Finding Oneself in the World

Abstract

Thinking about oneself as the subject of a perspective on the world leaves unanswered fundamental questions about one’s identity as an object in the world: about which thing one is, what kind of thing one is, and about whether one exists as an object at all. I put forward a new way of thinking about these questions by outlining the subject-as-object problem, a problem for any attempt to adopt a third-person perspective on oneself qua subject. I argue that the source of the problem lies in the relationship between a basic precondition for inquiry – that something be present – and a framework that enables us to conceive of ourselves as inquirers in an objective world – the framework of objectivity. Once the problem is recognized, we can explain why it is possible to raise questions about one’s identity in response to any account of oneself and one’s relation to the world. Furthermore, having the problem in view enables us to more deeply engage with a range of philosophical issues that concern, in one way or another, the relationship between the subject’s perspective and the objective circumstances under which this perspective discloses a part of the world.