love

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<sup>493</sup> cf. 1391a in Greek Aristotle. Avicenna's text is difficult to make sense of here, but it seems meant to convey spirit of Aristotle's original discussion. That is, some think the rich are better than the wise because the wise beg from the rich.

honor. And their dispositions are manly, and they are better equipped in terms of thought, and they are more capable than those inclining towards the acquisition of goods, because the activities of power are, for example, dominance, honor and augustness.

As for acquisitiveness and seeking an abundance of provision, this is due to weakness. For whenever the soul is stronger, it is more inclined towards living well and pride. Such ones acquire, by the power of their soul, excellence of mind, and they have too much self-respect to pridefully pretend [to a station they do not have], [163.10] and therefore they see no need for haughtiness—on account of their [strength of] soul—for they are moderate, [and they are] of good character in society. They do not strive for vile injustice, rather, if they do injustice, they do it on a great scale.

As for the ones made recently wealthy, their dispositions are as follows: comfort-seeking, pleasure-enjoying, presumptuous, [and] having little concern [for others], owing to a great amount of self-sufficiency. And they are serious lovers of God, trusting in him, trusting in providence, because they are used to benefiting from luck, without hard work.<sup>494</sup>

[163.15] And the states contrary to these [of the poor] can be known from the states of those [just mentioned].

Since the benefit [sought] in persuasive speech is the attainment of persuasion,<sup>495</sup> and since [proper] persuasion will not occur [164] except when no response is possible, and when a speech is true, and since it is difficult to silence an individual, and his acknowledgement of [the speaker's point of view] is unlikely, especially in persuasive matters, [for all these reasons] it is important—in order to have sound governance over rhetorical discussions—that a judge is appointed who can reprove the one committing [some act] from his committing it, and [reprove] the one treating someone harshly, along with [the judge] having total self-control over his speech, not being hindered or proceeding on to idle prattle. And it is necessary that [164.5] [the judge] restrain the audience from participating with [the judge] in deciding when the [the

<sup>494</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this somewhat scathing remark that the apparent noble religiosity of the wealthy is just due to their being lucky. In other words, in poorer circumstances, they would likely not be so virtuous, which suggests that their virtue is superficial.

<sup>495</sup> cf. 1391b in Greek Aristotle.

speaker] is prattling. And the testimony of the listeners [should be brought] from the outset so that [one] does not bring a particular slant [later on].<sup>496</sup>

So it is necessary that there is there a speaker, and a judge, and an audience. And if that is the case, then it is necessary that the rhetorician knows about these distinct characterizations of emotions [*infi' ālāt*] and dispositions.

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<sup>496</sup> No parallel in Aristotle's text for this for this way of describing what conditions are needed for persuasion.

## Appendix 2 Emotions in Avicenna's *Categories*

Avicenna's *Healing: Categories* [*al-Maqūlāt*] addresses the same issues as Aristotle's *Categories*, with a key difference between the two texts being Avicenna's extra attention to the category of quality [*kayfiyya*]. A full two books of Avicenna's seven-book *Categories* are dedicated to quality, taking up about a quarter of the total page count. Another difference is that Avicenna takes more care to clearly define the boundaries between each of the four species of quality. *Healing: Categories* is relevant to our purposes here because Avicenna uses emotions as an illustration of conditions [*aḥwāl*], which are one of the two sub-types of the first species of quality. The four species of quality will be discussed shortly, but here is the quote that places emotions squarely in this conceptual territory:

As for "condition," that which is named by this type [of quality] is that which easily passes away [...] As for health and sickness, if they come and go quickly, they are of this type. And other types of conditions include: anger [*al-ḥarad*], shyness [*al-khajal*], sadness [*al-ghamm*], pity [*al-hamm*], opinion, and belief that is not fixed.<sup>497</sup>

As can be seen, emotions are not the only things that can be conditions, so what we learn about conditions is meant to apply to more phenomena than just emotions. Nevertheless, the discussions of emotions as states in *Categories* gives us some further insight into the sort of things emotions are, and puts them in the context of other mental phenomena. That is, it is explicitly said that emotions are passing and transitory, as distinct from things like virtues and faculties.

Fundamentally, the category "quality" (of which "conditions" are a species) is meant to answer the question "how," but it is possible to mistakenly answer this question about something in ways that pick out features that properly belong to another category.<sup>498</sup> For example, in response to a question about "how" something exists, we might say "six feet tall," but this would actually be a way of quantifying it.

After dealing with this and similar confusions, Avicenna defines quality as an answer to "how" in a more restricted sense, saying "Let us determine now that quality is any trait [*hay'a*] fixed

<sup>497</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 182.

<sup>498</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.1, 167.

[*qārra*] in its subject which does not necessitate or demand [the subject's] being measured [*taqdīrihi*].”<sup>499</sup> One part of this definition tells us what a quality *is*, the other part tells us what it is *not*. On the affirmative side, *hay'a* is a very general term for accidental form, so by saying that a quality is a “fixed” *hay'a*, this means that quality is any accidental form that is inhering in a substance. That is, a quality tells us something about how a substance is constituted, not just some circumstance or relation that it is in. So hardness is a quality, but being a brother is not. By way of negation, Avicenna distinguishes qualities from anything that involves measurement; in essence, this distinguishes a quality from a quantity. So, again, hardness is a quality, but being six feet tall is not. This is just to prevent the erroneous answer to the question “how” mentioned earlier. So emotions, like all qualities, are accidental forms, really present in their subjects, for some amount of time. To be more specific than that, we need to turn to the explanation of the particular species of quality under which emotions fall.

Of the four species of quality, emotions fall under the first, which encompasses those qualities that exist “because of the soul,” and these are divided into habits [*malakāt*] and conditions [*aḥwāl*].<sup>500</sup> Emotions fall under the latter heading (*aḥwāl*), while the term *malakāt*, being a translation of the Greek *hexis*, includes states like virtues and vices. This highlights the link, for both Aristotle and Avicenna, between some of what is discussed here and what is discussed in their ethical/psychological texts. Avicenna argues that there is not actually a generic name for these two types of the first species of quality, since they are only distinguished in an accidental way—with respect to their stability—as we will see.

The second species of quality circumscribes psychological faculties, including psychological capacities (e.g., imagination) and lacks of capacities.<sup>501</sup> The first species of quality, he says, is dependent on this second species.<sup>502</sup> For example, you have to have the irascible appetite (second species of quality) in order to have an instance of anger (first species of quality).

<sup>499</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.1, 171.

<sup>500</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 181.

<sup>501</sup> Any variations on the term “faculty [*quwwa*],” such as “sub-faculty” and “capacity” are not reflected in the Arabic of Avicenna's text. Where he wants to talk about more specific functions, beyond the major faculties of imagination, appetite, and so on, he still uses *quwwa*.

<sup>502</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 185.

The third species of quality encompasses passive qualities and passions [*al-kayfiyyāt al-infi' āliyya wal-infi' ālāt*], which are qualities like colors and textures. The terminology for the third species might seem surprising, since Avicenna elsewhere refers to emotions as *infi' ālāt*, and now this is the term being used for a distinct species of quality that does *not* include emotion. But, as Avicenna points out later in this chapter of the *Categories*, *infi' ālāt* is used equivocally sometimes between emotions and non-emotional passions, and this is not problematic, as long as we know what we are talking about.<sup>503</sup> In this case, Avicenna wants to make the point that this third species of quality includes passions that do not exist on account of the soul, yet which have a relation to one another similar to that which has been described to exist between the states and conditions, in the first species of quality.<sup>504</sup> For example, picking up on one of Avicenna's examples, the liver can briefly take on something like a yellow hue, or, if the passion solidifies, take on the stable affective quality yellow (which, incidentally, would not bode well for its owner). This is similar to the distinction in terms of stability we will see between psychological states and conditions, but this third category is for non-psychological fixed and transitory states.

The fourth species of quality is “figure [*shakl*].” Avicenna reserves discussion of figure for a separate book of the *Categories*, book 6, since he views it as less intertwined with the prior three.

Emotions being placed in the first species of quality shows us that emotions are transitory, as opposed to states, though both are caused by psychological faculties. Habits, Avicenna writes, are those qualities that exist on account of the soul which are “fixed in nature in such a way as that they will not cease, or at least that their ceasing is difficult, and in general not easy,” whereas conditions are the sort of quality that exists on account of the soul and which is “not fixed, but which is liable to cease, which easily goes away [...]”<sup>505</sup> Avicenna's examples for habits and dispositions are as follows:<sup>506</sup>

<sup>503</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.6, 200.

<sup>504</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.5, 191-192.

<sup>505</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 181.

<sup>506</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 182.



Examples of Habits	Examples of Conditions
Virtues and vices	Emotions
Firm grasp of a scientific truth	Unfixed belief
Healthy or sick body	Passing sickness

Avicenna describes the stable states on the left as corresponding to the transitory conditions on the right. A sickness is the sort of thing that, if it sticks around long enough, leads to an overall unhealthy body. An unfixed belief is something that, if it is verified and dwelt on long enough, becomes firmly grasped. Since we know that both states and conditions depend on psychological faculties, it is clear that that Avicenna is providing examples that depend on motive faculties (concupiscible appetite, etc), cognitive faculties and vegetative faculties, respectively.

Having the same sort of emotions over and over can eventually lead to the cultivation of a virtue (which, in turn, makes it easier to have the corresponding emotion)<sup>507</sup>. Avicenna makes the general point as follows:

Everything that is an acquired habit [*malaka muktasaba*] was previously a condition. That is, that trait [*al-hay'a*] was previously a state, and then it solidified. [On the other hand] it is not the case that every condition was previously state, eventually becoming undone into a condition.<sup>508</sup>

An emotion is not the same thing as a virtue, nor is a belief the same thing as a scientific habit of mind, nor a sickness the same as an unhealthy body. Rather, states and conditions are causally related to one another. The mechanism by which this change occurs is left vague: a condition becomes a state if the condition is “repeatedly exercised [*tamarrana 'alayhi*]”;<sup>509</sup> the state of being an angry person is acquired “through the doing [*isti'māl*] of many acts [*af'āl*] of anger”.<sup>510</sup>

How exactly instances of sadness lead to a person becoming depressed is a specific question

<sup>507</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 182: “And we mean by virtues [*al-faḍā'il*] not the determinate actions, but rather the psychological traits [*al-hay'āt al-naḥsāniyyah*] from which come the determinate actions in an easy manner, as if by nature, without the need for deliberation [*ru'yah*] or renewed choice [*ikhtiyār musta'nif*]. And they are such that if the contrary of those actions were desired, it would be burdensome for the ones trying to do that, and it was be difficult for them, and they would need to exert effort. And this [sort of thing] is like the character trait [*khulq*] of justice, or modesty. And the vices [*al-radhā'il*] also, which are the contraries [of the virtues] are states. So licentiousness is a character trait that makes acting modesty with respect to self-control difficult, for one is pained by carrying it [modest acts] out, while carrying out the acts of profligacy are easy for such a one. For in itself a character trait easily yielding to one action has difficulty with another. And these are states.”

<sup>508</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 182.

<sup>509</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 181.

<sup>510</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.6, 200.

about which Avicenna has little to say, even in his physiological works. But we know that one way of developing virtues and vices is by allowing yourself to experience certain emotions over and over again.

The only distinction between a state and a condition—at least from the point of view of the *Categories*—is their fixedness. When he first distinguishes the two varieties of the first species of quality, Avicenna emphasizes that the distinction between them is only accidental:

The distinction [*iftirāq*] between condition and state is not a difference of two species under a genus, for the division [*al-infiṣāl*] between them is merely through the state of the relationship to change and the time of change, and this is an accidental difference [*infiṣāl bi-‘arād*], not through a division internal to the nature of the thing.<sup>511</sup>

Following this quote, to show how something can change in terms of accidental features while still remaining “one thing,” Avicenna gives the example of a boy becoming a man. As the boy grows to become a man, certain accidental features change, but he is fundamentally the same. Now, it is unclear how far to take this analogy. We may agree that the emotion of bravery, repeated often enough, leads to the virtue of courage, but it hardly seems that the only thing distinguishing a disposition towards an emotion (virtue) from the emotion itself, is the fixedness. The courageous person is not just someone who is courageous all the time. What Avicenna must mean, then, is that, from the point of view of the *Categories*, the only metaphysical difference between emotions and virtues is their fixedness. They are both qualities that inhere in subjects, on account of psychological faculties, distinguished with respect to their fixedness. Surely other differences exist, but none that are relevant to the project of categorizing substances and accidents.

Looking at the *Categories*, then, helps us distinguish three psychological phenomena related to emotional experience: 1) emotions themselves, which are transitory conditions, 2) psychological faculties, which cause emotions, and 3) fixed states, such as virtues, which can be acquired through (among other things) repetition of similar emotions.

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<sup>511</sup> Avicenna, *Healing: Categories* (1959), 5.3, 181.

### Appendix 3

#### List of emotions mentioned in Avicenna's writings<sup>512</sup>

Arabic	English	Healing: Psychology					Healing: Rhetoric	Canon	Cardiac Drugs	Healing: Categories	Treatise on Love	Remarks and Admonitions	Healing: Metaphysics	Healing: Categories
		1.3	1.5	4.3	4.4	5.1								
غضب	Anger			x	x (irasc)		3.1	I.6.4, II.3.1.18	Section 3					
حرض	Anger									5.3			5.3	
استحياء /حياء	Embarrassment		x				3.2							
نهم	Avarice				x (conc)									
فتور الغضب	Calmness						3.1							
سلامة	Calmness				x									
الشجاعة	courage						3.2							
بكاء	crying		x			x								
غم	anxiety	x		x	x (irasc)			II.3.1.18	Section 3	5.3			5.3	
عداوة	enmity						3.2							
حسد	envy						3.4							
خوف	fear			x	x (irasc)	x	3.2	I.6.4, II.3.1.18	Section 3					
صداقة	friendliness						3.2							
حلم	gentleness				x									
سرور	glee/happiness	x			x (perc)			II.3.1.18						
حرص	greed				x (conc)									
ضجر	grief					x								
بغض	hatred						3.2							
أمن	hope			x										
جزع	indignation						3.4							
فرح	joy	x			x (irasc)		3.4		Section 3					
منة	kindness						3.3							
ضحك	laughter		x			x								
عشق	love									Throughout		8.7		
شيق	lust				x (conc)									
يأس	misery			x										
منة opp	Non-kindness						3.3							
هم	pity				x		3.4			5.3			5.3	
لذة	Pleasure (often contrasted with pain)						Throughout	II.3.1.18	Section 4		Throughout book 8	8.7		
حقد	rancor				x									
حزن	sadness			x	x (irasc)									
خجل	shame		x			x	3.3			5.3			5.3	
وقاحة	shamelessness						3,3							
استيناس	sociability				x (perc)									
نقمة	vengeance						3.4							
رجاء	wishing			x		x								
تعجب	wonder					x								
حمية	zeal/emulation						3.4							
غيرة	zeal						3.4							

<sup>512</sup> This inventory is not exhaustive, but it covers all the significant discussions/mentions of emotions in Avicenna's writings.

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