Montaigne and Hobbes: Two Political Philosophies of Mere Life

Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore the ethical-political vision of “mere life” in Montaigne and Hobbes. I mean by “mere life” the enjoyment of natural pleasures inherent in human and animal life. Both Montaigne and Hobbes argue that the way of mere life is based on knowledge and desirable, and they propose political arrangements that accommodate it. My reading of Montaigne and Hobbes means to show that there is a positive and moderate conception of human good as mere life underlying modern political philosophy and modern life. Throughout our discussion, we see that Montaigne and Hobbes wrestle with Aristotelianism. The attraction of mere life finds a clear early expression in Aristotle’s almost poetic description of “life in itself” as “containing some sort of inherent joy and natural sweetness.” However, the disenfranchisement of mere life as a possible candidate for a worthy and coherent understanding of human life is also already in Aristotle. It is indeed against Aristotelian political philosophy of the good life Montaigne and Hobbes articulate their political philosophies of mere life as a more humane alternative. In the first three chapters, I will discuss (1) Montaigne’s critique of scholastic natural law and his new conception of natural law inspired by American indigenous people, (2) his skeptic solution to the theological-political problem and his ethic of mere life, (3) his anti-Aristotelian conception of human individual and the political arrangements for such individuals. In Chapters (4) and (5), I discuss Hobbes’ anti-Aristotelian accounts of human action and human happiness. In chapter (6), I discuss how Hobbes facilitates enjoyment of mere life in political society with the use of fear and the laws of nature as mores and compare Montaigne’s and Hobbes’ political arrangements; moreover, I also reflect on the tension between individual enjoyment of mere life and the inherent need of social cohesion in political society.