Disclosure, transparency, and accountability: a qualitative survey of public sector pharmaceutical committee conflict of interest policies in the World Health Organization South-East Asia Region

Abstract

Abstract Background Weak governance over public sector pharmaceutical policy and practice limits access to essential medicines, inflates pharmaceutical prices, and wastes scarce health system resources. Pharmaceutical systems are technically complex and involve extensive interactions between the private and public sectors. For members of public sector pharmaceutical committees, relationships with the private sector can result in conflicts of interest, which may introduce commercial biases into decision-making, potentially compromising public health objectives and health system sustainability. We conducted a descriptive, qualitative study of conflict of interest policies and practices in the public pharmaceutical sector in ten countries in the World Health Organization (WHO) South-East Asia Region (SEAR) (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Timor-Leste) between September 2020 and March 2021.

Results We identified 45 policy and regulatory documents and triangulated documentary data with 21 expert interviews. Key informants articulated very different governance priorities and conflict of interest concerns depending on the features of their country’s pharmaceutical industry, market size, and national economic objectives related to the domestic pharmaceutical industry. Public sector pharmaceutical policies and regulations consistently contained provisions for pharmaceutical committee members to disclose relevant interests, but contained little detail about what should be declared, when, and how often, nor whether disclosures are evaluated and by whom. Processes for preventing or managing conflicts of interest were less well developed than those for disclosure except for a few key procurement processes. Where processes for managing conflicts of interest were specified, the dominant strategy was to recuse committee members with a conflict of interest from relevant work. Policies rarely specified that committee members should divest or otherwise be free from conflicts of interest.

Conclusions Robust processes for conflict of interest prevention and management could ensure the integrity of decision-making and build public trust in pharmaceutical processes to achieve public health objectives. Upstream approaches including supportive legislative frameworks, the creation of oversight bodies, and strengthening regulatory institutions can also contribute to building cultures of transparency, accountability, and trust.